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Abstract
Given the large variety of existing logical formalisms it is of utmost import-
ance to select the most adequate one for a specific purpose, e.g. for representing
the knowledge relevant for a particular application or for using the formalism
as a modeling tool for problem solving. Awareness of the nature of a logical
formalism, in other words, of its fundamental intrinsic properties, is indispens-
able and provides the basis of an informed choice.
One such intrinsic property of logic-based knowledge representation lan-
guages is the context-dependency of pieces of knowledge. In classical propos-
itional logic, for example, there is no such context-dependence: whenever two
sets of formulas are equivalent in the sense of having the same models (ordinary
equivalence), then they are mutually replaceable in arbitrary contexts (strong
equivalence). However, a large number of commonly used formalisms are not
like classical logic which leads to a series of interesting developments. It turned
out that sometimes, to characterize strong equivalence in formalismL , we can
use ordinary equivalence in formalismL ′: for example, strong equivalence in
normal logic programs under stable models can be characterized by the stand-
ard semantics of the logic of here-and-there. Such results about the existence of
characterizing logics has rightly been recognized as important for the study of
concrete knowledge representation formalisms and raise a fundamental ques-
tion: Does every formalism have one? In this thesis, we answer this question
with a qualified “yes”. More precisely, we show that the important case of
considering only finite knowledge bases guarantees the existence of a canon-
ical characterizing formalism. Furthermore, we argue that those characterizing
formalisms can be seen as classical, monotonic logics which are uniquely de-
termined (up to isomorphism) regarding their model theory.
The other main part of this thesis is devoted to argumentation semantics
which play the flagship role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory. Almost
all of them are motivated by an easily understandable intuition of what should
be acceptable in the light of conflicts. However, although these intuitions equip
us with short and comprehensible formal definitions it turned out that their
intrinsic properties such as existence and uniqueness, expressibility, replace-
ability and verifiability are not that easily accessible. We review the mentioned
properties for almost all semantics available in the literature. In doing so we
include two main axes: namely first, the distinction between extension-based
and labelling-based versions and secondly, the distinction of different kind of
argumentation frameworks such as finite or unrestricted ones.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Given the large variety of existing logical formalisms it is of utmost importance to select the most ad-
equate one for a specific purpose, e.g. for representing the knowledge relevant for a particular application
or for using the formalism as a modeling tool for problem solving. Awareness of the nature of a logical
formalism or, in other words, of its fundamental intrinsic properties, is indispensable and provides the
basis of an informed choice. Apart from a deeper understanding of the considered formalism, the study
of such intrinsic properties can help to identify interesting fragments or to develop useful extensions of a
formalism. Moreover, the obtained insights can be used to refine existing algorithms or even give rise to
new ones.
Presumably, the best-known intrinsic property of logics is monotonicity. Monotonic logics like pro-
positional logic or first order logic are perfectly suitable for the formalization of universal truths since in
these logics, whenever a formula φ is a logical consequence of a theory T , it remains true forever and
without any exception even if we add further information to T . In contrast, formalisms which do not
satisfy monotonicity, commonly referred to as nonmonotonic logics, allow for defeasible reasoning, i.e.
it is possible to withdraw former conclusions (cf. [Brewka, 1992; Gabbay et al., 1994] for excellent over-
views). Both kinds of logics have their traditional application domains and apart from this fundamental
choice there are many other criteria of comparison influencing the decision which logic or which specific
semantics of a logic to use in a certain context.
One of the first intrinsic properties which comes to mind is computational complexity, i.e. how ex-
pensive it is to solve typical decision problems in the candidate formalism. A related issue is modularity
which is, among other things, concerned with the question of whether it is possible to divide a given theory
in subtheories, s.t. the formal semantics of the entire theory can be obtained by constructing the semantics
of the subtheories. Both topics were studied in-depth for mainstream nonmonotonic formalisms such as
default logic [Gottlob, 1992; Turner, 1996], logic programming under certain semantics [Dantsin et al.,
1997; Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] as well as abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) under various
argumentation semantics [Dvorˇák and Dunne, 2018; Baroni et al., 2018b].
In this habilitation treatise we elaborate a theory of four further intrinsic properties of abstract ar-
gumentation semantics. In brief, Dung-style AFs consist of arguments and attacks which are treated as
primitives, i.e., the internal structure of arguments is not considered. The major focus is on resolving
conflicts. To this end a variety of semantics have been defined, each of them specifying acceptable sets of
arguments, so-called extensions, in a particular way. Another main approach to argumentation semantics
are so-called labelling-based semantics which contain more information then their extension-based coun-
terparts. A labelling explicitly classifies each argument either as accepted, rejected or undecided.
1
1. existence and uniqueness Is it possible, and if so how, to guarantee the existence of at least one
or exactly one extension/labelling by considering the structure of a given AF F only? (Chapter 3)
2. expressibility Is it possible, and if so how, to realize a given candidate set of extensions/labellings
within a single AF F? (Chapter 4)
3. replaceability Is it possible, and if so how, to simplify parts of a given AF F s.t. the modified
version F′ and F cannot be distinguished semantically by further information that might be added
later to both simultaneously? (Chapter 5)
4. verifiability Is it possible, and if so how, to compute the semantics of an AF F unambiguously,
given that we are faced with strictly less information than the entire framework F? (Chapter 6)
The question whether a certain formalism always provides one with a formal meaning or even with
a uniquely determined semantical answer is a crucial factor for its suitability for the application in mind.
For instance, in problem solving a plurality of solutions may possibly be desired, whereas in decision
making one might be interested in guaranteeing a single answer. It is well-known that a given theory
in propositional logic neither has to possess a model nor, in case of existence, has there to be exactly
one. The same applies to logic programs under stable model semantics. In contrast, a propositional the-
ory of only positive formulae is always satisfiable and definite logic programs constitute a subclass of
logic programs where even uniqueness of a model is guaranteed. In Chapter 3 we will see that Dung’s
abstract argumentation semantics behave in a similar way, i.e. the existence and uniqueness of exten-
sions/labellings depend on structural restrictions of argumentation frameworks.
Expressibility is concerned with the expressive power of logical formalisms. The question here is
which kinds of models are realizable, that is, can be the set of models of a single knowledge base of the
formalism. This is a decisive property from an application angle since potential necessary or sufficient
properties of model sets may rule out a logic or make it perfectly appropriate for representing certain
solutions. For instance, it is well-known that in case of propositional logic every finite set of two-valued
interpretations is realizable. This means, given such a finite set I , we always find a set of formulae T ,
s.t. Mod(T ) =I . In case of normal logic programs it is obvious that not all model sets can be expressed,
since any set of stable models forms a ⊆-antichain. Remarkably, being such an antichain is not only
necessary but even sufficient for realizability w.r.t. stable model semantics [Eiter et al., 2013; Strass,
2015]. In case of abstract argumentation we are equipped with a high number of semantics, for which
we will see in Chapter 4 that characterizing properties are not that easy to find. Moreover, as expected,
representational limits highly depend on the chosen semantics.
In case of propositional logic – in contrast to all nonmonotonic logics available in the literature –
we have that standard equivalence, i.e. sharing the same models, even guarantees intersubstitutability in
any logical context without loss of information. As an aside, it is not the monotonicity of a certain lo-
gic but rather the so-called intersection property which guarantees this behavior [Baumann and Strass,
2016]. Substitutability is of great importance for dynamically evolving scenarios since it allows one to
simplify parts of a theory without looking at the rest. For this reason, much effort has been devoted
to characterizing strong equivalence for nonmonotonic formalisms, such as logic programs [Lifschitz
et al., 2001], causal theories [Turner, 2004], default logic [Turner, 2001a] and nonmonotonic logics in
general [Truszczyn´ski, 2006; Baumann and Strass, 2016]. In Chapter 5 we will see that characteriza-
tion theorems in case of abstract argumentation are quite different from those for the aforementioned
formalisms in that being strongly equivalent can be decided by looking at the syntax only.
Verifiability is a topic that is very specific for abstract argumentation. Over the last two decades a
bunch of argumentation semantics were introduced [Baroni et al., 2018a]. The motivations of these se-
mantics range from the desired treatment of specific examples to fulfilling a number of abstract principles.
Mathematically speaking, a semantics takes as input an AF and returns acceptable sets of arguments.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Verifiability deals with the question whether we really need the entire AF to compute a certain argument-
ation semantics σ? In other words, is it possible to unambiguously determine acceptable sets w.r.t. σ ,
given only partial information of the underlying framework F. In Chapter 6 we will see that most of the
existing semantics can be computed with indeed less information than the entire framework. We will
categorize the amount of information required by taking the conflict-free sets as a basis and distinguish-
ing between different amounts of knowledge about the neighborhood of these sets, so-called verification
classes. These classes allow us to categorize semantics with respect to the information needed to verify
whether a certain set of arguments is acceptable. The study of this topic as well as the properties men-
tioned before pave the way for a more general view on argumentation semantics, their common features,
and their inherent differences.
Let us return to knowledge representation formalisms in general. Two knowledge bases are strongly
equivalent if and only if they are mutually interchangeable in arbitrary contexts. This notion is of high
interest for any logical formalism since it allows one to locally replace, and thus potentially give rise to
simplification, parts of a given theory without changing the semantics of the latter. As already said, since it
is possible to find ordinarily but not strongly equivalent objects for any nonmonotonic formalism available
in the literature a lot of research has been devoted to characterizing strong equivalence. For example, it
turned out that strong equivalence for logic programs under stable models can be characterized by so-
called HT-models [Lifschitz et al., 2001]. More precisely, two logic programs are strongly equivalent
if and only if they are standard equivalent in the logic of here-and-there. This means the logic of here-
and-there can be seen as a characterizing formalism for logic programs under stable model semantics.
In Chapter 2 we will study whether the existence of such characterization logics can be guaranteed for
every logic. One main result is that every knowledge representation formalism that allows for a notion
of strong equivalence on its finite knowledge bases also possesses a canonical characterizing formalism.
In particular, we argue that those characterizing formalisms can be seen as classical, monotonic logics
which are uniquely determined (up to isomorphism) regarding their model theory.
1.1 Publications
Most of the results presented in this habilitation thesis have already been published as conference pa-
pers or journal articles, as a chapter of a handbook as well as in a book in honour of Gerhard Brewka.
Moreover, an extended version of [Baumann and Strass, 2016] is currently under review in the Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR). In the following we list the involved publications together with
the chapters or sections where they are mainly used.
• conference papers
1. [Baumann, 2014a] (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3)
Context-free and context-sensitive kernels: Update and deletion equivalence in abstract ar-
gumentation
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)
2. [Baumann et al., 2014a] (Section 4.3)
Compact argumentation frameworks
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)
3. [Baumann and Brewka, 2015a] (Section 2.3.1)
AGM meets abstract argumentation: Expansion and revision for Dung frameworks
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)
4. [Baumann, 2016] (Section 5.4)
Characterizing equivalence notions for labelling-based semantics
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR)
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1.1. Publications
5. [Baumann and Strass, 2016] (Chapters 2)
An abstract logical approach to characterizing strong equivalence in logic-based knowledge
representation formalisms
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR)
6. [Baumann et al., 2016b] (Chapter 6)
Verifiability of argumentation semantics
Computational Models of Argument (COMMA)
7. [Baumann and Spanring, 2017] (Sections 3.3, 4.5 and 5.3)
A study of unrestricted abstract argumentation frameworks
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)
• journal articles
8. [Baumann et al., 2016a] (Sections 4.3 and 4.4)
On rejected arguments and implicit conflicts: The hidden power of argumentation semantics
Journal of Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)
• book contribution
9. [Baumann, 2018] (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6)
On the nature of argumentation semantics: Existence and uniqueness, expressibility, and
replaceability
Handbook of Formal Argumentation
10. [Baumann and Spanring, 2015] (Chapters 3)
Infinite argumentation frameworks - On the existence and uniqueness of extensions
Advances in Knowledge Representation, Logic Programming, and Abstract Argumentation –
Essays Dedicated to Gerhard Brewka on the Occassion of His 60th Birthday
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Chapter 2
On the Existence of Characterization
Logics for Knowledge Representation
Formalisms
Reusability of human-made artifacts is of paramount importance in computer science. To assess the re-
usability of (parts of) knowledge bases in logic-based knowledge representation languages, we have to
know whether pieces of knowledge make certain context-dependent assumptions. In classical propos-
itional logic, for example, there is no such context-dependence: whenever two (sets of) formulas are
equivalent in the sense of having the same models, then they are mutually replaceable in arbitrary con-
texts.
In the field of knowledge representation and reasoning, however, not all commonly used formal-
isms are like classical logic in this regard. For example, the answer-set-programming paradigm uses the
formalism of normal logic programs to encode combinatorial problems such that the answer sets (stable
models) of the logic programs correspond to and encode solutions to the encoded problem [Gebser et al.,
2012]. Alas, for normal logic programs, having the same stable models does not amount to mutual re-
placeability. For this, a stronger property is needed: it is called strong equivalence, and holds for two logic
programs if and only if they keep the same stable models even if they are both extended with an arbitrary
third logic program. Formally – as a logic program is a set of rules –, extending a logic program can be
modeled by ordinary set union. Consequently, the notion of strong equivalence can be defined in a similar
way for other knowledge representation formalisms for which set union is an adequate formalization of
appending or otherwise combining knowledge bases.
In a series of interesting developments, researchers have succeeded in precisely characterizing strong
equivalence for several formalisms, among them normal logic programs under the stable model se-
mantics [Lifschitz et al., 2001; Turner, 2001a]. What is more, it turned out that sometimes, to characterize
strong equivalence in formalism F, we can use ordinary equivalence in formalism F′: for example, strong
equivalence in normal logic programs under stable models can be characterized by the standard semantics
of the logic of here-and-there [Lifschitz et al., 2001]. Such results have rightly been recognized as im-
portant for the study of these concrete knowledge representation formalisms, as having a characterization
of strong equivalence gives us a deeper level of understanding of the meaning of pieces of knowledge in
that formalism.
However, such results about the existence of characterizing formalisms also raise a fundamental ques-
tion: Does every formalism have one? In the following we will see that the answer to this question is
a qualified “yes”. More precisely, while not every formalism has one, we show that the important case
5
2.1. An Abstract View on Model Theory
of considering only finite knowledge bases (but still possibly infinite languages) guarantees the exist-
ence of a characterizing formalism, and that in a very general setting. Existing results on characterizing
formalisms make use of specifics of each formalism [Lifschitz et al., 2001; Turner, 2001a; Truszczyn´ski,
2007; Truszczyn´ski and Woltran, 2008; Cabalar and Diéguez, 2014]. The presented approach completely
abstract away from formalism specifics and addresses the core of the problem, the nature of strong equi-
valence itself. In fact, we will not only show the existence of just any characterizing formalism, but of
characterizing formalisms whose model theory is uniquely determined (up to isomorphism), and struc-
turally resembles that of classical logics. At this point, we appeal to the reader’s intuition on what makes
logics classical; we will later define what we mean by “classical logic” in a precise mathematical way.
From our point of view, the main is a surprising and important insight, as it tells us that for the over-
whelming majority of knowledge representation formalisms, strong equivalence can be approached using
established techniques from classical logic.
While our work is in its essence derived from first principles, building mostly upon classical logic
and lattice theory, there have been important inspirations. Foremost, [Truszczyn´ski, 2006] presented a
general, algebraic account of strong equivalence within approximation fixpoint theory [Denecker et al.,
2000]. His setting is indeed quite general, but most of this generality derives from algebraic common-
alities in the semantics of logic programs and default logic. It is not immediately clear, for example, if
and how it captures Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation [Dung, 1995], which will be discussed in
depth in the subsequent chapters. More precisely, while argumentation frameworks (AFs) with all their
semantics can be captured by approximation fixpoint theory [Strass, 2013], Truszczyn´ski’s notion of ex-
panding an operator does not coincide with the corresponding notion of expanding AFs and his results are
not directly applicable. In other words, while the operator associated to the union of two logic programs
corresponds to the union of their respective associated operators, the same does not hold for the (compon-
entwise) union of two AFs and their operators. Thus although AFs are essentially a restricted subclass of
normal logic programs with respect to the ordinary equivalence of having the same models, this does not
carry over to strong equivalence because the respective notions of knowledge base union are different in
AFs and normal logic programs. For example, the AF where b attacks a corresponds to the logic program
P1 = {a←∼b}; likewise, P2 = {a←∼c} corresponds to the AF where c attacks a [Osorio et al., 2005;
Wu et al., 2009; Strass, 2013]. However, the AF where both b and c attack a (the union of the two AFs
above) corresponds to the logic program P3 = {a←∼b,∼c}, where obviously the three programs are
not subset-related: P1 6⊆ P3 and P2 6⊆ P3.
In contrast, we show how the approach we develop in this paper can be directly applied to argumenta-
tion frameworks. Thus as a consequence of our main theorem, we get the first semantical characterization
of strong equivalence in AFs in contrast to the currently known syntactical characterizations [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011].
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the general setting in which
we derive our results and present our conception of the term “classical logic”. Afterwards, we define
characterization logics and show two classes of formalisms that always possess them. We next apply our
results, chiefly to abstract argumentation frameworks but briefly also to normal logic programs. Finally,
we conclude the chpater with a discussion of related and future work.
2.1 An Abstract View on Model Theory
What is a classical logic?
We will spend this section introducing an abstract notion of logics with model-theoretic semantics
and explaining when we call some of them classical. Formally, we consider logical languages L , that
is, non-empty sets of language elements. We make no assumption on the internal structure of pieces of
knowledge f ∈L . These pieces of knowledge could be formulas of classical propositional logic, normal
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logic program rules, attacks between arguments, or Reiter-style defaults. A model-theoretic semantics
for a languageL uses a set I of interpretations and a model function σ : 2L → 2I with the intuition that
σ assigns each language subset T ⊆L , a theory, the set σ(T ) of its models. We make no assumptions
on the internal structure of interpretations – there need not be an underlying vocabulary of atoms or the
like (although in the concrete cases we consider there often will be) that are the same among syntax
and semantics. This is the main abstraction in our setting. It goes beyond what is known from classical
logic in that meaning is not assigned to language elements (formulas), but only to theories, that is, sets
of language elements. This is a necessary requirement for being able to model a number of established
knowledge representation formalisms: for example, in normal logic programs, meaning is not assigned
to single rules, but only to sets thereof. Likewise, in default logic, meaning is not assigned to single
defaults, but only to sets thereof. We illustrate our definitions so far by showing more precisely how
existing formalisms can be embedded into our setting.
Example 2.1. Consider a set A of propositional atoms.
Classical propositional logic: The underlying language LPL is the set of all classical propositional for-
mulas over A and can be defined as usual by induction. The set of interpretations is then given by
the set IPL = {v :A →{t, f}} of all two-valued interpretations of A . Lastly, σmod(T ) is the set of
all models of the theory T ⊆LPL, that is, the set of all interpretations satisfying all formulas in T .
Normal logic programs: The underlying language LLP is the set of all normal logic program rules
a0← a1, . . . ,am,∼am+1, . . . ,∼an with 0≤ m≤ n and a0,a1, . . . ,an ∈A . The set ILP of interpreta-
tions is then the set ILP = 2A of all possible stable model candidates. Accordingly, σstb(T ) returns
the set of stable models of the theory (normal logic program) T ⊆LLP [Gelfond and Lifschitz,
1988]; we could also define σsup(T ) returning the set of supported models of T [Clark, 1978], or
σmod(T ) the set of classical models of T , interpreting← as material implication and ∼ as classical
negation [van Emden and Kowalski, 1976].
Propositional default logic [Reiter, 1980]: The underlying language LDL is the set of all defaults over
formulas over A , that is, LDL = {(ϕ ,Ψ,ξ ) | ϕ ,ξ ∈LPL,Ψ ⊆LPL} where the triple
(ϕ ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψn} ,ξ ) represents the default ϕ : ψ1, . . . ,ψn/ξ . The possible interpretations are given
by IDL = 2L , as each default theory is assigned a set of logical theories called extensions:
σDL(T ) = {E ⊆L | E is an extension of T}.
Abstract argumentation frameworks [Dung, 1995]: The language LAF contains the fundamental build-
ing blocks of AFs, i.e. arguments and attacks: LAF = {({a} , /0), ({a,b} ,{(a,b)}) | a,b ∈A } .
Extension-based semantics can be incorporated by setting IAF = 2A and, depending on the ar-
gumentation semantics ρ we use, we set σρ (T ) = ρ(FT ), where FT = (
⋃
(A,R)∈T A,
⋃
(A,R)∈T R)
represents the AF associated to T ⊆LAF (cf. Section 2.3.1 for more detailed information and dis-
cussion).
Before we delve into the main aim, namely characterizing strong equivalence, we briefly analyze
some foundational properties of our way of abstractly modeling knowledge representation languages.
We begin with the relationship between the model function and the consequence function of a logical
language.
2.1.1 Models and Consequences
A consequence function for a language L is a function Cn : 2L → 2L that assigns a given set T of
language elements another set Cn(T ) of language elements. Intuitively, Cn(T ) is understood to be the
set of logical consequences of the theory T . Given a language, we can define the consequence function in
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terms of the semantics. In words, the set of consequences of a given theory T is the union of all theories
S such that any model of T is a model of S.
Definition 2.2. LetL be a language and σ : 2L → 2I be a model function. The canonical consequence
function of σ is defined as follows:
Cnσ : 2L → 2L , T 7→
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T )⊆σ(S)
S
In classical definitions of logical consequence, one typically says that a single formula is a con-
sequence of a theory if all models of the theory are models of the formula. In our case, the focus is
primarily on theories both for presumptions and consequences, so we stick to the above definition. For
classical logicLPL, this definition coincides with the standard notion of logical consequence.
It will be of great interest that certain algebraic properties of the semantics induce certain useful
properties of the consequence relation. We now introduce the most important properties.
Definition 2.3. LetL be a language.
• A model function σ : 2L → 2I is antimonotone iff
for all T1,T2 ∈ 2L : T1 ⊆ T2 =⇒ σ(T2) ⊆ σ(T1).
• A consequence operator Cn : 2L → 2L is monotone iff
for all T1,T2 ∈ 2L : T1 ⊆ T2 =⇒ Cn(T1) ⊆ Cn(T2).
• A consequence operator Cn : 2L → 2L is increasing iff
for all T ∈ 2L , we find T ⊆ Cn(T ).
• A consequence operator Cn : 2L → 2L is idempotent iff
for all T ∈ 2L , we find Cn(Cn(T ))⊆ Cn(T ).
• A consequence operator Cn : 2L → 2L is a closure operator iff
Cn is monotone, increasing, and idempotent.
In what follows, we define a logic as a tuple (L , I,σ) consisting of a languageL , an interpretation set
I, and a model function σ : 2L → 2I . We will sometimes associate the canonical consequence function
of σ to the whole logic for convenience.
To start out in analyzing how semantics and consequence relate in our setting, we show some straight-
forward properties of the canonical consequence function defined above. More precisely, any induced
consequence operator is increasing and moreover, it is antimonotone if the considered model function is
antimonotone.
Proposition 2.4. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic and Cnσ its canonical consequence function.
1. Cnσ is increasing.
2. If σ is antimonotone, then Cnσ is monotone.
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Proof.
1. Clearly for any T ⊆L we find σ(T ) ⊆ σ(T ) whence T ⊆
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T )⊆σ(S)
S = Cnσ (T ).
2. Let σ be antimonotone and T1 ⊆ T2. Then clearly σ(T2) ⊆ σ(T1) by antimonotonicity. Thus for
any S⊆L with σ(T1) ⊆ σ(S) we also find σ(T2) ⊆ σ(S). It follows that⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T1)⊆σ(S)
S⊆
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T2)⊆σ(S)
S,
that is, Cnσ (T1) ⊆ Cnσ (T2). Since T1 and T2 were arbitrary, Cnσ is monotone.
The reverse of Item 2 does not hold, that is, monotone consequence functions do not necessitate
antimonotone model functions.
Example 2.5. ConsiderL = {a} and I = {1} with σ( /0) = /0 and σ({a}) = {1}. We get the following
canonical consequence function:
Cnσ ( /0) =
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ( /0)⊆σ(S)
S =
⋃
S⊆L ,
/0⊆σ(S)
S =
⋃
S⊆L
S =L = {a}
Cnσ ({a}) =
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ({a})⊆σ(S)
S =
⋃
S⊆L ,
{1}⊆σ(S)
S = {a}
Thus Cnσ ( /0) = {a}= Cnσ ({a}) and Cnσ is monotone and increasing albeit σ is not antimonotone.
Also, not every antimonotone model function induces a closure operator, that is, an operator that is
monotone, increasing and idempotent.
Example 2.6. Consider the logic (L , I,σ) with language L = {a,b,c}, interpretation set I = {1} and
model function σ : 2L → 2I given by
σ(T ) =
{
{1} if T ∈ { /0,{a} ,{b}}
/0 otherwise
In addition to σ being antimonotone we have Cnσ ( /0) = {a,b} and Cnσ ({a,b}) = {a,b,c}, whence
{a,b,c}= Cnσ ({a,b}) = Cnσ (Cnσ ( /0)) 6⊆ Cnσ ( /0) = {a,b}
which shows that Cnσ is not idempotent.
We can show that our restriction to semantics via model functions is not overly limiting. We could
have chosen to start out from consequence functions as well, as long as these consequence functions are
increasing (what is contained in a theory follows from it) and idempotent (all consequences are obtained
in one step). More precisely, when given a consequence operator satisfying these two requirements, we
can also define a canonical model function whose associated canonical consequence function is exactly
the given consequence function we started with.
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Proposition 2.7. LetL be a language and C : 2L → 2L be a consequence function which is increasing
and idempotent.
Then the model function σC : 2L → 2L with T 7→L \C(T ) is such that CnσC =C.1
Proof. Let T ⊆L . We find that
CnσC (T ) =
⋃
S⊆L ,
σC(T )⊆σC(S)
S (Def. Cnσ )
=
⋃
S⊆L ,
L \C(T )⊆L \C(S)
S (Def. σC)
=
⋃
S⊆L ,
C(S)⊆C(T )
S (set algebra)
=
⋃
S⊆L ,
S⊆C(S)⊆C(T )
S (C is increasing)
Firstly, this shows that CnσC (T ) ⊆C(T ). Moreover, in the last equation we can substitute S =C(T ) to
obtain that C(T ) ⊆ CnσC (T ).
It is clear from Item 1 of Proposition 2.4 that no non-increasing consequence function C can be
mimicked by Cnσ for any σ . However, we consider the restrictions of possible consequence functions C
having to be increasing and idempotent not to be too severe.
2.1.2 Standard and strong equivalence
This paper is chiefly about characterizing strong equivalence in one logic via standard equivalence in
another logic. We will now formally introduce these concepts.
Definition 2.8. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic and T1,T2 ⊆L theories. We say that T1 and T2 are
• ordinarily equivalent if and only if σ(T1) = σ(T2);
• strongly equivalent if and only if ∀U ⊆L : σ(T1∪U) = σ(T2∪U).
The notion of strong equivalence is intimately connected with the possibility to simplify parts of a
given theory without affecting its semantics. Consider the following example.
Example 2.9. Given a logic (L , I,σ), a theory S and a subtheory T1 of it, i.e. T1 ⊆ S. Now, we may
replace T1 with any T2 being strongly equivalent to it without changing the semantics of S. More pre-
cisely, σ(S) = σ(S[T1|T2]) with S[T1|T2] = T2 ∪ (S \ T1). This can be seen as follows: Since T1 ⊆ S
we have T1 ∪ (S \ T1) = S. Moreover, due to the assumed strong equivalence of T1 and T2 we obtain
σ(T1∪ (S\T1)) = σ(T1∪ (S\T1)). Hence, σ(S) = σ(S[T1|T2]) as claimed.
Clearly, strongly equivalent theories are ordinarily equivalent by definition. What about the converse
direction? It is a matter of fact that in case of well-known nonmonotonic formalisms, such as logic pro-
grams [Lifschitz et al., 2001], default logic [Turner, 2001a], causal theories [Turner, 2004] and abstract
argumentation [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Baumann, 2016] strong equivalence and ordinary equival-
ence are indeed different concepts. However, there are logics like propositional logic or first order logic
1Please note that the assigned interpretation set I of σC is just the languageL .
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where both concepts coincide. In the following we will say that the model function σ has the replacement
property if ordinary equivalence implies strong equivalence. The following natural question arises: What
properties must a logic possess in order for ordinary and strong equivalence to coincide? Propositional as
well as first order logic possess a monotone consequence function. Does monotony of the consequence
operator ensure the coincidence of both concepts? The following example provides us with a negative
answer.
Example 2.10. Consider the language L = {a,b} with interpretation set I = {1,2} and model func-
tion σ given by
σ( /0) = {1,2}
σ({a}) = {1,2}
σ({b}) = {2}
σ({a,b}) = /0
It is easy to verify that the semantics σ is antimonotone. Therefore, by Proposition 2.4, its con-
sequence function Cnσ is monotone. However, while /0 and {a} are obviously ordinarily equivalent, they
are not strongly equivalent, which can be seen by extending both with the theory {b}:
σ( /0∪{b}) = σ({b}) = {2} 6= /0 = σ({a,b}) = σ({a}∪{b})
We also inspect the induced consequence operator:
Cnσ ( /0) =
⋃
{S⊆L | {1,2} ⊆ σ(S)}= {a}
Cnσ ({a}) =
⋃
{S⊆L | {1,2} ⊆ σ(S)}= {a}
Cnσ ({b}) =
⋃
{S⊆L | {2} ⊆ σ(S)}= {a,b}
Cnσ ({a,b}) =
⋃
{S⊆L | /0⊆ σ(S)}= {a,b}
Since the codomain of Cnσ consists entirely of fixpoints, Cnσ is idempotent. Therefore the induced
consequence operator Cnσ is increasing, monotone, and idempotent, thus a closure operator. Yet, the
inducing semantics does not have the replacement property.
So having a monotone consequence function is, by itself, insufficient to guarantee the replacement
property. We can however identify a property that is strong enough to guarantee replacement on its own.
We call it the intersection property, because it basically says that the semantics of a theory can be obtained
by only considering the semantics of the singleton sets constituting the theory.
Definition 2.11. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic. Its model function σ : 2L → 2I has the intersection property
iff for all T ⊆L :
σ(T ) =
⋂
F∈T
σ({F})
It follows from the definition that in particular for any two theories T1,T2 ⊆L , we have that
σ(T1∪T2) = σ(T1)∩σ(T2). The intersection property is a certain locality, independence, or composi-
tionality criterion. Towards an explanation of Example 2.10 we can now remark that its model function σ
does not have the intersection property:
σ({a,b}) = /0 6= {2}= {1,2}∩{2}= σ({a})∩σ({b})
Indeed, this is necessarily so: as we will show next (and as is easy to show), satisfying the intersection
property is sufficient for satisfying the replacement property.
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Proposition 2.12. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic. If σ satisfies the intersection property, then standard equi-
valence coincides with strong equivalence.
Proof. Let σ satisfy the intersection property. It is clear that strong equivalence implies ordinary equi-
valence (set U = /0), so it remains to show the converse. Let T1,T2 ⊆L such that σ(T1) = σ(T2) and
consider any U ⊆L . We have
σ(T1∪U) = σ(T1)∩σ(U) (intersection)
= σ(T2)∩σ(U) (presumption)
= σ(T2∪U) (intersection)
Notably, monotonicity properties were not even needed in the above result. So why is it that all
formalisms we know of that have the replacement property also happen to have monotone consequence
functions? It holds because σ having the intersection property implies that σ is antimonotone (which in
turn implies that Cnσ is monotone).
Proposition 2.13. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic. If σ has the intersection property, then σ is antimonotone.
Proof. Let T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆L . Then T1∪T2 = T2, and we conclude the desired subset-inclusion via
σ(T2) = σ(T1∪T2) = σ(T1)∩σ(T2) ⊆ σ(T1).
In the other direction, we can observe that the replacement property on its own does not guarantee
antimonotonicity.
Example 2.14. Consider the language L = {a} and interpretation set I = {1}. For semantics σ with
σ( /0) = /0 and σ({a}) = {1}, we can see that the replacement property holds trivially since there are
no semantically equivalent theories that are syntactically different. However, σ is not antimonotone (as
σ({a}) = {1} 6⊆ /0 = σ( /0)) and does not have the intersection property:
σ( /0∪{a}) = σ({a}) = {1} 6= /0 = /0∩{1}= σ( /0)∩σ({a})
It is easy to see that classical propositional logic LPL has the intersection property simply by defin-
ition: the standard model semantics is typically firstly defined for single formulas ϕ ∈LPL and then
generalized to theories T by setting σmod(T ) =
⋂
ϕ∈T σmod({ϕ}).
As it turns out, for all logics, the intersection property also guarantees that each theory T has the same
models as the set of all canonical consequences of T .
Proposition 2.15. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic that has the intersection property. Then for each T ⊆L we
find that σ(T ) = σ (Cnσ (T )).
Proof.
σ (Cnσ (T )) = σ
 ⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T )⊆σ(S)
S
 (Definition 2.2)
=
⋂
S⊆L ,
σ(T )⊆σ(S)
σ(S) (intersection property)
= σ(T )
In the last equality, the ⊇-direction is clear as we intersect only supersets of σ(T ), and the ⊆-direction is
clear as we can substitute T for S in the line above.
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Finally, this means that the intersection property only holds for semantics whose canonical con-
sequence functions are closure operators.
Proposition 2.16. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic that has the intersection property. Then Cnσ is a closure
operator.
Proof. We have to show that Cnσ is increasing, monotone and idempotent. First, Cnσ is increasing
in any case (Proposition 2.4). Moreover, since σ has the intersection property, it is also antimono-
tone (Proposition 2.13) and thus, Cnσ is monotone (Proposition 2.4). Finally, it follows from Propos-
ition 2.15 that Cnσ is also idempotent. More precisely, if ϕ ∈ Cnσ (Cnσ (T )) then there is an S⊆L with
ϕ ∈ S and σ(Cnσ (T ))⊆ σ(S), and by σ(T ) = σ(Cnσ (T )) it is clear that in this case σ(T ) ⊆ σ(S) and
ϕ ∈ S⊆ Cnσ (T ). Hence, Cnσ is a closure operator.
We have shown in Proposition 2.7 that we also could have started with a consequence function.
Clearly the replacement property could be easily defined for consequence functions C : 2L → 2L in the
sense that C has the replacement property if and only if for all theories T1,T2 ⊆L , “classical consequence-
equivalence” C(T1) =C(T2) coincides with “strong consequence-equivalence” ∀U ⊆L :
C(T1 ∪U) = C(T2 ∪U). It is also clear that any semantics having the replacement property induces a
canonical consequence function having the consequence-function version of the replacement property.
However, we must remark that we have not found a consequence-function equivalent of the intersection
property. Even setting C(T ) =
⋃
F∈T C({F}) would be too weak to capture interactions between differ-
ent subtheories of T . On the other hand, and on the positive side, we will see that the intersection property
for model functions as we defined it in Definition 2.11 will give us a good handle on characterizing strong
equivalence.
2.1.3 Galois correspondences
Up to here, we have considered various properties of logics in our abstract setting. Mostly, those were
algebraic properties of the model-theoretic semantics. In this subsection, we conclude our argument for
defining as “classical” those logics whose semantics satisfy the intersection property.
For this, it is firstly necessary to slightly extend (and, for the time being, also slightly constrain) our
abstract notion of “logic”. Up to now, we only assumed the existence of a model function σ : 2L → 2I
that assigns a set of interpretations to a theory (intuitively, its models). In the converse direction, we now
also assume a theory function τ : 2I → 2L , that takes as input a set K ⊆ I of interpretations and intuitively
returns the set τ(K) of all language elements that are true under all interpretations in K. A logic will now
be a tuple (L , I,σ ,τ) withL , I,σ as before and τ : 2I → 2L a theory function.
This immediately yields another way of defining a consequence operator: given σ and τ , we can
define Cnσ ,τ (T ) = τ(σ(T )). Symmetrically, we can define an operator on interpretation sets by
K 7→ σ(τ(K)).
We next consider a class of logics where the interplay of model function and theory function satisfies
certain conditions. Below, we denote the composition of functions f : A→ B and g : B→C by g◦ f , that
is, g◦ f : A→C with x 7→ g( f (x)).
Definition 2.17. Let (L , I,σ ,τ) be a logic. The functions σ and τ are in Galois correspondence if and
only if:
1. σ is antimonotone and τ is antimonotone;
2. σ ◦ τ is increasing and τ ◦σ is increasing.
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If σ and τ are in Galois correspondence, we also say that (L , I,σ ,τ) is a Galois logic.
The first two properties together imply that the resulting consequence function is monotone; by the
last property, it is also increasing. Galois correspondences have been studied in model theory [Goguen
and Burstall, 1984], and in an even more abstract way in lattice theory [Ore, 1944; Birkhoff, 1973; Cohn,
1981; Davey and Priestley, 2002].
Indeed, there is also another (equivalent) formulation [Davey and Priestley, 2002].
Proposition 2.18. Let (L , I,σ ,τ) be a logic. It holds that σ and τ are in Galois correspondence iff for
all T ⊆L and K ⊆ I:
K ⊆ σ(T ) ⇐⇒ T ⊆ τ(K)
Proof. if: Assume that for all T ⊆L and K ⊆ I we have, K ⊆ σ(T ) iff T ⊆ τ(K).
1. We start with showing that τ ◦σ is increasing.
Let T ⊆L . Obviously, σ(T ) ⊆ σ(T ). Hence, if substituting K = σ(T ) we obtain by pre-
sumption T ⊆ τ(σ(T )).
In the same spirit one may easily show that σ ◦ τ is increasing.
2. We show now that σ is antimonotone.
Let T1 ⊆ T2. Then T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ τ(σ(T2)) by the above. By presumption (with K = σ(T2)), it
follows that σ(T2) ⊆ σ(T1).
Analogously one may show that τ is antimonotone.
only if: Let T ⊆L and K ⊆ I. If K ⊆ σ(T ), then τ(σ(T ))⊆ τ(K), whence we conclude that
T ⊆ τ(σ(T ))⊆ τ(K). The reverse implication follows symmetrically.
It also follows that Galois correspondences induce closure operators, that is, operators that are mono-
tone, increasing, and idempotent.
Proposition 2.19. Let (L , I,σ ,τ) be a Galois logic. Then the operators
• σ ◦ τ : 2I → 2I , K 7→ σ(τ(K))
• τ ◦σ : 2L → 2L , T 7→ τ(σ(T ))
are closure operators.
Proof. We have to show that σ ◦ τ and τ ◦σ are (1) increasing, (2) monotone and (3) idempotent. We
only consider σ ◦ τ as the proof for τ ◦σ is absolutely symmetric.
1. The second item of Definition 2.17 states verbatim that σ ◦ τ is increasing.
2. It is easy to show that σ ◦ τ is monotone since both σ and τ are antimonotone: if K1 ⊆ K2, then
τ(K2) ⊆ τ(K1) whence σ(τ(K1)) ⊆ σ(τ(K2)), which means (σ ◦ τ)(K1) ⊆ (σ ◦ τ)(K2).
3. Consider K ⊆ I. We have to show that (σ ◦ τ)((σ ◦ τ)(K)) ⊆ (σ ◦ τ)(K), that is,
σ(τ(σ(τ(K)))) ⊆ σ(τ(K)).
Since τ ◦σ is increasing by definition, we have that τ(K) ⊆ τ(σ(τ(K))). Since σ is antimonotone,
σ(τ(σ(τ(K)))) ⊆ σ(τ(K)).
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Towards showing that having the intersection property and being in a Galois correspondence are one
and the same, we firstly derive a slightly modified characterization of the intersection property. Instead
of decomposing theories into its singletons, this version considers families of theories.
Proposition 2.20. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic. Its model function σ : 2L → 2I satisfies the intersection
property if and only if for all T ⊆ 2L :
σ
( ⋃
T∈T
T
)
=
⋂
T∈T
σ(T )
Proof. if: Let T ⊆L and define T = {{F} | F ∈ T}. Clearly T = ⋃F∈T {F}, whence
σ(T ) = σ
(⋃
F∈T
{F}
)
= σ
 ⋃
{F}∈T
{F}

=
⋂
{F}∈T
σ({F})
=
⋂
F∈T
σ({F})
only if: Let T ⊆ 2L and define T = ⋃U∈T U . Now we have that
σ
( ⋃
U∈T
U
)
= σ(T )
=
⋂
F∈T
σ({F})
=
⋂
F∈⋃U∈T U
σ({F})
=
⋂
U∈T
(⋂
F∈U
σ({F})
)
=
⋂
U∈T
σ(U)
In what follows, we will make implicit use of this result and consider the two formulations of the
intersection property to be interchangeable.
We now conclude this section with its main result. It states that for any logic (L , I,σ), the conditions
“σ has the intersection property” and “σ is in a Galois correspondence with some τ” are equivalent.
The proof can be adapted from the literature [Davey and Priestley, 2002, Propositions 7.31 and 7.33]
to our slightly different setting with acceptable effort.
Theorem 2.21. Let (L , I,σ) be a logic.
1. If there is a τ : 2I → 2L such that σ and τ are in Galois correspondence, then σ has the intersection
property.
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2. If σ has the intersection property, then we can define a theory function τ : 2I → 2L with
K 7→
⋃
T⊆L ,
K⊆σ(T )
T
such that σ and τ are in Galois correspondence.
Proof. 1. Assume the presumption. We have to show that for any T ⊆ 2L , we find that
σ
( ⋃
T∈T
T
)
=
⋂
T∈T
σ(T )
Let Z =
⋃
T∈T T . We first show that σ(Z) is a lower bound for the set σ(T ) = {σ(T ) | T ∈T }.
Clearly, for each T ∈T we have T ⊆ Z, whence by antimonotonicity of σ we get σ(Z) ⊆ σ(T ) for
each T ∈T . Now let Q⊆ I be any lower bound for σ(T ). Then Q⊆ σ(T ) for all T ∈T . By Pro-
position 2.18, we get T ⊆ τ(Q) for all T ∈T . By definition, this entails that⋃T∈T T = Z ⊆ τ(Q).
Now using Proposition 2.18 again yields Q⊆ σ(Z) whence σ(Z) is the greatest lower bound of
σ(T ).
2. Let σ have the intersection property. By Proposition 2.13, it follows that σ is antimonotone. For
antimonotonicity of τ , consider K1 ⊆ K2. Then
τ(K2) =
⋃
T⊆L ,
K2⊆σ(T )
T ⊆
⋃
T⊆L ,
K1⊆σ(T )
T = τ(K1)
Now for showing that σ ◦ τ and τ ◦σ are increasing.
Let K ⊆ I. We find
K ⊆
⋂
T⊆L ,
K⊆σ(T )
σ(T ) = σ
 ⋃
T⊆L ,
K⊆σ(T )
T
= σ(τ(K))
Now let T ⊆L . By using σ(T ) ⊆ σ(T ) it is easy to verify that
T ⊆
⋃
S⊆L ,
σ(T )⊆σ(S)
S = τ(σ(T ))
This is the main motivation for our definition saying that classical logics are exactly those that have
the intersection property, or, equivalently, that have model and theory functions that are in Galois cor-
respondence. Furthermore, as partly mentioned before, many well-studied logics (that we would call
classical due to their ubiquity alone) have the intersection property simply by definition, as their funda-
mental building blocks are formulas instead of theories.
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2.2 Characterization Logics
From now on we omit I from the presentation of logics and thus write (L ,σ), since concrete interpret-
ations are immaterial for strong equivalence. Furthermore, we will distinguish between two important
cases regarding the domain of σ . The first one is dom(σ) = 2L (called full logics) and the second one
is dom(σ) =
(
2L
)
fin
= {T ∈ 2L | T is finite} (finite-theory logics), the restriction of L to finite know-
ledge bases.
Definition 2.22. Let (L ,σ) be a logic. The binary relation strong equivalence≡σs ⊆ dom(σ)×dom(σ)
is defined by T1 ≡σs T2 ⇐⇒ ∀U ∈ dom(σ) : σ(T1∪U) = σ(T2∪U).
It is straightforward to show that ≡σs is an equivalence relation; we denote the equivalence class of a
theory T ∈ dom(σ) ⊆ 2L by [T ]σs . We recall and will pervasively use that for all theories T1,T2 ⊆L ,
we have T1 ∈ [T2]σs if and only if [T1]σs = [T2]σs .
Given an arbitrary logic (L ,σ), we want to find a characterizing classical logic, that is, a semantics σ ′
that has the intersection property and whose ordinary equivalence coincides with strong σ -equivalence.
Such logics get a name.
Definition 2.23. Let (L ,σ) be a (full) logic. The logic (L ,σ ′) is a (full) characterization logic for
(L ,σ) if and only if:
∀T1,T2 ⊆L : σ ′(T1) = σ ′(T2) ⇐⇒ [T1]σs = [T2]σs (characterization)
∀T ⊆ 2L : σ ′
( ⋃
T∈T
T
)
=
⋂
T∈T
σ ′(T ) (intersection)
Since characterization logics are the centerpiece of our study we would like to take a look to this
central definition from an other angle, namely in terms of consequence functions. Note that the analysis
of consequence relations have been very prominent in the formative years of nonmonotonic reasoning.
We refer the interested reader to [Gabbay, 1985; Kraus et al., 1990; Makinson, 1994]. Let us consider
the canonical consequence functions of σ and σ ′ according to Definition 2.2. Doing so reveals that the
characterizing and characterized consequence relations fit together appropriately as stated in the following
assertion. It is part of future work to study further properties in terms of consequence relations.
Proposition 2.24. Given a logic (L ,σ) and a characterization logic (L ,σ ′) of it. Let Cnσ and Cnσ
′
be the canonical consequence functions of the corresponding logics. Given T ⊆L .
1. Cnσ
′(
T
)⊆ Cnσ(T) (sublogic)
2. Cnσ
(
T
)
= Cnσ
′(
Cnσ
(
T
))
(left absorption)
3. Cnσ
(
T
)
= Cnσ
(
Cnσ
′(
T
))
(right absorption)
Proof. In the following proofs we will often use that (L ,σ) and (L ,σ ′) are characterization logics
implying that σ and σ ′ possess the intersection property (Definition 2.23) which in turn means that Cnσ
and Cnσ
′
are closure operators (Proposition 2.16).
1. In order to show Cnσ
′(
T
)⊆Cnσ(T)we first prove the subsequent property (*). For any U ⊆L : If
U ⊆ Cnσ ′(T), then Cnσ ′(T)= Cnσ ′(T ∪U). Since T ⊆ T ∪U we derive Cnσ ′(T)⊆ Cnσ ′(T ∪U)
(monotonicity). Moreover, we have T ⊆ Cnσ ′(T) (increasing) and U ⊆ Cnσ ′(T) (assumption)
justifying T ∪U ⊆ Cnσ ′(T). Hence, Cnσ ′(T ∪U) ⊆ Cnσ ′(Cnσ ′(T)) (monotonicity) and finally,
Cnσ
′
(T ∪U) ⊆ Cnσ ′(T) (idempotency) concluding the proof for property (*).
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Now, let U ⊆ Cnσ ′(T). We have to show U ⊆ Cnσ(T). Due to Proposition 2.15 and property (*)
we obtain σ ′(T ) = σ ′
(
Cnσ
′(
T
))
= σ ′
(
Cnσ
′(
T ∪U))= σ ′(T ∪U). Since (L ,σ ′) is assumed to
be a characterization logic we derive [T ]σs = [T ∪U ]σs . Consequently, σ(T ) = σ(T ∪U) implying
Cnσ (T ) = Cnσ (T ∪U) in consideration of Definition 2.2. Using the previous equality justifies
U ⊆ T ∪U ⊆ Cnσ (T ).
2. On the one hand, we have Cnσ
(
T
)⊆ Cnσ ′(Cnσ(T)) since Cnσ ′ is increasing. On the other hand,
Cnσ
′(
Cnσ
(
T
)) ⊆ Cnσ(Cnσ(T)) due to item 1 (sublogic) and finally, Cnσ ′(Cnσ(T)) ⊆ Cnσ(T)
since Cnσ is increasing too. Thus, Cnσ
(
T
)
= Cnσ
′(
Cnσ
(
T
))
as claimed.
3. Due to Proposition 2.15 we have σ ′(T ) = σ ′
(
Cnσ
′(
T
))
. Since (L ,σ ′) is a characterization
logic we further conclude [T ]σs =
[
Cnσ
′(
T
)]σ
s . Hence, σ(T ) = σ
(
Cnσ
′(
T
))
which guarantees
Cnσ
(
T
)
= Cnσ
(
Cnσ
′(
T
))
by Definition 2.2.
We now start our analysis of characterization logics in terms of model functions. We first show that
characterization logics are unique up to isomorphism. More precisely, for any model function σ , the
algebras corresponding to the model theories of any two characterizing model functions σ ′ and σ ′′ are
isomorphic. To do that, we first show that the model theory of any characterization logic2 is a complete
lattice, that is, a partially ordered set where each subset of the carrier set has both a greatest lower bound
(glb) and a least upper bound (lub).
Theorem 2.25. Let (L ,σ) be a full logic with characterization logic (L ,σ ′). The pair
(
σ ′
(
2L
)
,⊆) is
a complete lattice where glb
∧
and lub
∨
are given such that for allK ⊆ σ ′(2L ),∧
K∈K
K =
⋂
K∈K
K and
∨
K∈K
K =
∧
L∈K u
L
whereK u =
{
L ∈ σ ′(2L ) ∣∣ ∀K ∈K : K ⊆ L} is the set of upper bounds ofK .
Proof. Let K ⊆ σ ′(2L ); we first show ⋂K∈K K ∈ σ ′(2L ). Clearly for each K ∈K ⊆ σ ′(2L ) there
exists a T ⊆L with σ ′(T ) = K. Thus by the axiom of choice there is a T ⊆ 2L that contains a
T ∈T with σ ′(T ) = K for each K ∈K . Since ⋃T∈T T ∈ 2L and σ ′ has the intersection property,⋂
K∈K K =
⋂
T∈T σ ′(T ) = σ ′(
⋃
T∈T T ) ∈ σ ′
(
2L
)
.
Now consider
∨
K∈K K. We show that
∧
L∈K u L is the least element of K u, the set of all upper
bounds of K . Clearly, L ∈K u implies that ∀K ∈K : K ⊆ L. Thus, ∀K ∈K : K ⊆⋂L∈K u L whence⋂
L∈K u L ∈K u. In particular, if M ∈K u then
⋂
L∈K u L⊆M and
⋂
L∈K u L is the least upper bound
ofK .
It is vital that the least upper bound is defined in terms of the greatest lower bound, as ordinary set
union will not work.
Example 2.26. ConsiderL = {a,b,c} and semantics σ with
[ /0]σs = { /0} ,
[{a}]σs = {{a}} ,
[{b}]σs = {{b}} ,
[{c}]σs = {{c}} ,
[{a,b}]σs = [{a,c}]σs = [{b,c}]σs = [{a,b,c}]σs = {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
2The proof of Theorem 2.25 reveals that (L ,σ ′) does not necessarily has to be a characterization logic of (L ,σ). Indeed, the
stated properties regarding the model theory hold for any logic possessing the intersection property.
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Assume that (L ,σ ′) is a characterization logic for (L ,σ). We claim that
σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}) /∈ σ ′
(
2L
)
whence σ ′
(
2L
)
is not closed under set union and thus cannot be the carrier set of any sublattice of
(2I
′
,⊆). Assume to the contrary that there is a T ⊆L with σ ′(T ) = σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}). Then
σ ′({a}∪T ) = σ ′({a})∩σ ′(T )
= σ ′({a})∩ (σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}))
= (σ ′({a})∩σ ′({b}))∪ (σ ′({a})∩σ ′({c}))
= σ ′({a,b})∪σ ′({a,c})
= σ ′({a,b}) = σ ′({a,c}) = σ ′({b,c}) = σ ′({a,b,c})
Thus T = {b} or T = {c} or T ∈ [{a,b,c}]σs . Since σ ′ has the intersection property, it is in partic-
ular antimonotone (Proposition 2.13). Hence for T ∈ [{a,b,c}]σs , we get σ ′(T ) ⊆ σ ′({b}) and since
[{b}]σs 6= [{a,b,c}]σs even σ ′(T ) ( σ ′({b}). Substituting c for b in the argument above, we obtain
σ ′(T ) ( σ ′({c}) in the same fashion. In combination σ ′(T ) ( σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}), contradiction. Thus
T = {b} or T = {c}. Clearly [{b}]σs 6= [{b,c}]σs and [{c}]σs 6= [{b,c}]σs imply that
σ ′({b})∩σ ′({c}) = σ ′({b,c}) ( σ ′({b})
σ ′({b})∩σ ′({c}) = σ ′({b,c}) ( σ ′({c})
Thus σ ′({b}) \σ ′({c}) 6= /0 and σ ′({c}) \σ ′({b}) 6= /0. Therefore
σ ′({b}) ( σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}) = σ ′(T )
as well as
σ ′({c}) ( σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}) = σ ′(T ).
Contradiction. Thus T does not exist and σ ′({b})∪σ ′({c}) /∈ σ ′(2L ).
This example shows in particular that the resulting complete lattice induced by the characterization
logic is not necessarily distributive, not even in the case of finite logics.
After these necessary preliminaries, we now present the result on uniqueness of characterization lo-
gics.
Theorem 2.27. Let (L ,σ) be a full logic with characterization logics (L ,σ ′) and (L ,σ ′′). Then the
complete lattices
(
σ ′
(
2L
)
,⊆) and (σ ′′(2L ) ,⊆) are isomorphic.
Proof. We provide a bijection φ : σ ′
(
2L
)→ σ ′′(2L ) with
φ
( ∧
K∈K
K
)
=
∧
K∈K
φ (K) and φ
( ∨
K∈K
K
)
=
∨
K∈K
φ (K)
Given any K ∈ σ ′(2L ), there clearly exists a T ⊆L with σ ′(T ) = K; now define φ (K) such that
φ (K) = σ ′′(T ). This means, φ (σ ′(T )) = φ (σ ′′(T )).
• φ is injective: Let K1,K2 ∈ σ ′
(
2L
)
with φ (K1) = φ (K2). Clearly there exist T1,T2 ⊆L such that
σ ′(T1) = K1 and σ ′(T2) = K2. Thus φ (K1) = φ (K2) implies σ ′′(T1) = φ (K1) = φ (K2) = σ ′′(T2).
Since σ ′′ has the characterization property, we get [T1]σs = [T2]σs . Since σ ′ has the characterization
property, we get K1 = σ ′(T1) = σ ′(T2) = K2.
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• φ is surjective: Let M ∈ σ ′′(2L ). Then there exists a T ⊆L with σ ′′(T ) = M. It follows by
definition that φ (σ ′(T )) = σ ′′(T ) = M.
• φ is structure-preserving: Let K ⊆ σ ′(2L ) and define T ⊆ 2L such that for each K ∈K , the
family T contains an element of the preimage of K with respect to σ ′. (T need not be unique, but
exists by the axiom of choice.)
φ
( ∧
K∈K
K
)
= φ
( ⋂
K∈K
K
)
= φ
( ⋂
T∈T
σ ′(T )
)
= φ
(
σ ′
( ⋃
T∈T
T
))
= σ ′′
( ⋃
T∈T
T
)
=
⋂
T∈T
σ ′′(T ) =
⋂
K∈K
φ (K) =
∧
K∈K
φ (K)
Since
∨
can be defined in terms of
∧
, it follows that
φ
( ∨
K∈K
K
)
= φ
( ∧
K∈K u
K
)
=
∧
K∈K u
φ (K) =
∨
K∈K
φ (K)
Thus
(
σ ′
(
2L
)
,⊆) and (σ ′′(2L ) ,⊆) are isomorphic.
Thus if a classical characterization logic exists, it is (up to isomorphism on its model theory) uniquely
determined. However, as we show next, in some cases there simply is no characterization logic.
Example 2.28. Let L =N be the natural numbers and I 6= /0 arbitrary. We define the semantics
σ : 2L → 2I such that
σ(T ) =
{
/0 if T is finite,
I otherwise.
There are two strong equivalence classes: [ /0]σs , the set of all finite subsets of N, and [N]
σ
s , the set of
all infinite subsets of N. Assume that (L ,σ ′) is a characterization logic for (L ,σ). By the model
intersection property, we get
σ ′(N) = σ ′
(⋃
n∈N
{n}
)
=
⋂
n∈N
σ ′({n}) = σ ′( /0)
in contradiction to the characterization property.
The example above motivates the study of special features of logics warranting the existence of char-
acterization logics. We now proceed with some useful properties that will be needed in this endeavour
later on. Most importantly, we show that strong equivalence classes have an expansion property: It is not
completely obvious, but follows easily from the definition of strong equivalence that two strongly equival-
ent theories can both be expanded (via set union) with the same theory and are again strongly equivalent;
the converse holds as well. Furthermore, the union of two strongly equivalent theories is again strongly
equivalent to the two theories. Finally, for any two strongly equivalent theories that are in subset relation,
every theory in between them is also strongly equivalent to them.
Lemma 2.29. Let (L ,σ) be a full logic and T ,T1,T2,T3 ⊆L .
1. Strong equivalence is invariant to expansion:
[T1]σs = [T2]
σ
s ⇐⇒
(
∀U ⊆L : [T1∪U ]σs = [T2∪U ]σs
)
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2. Each strong equivalence class is a join-semilattice:
T1,T2 ∈ [T ]σs =⇒ T1∪T2 ∈ [T ]σs
3. Each strong equivalence class is convex:
T1 ∈ [T ]σs ∧T3 ∈ [T ]σs ∧T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ T3 =⇒ T2 ∈ [T ]σs
Proof. 1.
[T1]σs = [T2]
σ
s
⇐⇒ ∀U ⊆L : σ(T1∪U) = σ(T2∪U) (Def. ≡σs )
⇐⇒ ∀U ′ ⊆L : ∀U ′′ ⊆L : σ(T1∪ (U ′∪U ′′)) = σ(T2∪ (U ′∪U ′′)) (write U =U ′∪U ′′)
⇐⇒ ∀U ′ ⊆L : ∀U ′′ ⊆L : σ((T1∪U ′)∪U ′′) = σ((T2∪U ′)∪U ′′) (associativity ∪)
⇐⇒ ∀U ′ ⊆L : [T1∪U ′]σs = [T2∪U ′]σs (Def. ≡σs )
⇐⇒ ∀U ⊆L : [T1∪U ]σs = [T2∪U ]σs (rename U ′ =U)
2.
T1,T2 ∈ [T ]σs
⇐⇒ [T1]σs = [T2]σs = [T ]σs
=⇒ [T1∪T2]σs = [T2∪T2]σs = [T2]σs = [T ]σs
=⇒ T1∪T2 ∈ [T ]σs
3.
T1,T3 ∈ [T ]σs ∧T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ T3
=⇒
(
T1∪T2 ∈ [T ]σs ⇐⇒ T3∪T2 ∈ [T ]σs
)
∧T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ T3
=⇒
(
T2 ∈ [T ]σs ⇐⇒ T3 ∈ [T ]σs
)
=⇒ T2 ∈ [T ]σs
We also take a closer look on the structure of strong equivalence classes and their relationships with
each other. We first define a binary relation v on strong equivalence classes where two classes are in
v-relation if and only if there are ⊆-comparable representatives of the classes.
Definition 2.30. Let (L ,σ) be a logic. Define the following relation on strong equivalence classes:
[S]σs v [T ]σs ⇐⇒ ∃S′ ∈ [S]σs : ∃T ′ ∈ [T ]σs : S′ ⊆ T ′
It is easy to show (and later useful) that v is a partial order.
Lemma 2.31. The relation v is a partial order, that is, reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
Proof. Reflexivity is clear.
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antisymmetric: Let [S]σs v [T ]σs and [T ]σs v [S]σs . Then there are S1,S2 ∈ [S]σs as well as T1,T2 ∈ [T ]σs
with S1 ⊆ T1 and T2 ⊆ S2. Clearly
[S]σs = [S1∪S2]σs (S1,S2 ∈ [S]σs ; Lemma 2.29, Item 2)
= [T2∪S1∪S2]σs (T2 ⊆ S2)
= [T1∪T2∪S1∪S2]σs ([T2]σs = [T1∪T2]σs )
= [T1∪T2∪S1]σs ([S1∪S2]σs = [S1]σs )
= [T1∪T2]σs (S1 ⊆ T1)
= [T ]σs (T1,T2 ∈ [T ]σs ; Lemma 2.29, Item 2)
transitive: Let [T1]σs v [T2]σs and [T2]σs v [T3]σs . Then there exist T ′1 ∈ [T1]σs , T ′2 ,T ′′2 ∈ [T2]σs and T ′′3 ∈ [T3]σs
with T ′1 ⊆ T ′2 and T ′′2 ⊆ T ′′3 . Since [T ′2 ]σs = [T ′′2 ]σs , we conclude that [T ′2 ∪T ′′3 ] = [T ′′2 ∪T ′′3 ] = [T ′′3 ]σs .
Now it is clear that T ′1 ⊆ T ′2 ⊆ T ′2 ∪T ′′3 with T ′1 ∈ [T1]σs and T ′2 ∪T ′′3 ∈ [T3]σs imply that [T1]σs v [T3]σs .
It follows from Lemma 2.29 in particular that in the case of logics (L ,σ) withL finite, each strong
equivalence class [T ]σs has a⊆-greatest element that equals the union of all elements. However, for logics
with infinite L , this need not be the case: in the logic of Example 2.28, the class [ /0]σs has no maximal
elements, in particular no greatest element; the class [N]σs has no minimal elements, in particular no
least element. We will see that having a ⊆-greatest element in each equivalence class is sufficient for the
existence of a characterization logic. We therefore decided to name this class of logics and study it in
some greater detail.
2.2.1 Covered Logics
Definition 2.32. Let (L ,σ) be a logic with strong equivalence relation ≡σs . For an equivalence class
[T ]σs ∈
(
2L
)
/≡σs = {[T ]
σ
s | T ⊆L }, we define its cover to be the set
[̂T ]σs =
⋃
S∈[T ]σs
S
and say that a logic (L ,σ) is covered if and only if ∀T ⊆L : [̂T ]σs ∈ [T ]σs .
Roughly, the existence of greatest elements in equivalence classes guarantees that these classes are
closed under arbitrary set union.3 Clearly any finite logic is covered. Furthermore, two familiar repres-
entatives of covered logics are classical logic and abstract argumentation theory. In the former case, it is
clear that arbitrary unions of families of equivalent theories are again theories that are equivalent to each
of its members. In the latter case it is not immediately clear but can be shown with reasonable effort.
Towards the main result of this section, we show that covered logics behave “nicely” in an algebraic
sense, which will pave the way for obtaining characterization logics for them. Most importantly, while
we know from Theorem 2.25 that the strong equivalence classes of any logic form a complete lattice, for
covered logics we can even specify the join and meet operations directly via set operations on covers and
subsequent class formation.
3Strong equivalence classes are always closed under set unions with non-empty, finite index sets (Lemma 2.29).
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Lemma 2.33. Let (L ,σ) be a covered logic with strong equivalence relation≡σs . The pair
((
2L
)
/≡σs ,v
)
is a complete lattice with operations
⊔
C∈C
C =
[⋃
C∈C
Ĉ
]σ
s
and
l
C∈C
C =
[⋂
C∈C
Ĉ
]σ
s
Proof. Let C ⊆ {[T ]σs | T ⊆L }.
• D = ⊔C∈C C is the least upper bound of C :
For any C ∈ C , we get Ĉ ⊆⋃B∈C B̂ immediately and Ĉ ∈C since (L ,σ) is covered. The fact that⋃
B∈C B̂ ∈
[⋃
B∈C B̂
]σ
s
= D is also immediate, whence C v D and by arbitrary choice of C we get
that D is an upper bound of C .
Now let E be any upper bound of C and consider an arbitrary C ∈ C . Since C v E, there are TC ∈C
and T ′C ∈ E such that TC ⊆ T ′C. Since (L ,σ) is covered, [TC]σs =C =
[
Ĉ
]σ
s
whence by strong equi-
valence [TC ∪T ′C]σs =
[
Ĉ∪T ′C
]σ
s
. That is, Ĉ∪T ′C ∈ [TC ∪T ′C]σs = [T ′C]σs = E. Since C was arbitrary,
we have that ∀C ∈ C : ∃T ′C ∈ E : Ĉ∪T ′C ∈ E. In particular, ∀C ∈ C : ∃T ′C ∈ E : Ĉ∪T ′C ⊆ Ê whence⋃
C∈C
(
Ĉ∪T ′C
)
⊆ Ê. Now fix a specific B ∈ C ; then we have in particular that there exists a
T ′B ∈ E such that B̂∪T ′B ∈ E. Furthermore, B̂∪T ′B ⊆
⋃
C∈C
(
Ĉ∪T ′C
)
⊆ Ê with Ê ∈ E since (L ,σ)
is covered. By Lemma 2.29 (Item 3) saying that strong equivalence classes are convex, we get⋃
C∈C
(
Ĉ∪T ′C
)
∈ E. Together with ⋃C∈C Ĉ ⊆⋃C∈C (Ĉ∪T ′C) and ⋃C∈C Ĉ ∈ D we get Dv E and
D is the least upper bound of C .
• D =dC∈C C is the greatest lower bound of C :
As above, C ∈ C implies ⋂B∈C B̂⊆ Ĉ, whence by Ĉ ∈C and ⋂B∈C B̂ ∈ D we get DvC. Since
C ∈ C was arbitrarily chosen, D is a lower bound of C .
Now let E be any lower bound of C . Thus by definition, for each C ∈ C there exist TC ∈C
and T ′C ∈ E such that T ′C ⊆ TC. Now fix one C ∈ C and consider an arbitrary B ∈ C . Clearly
[T ′C]
σ
s = [T
′
B]
σ
s = E whence [T
′
C ∪TB]σs = [T ′B∪TB]σs = [TB]σs by strong equivalence and
since T ′B ⊆ TB. Therefore, T ′C ∪TB ∈ B, that is, T ′C ⊆ T ′C ∪TB ⊆ B̂ with B̂ ∈ B since (L ,σ) is covered.
Since B was chosen arbitrarily, we get the following: for every B ∈ C , we have that T ′C ⊆ B̂. Con-
sequently T ′C ⊆
⋂
B∈C B̂ with T ′C ∈ E and
⋂
B∈C B̂ ∈ D. Thus E v D and D is the greatest lower
bound of C .
In particular, the least and greatest elements of that lattice are given by
⊔
C∈ /0
C =
[⋃
C∈ /0
Ĉ
]σ
s
= [ /0]σs and
l
C∈ /0
C =
[⋂
C∈ /0
Ĉ
]σ
s
= [L ]σs .
As we show next, it follows that the mapping [·]σs : 2L →
(
2L
)
/≡σs assigning a theory T its equi-
valence class [T ]σs is join-preserving for arbitrary joins. This is akin to the intersection property for the
characterizing semantics, only that the semantics is not yet a model theory in the form of a complete
lattice of sets but, more generally, a complete lattice (that is not necessarily one of sets).
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Lemma 2.34. Let (L ,σ) be a covered logic with strong equivalence relation ≡σs . For all T ⊆ 2L , we
have: [ ⋃
T∈T
T
]σ
s
=
⊔
T∈T
[T ]σs
Proof. Let T ⊆ 2L and denote C = {[T ]σs | T ∈T }. Clearly
⊔
T∈T [T ]σs =
⊔
C . Consequently, it suf-
fices to show that [ ⋃
T∈T
T
]σ
s
=
⊔
C .
This will be done by showing that D = [
⋃
T∈T T ]
σ
s is the least upper bound of C in
((
2L
)
/≡σs ,v
)
.
Let C ∈ C . Then there is a T ∈T with C = [T ]σs . Clearly T ∈C and
T ⊆
⋃
S∈T
S⊆
̂[ ⋃
S∈T
S
]σ
s
= D̂
with D̂ ∈ D since (L ,σ) is covered. Thus C v D. Since C ∈ C was arbitrarily chosen, D is an upper
bound of C .
Now let E be any upper bound of C . Consider an arbitrary C ∈ C . There clearly is a T ∈T with
C = [T ]σs and since E is an upper bound for C there also are TC ∈C and T ′C ∈ E with TC ⊆ T ′C.
We have [T ∪T ′C]σs = [TC ∪T ′C]σs = [T ′C]σs = [E]σs whence T ∪T ′C ∈ E. Now since every C ∈ C ori-
ginates in some T ∈T we get that for every T ∈T there exists a T ′C ∈ E with T ∪T ′C ∈ E, that is,
T ∪T ′C ⊆ Ê. Then clearly
⋃
T∈T T ⊆
⋃
T∈T (T ∪T ′C) ⊆ Ê, and by
⋃
T∈T T ∈ D and Ê ∈ E (the logic
(L ,σ) is covered) we get Dv E. Since E was an arbitrarily chosen upper bound of C , D is the least
upper bound of C .
While it preserves arbitrary joins, the mapping from theories to their strong equivalence classes does
not necessarily preserve meets. It is easy to see that for the meet operation in the complete lattice of
strong equivalence classes we have [
⋂
T∈T T ]
σ
s v
d
T∈T [T ]
σ
s , as
⋂
T∈T
T ⊆
⋂
T∈T
[̂T ]σs ∈
[ ⋂
T∈T
[̂T ]σs
]σ
s
=
l
T∈T
[T ]σs
The reverse relation does not hold, as is witnessed by the following small, finite logic.
Example 2.35. LetL = {a,b} and ≡σs such that /0 6≡σs {a} ≡σs {b} ≡σs {a,b}. Then we get:
[{a}∩{b}]σs = [ /0]σs = { /0}
[{a}]σs u [{b}]σs = [{a,b}]σs u [{a,b}]σs = [{a,b}]σs = {{a} ,{b} ,{a,b}} 6= { /0}
However, this is not a hindrance since the intersection property only needs to hold for arbitrary unions
of theories and does not say anything about theory intersection.
We conclude this section with its main theorem showing that any full logic being covered possesses
a characterization logic. The relevant characterization logic can even be defined (more or less) explicitly
via a Herbrand-style canonical construction: roughly, the semantics of the characterization logic maps a
theory T of the original language to the union of all strong equivalence classes [S]σs that are in w-relation
to the class [T ]σs of the input theory.
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Theorem 2.36. Let (L ,σ) be a logic. If (L ,σ) is covered then a characterization logic for (L ,σ) is
given by (L ,σ ′) with
σ ′ : 2L → 22L , T 7→
⋃
S∈2L ,
[T ]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs
Proof. characterization: We have to show ∀T1,T2 ⊆L : σ ′(T1) = σ ′(T2) ⇐⇒ [T1]σs = [T2]σs .
Let T1,T2 ⊆L .
=⇒ : Let σ ′(T1) = σ ′(T2). Then by definition of σ ′ we get⋃
S∈2L ,
[T1]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[T2]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs
that is, for any S ∈ 2L we find that [T1]σs v [S]σs iff [T2]σs v [S]σs . The set
{
[S]σs
∣∣ S ∈ 2L }
corresponds to a partition of 2L ; thus for any element T ∈⋃S∈2L ,[T1]σs v[S]σs [S]σs we have
[T1]σs v [T ]σs , and if also T ∈
⋃
S∈2L ,[T2]σs v[S]σs [S]
σ
s , then [T2]
σ
s v [T ]σs as well. Symmetry
applies to obtain the above conclusion.
In particular, T1,T2 ∈ 2L whence [T1]σs v [T1]σs iff [T2]σs v [T1]σs , and [T1]σs v [T2]σs iff
[T2]σs v [T2]σs . This shows [T1]σs v [T2]σs and [T2]σs v [T1]σs , that is, [T1]σs = [T2]σs .
⇐= : Let [T1]σs = [T2]σs . Then immediately
σ ′(T1) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[T1]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[T2]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs = σ
′(T2)
intersection: We have to show ∀T ⊆ 2L : σ ′(⋃T∈T T ) = ⋂T∈T σ ′(T ).
LetT ⊆ 2L . From Theorem 2.34, we know that [⋃T∈T T ]σs = ⊔T∈T [T ]σs is the least upper bound
of {[T ]σs | T ∈T }, whence for all S ∈ 2L , we have that
⊔
T∈T [T ]σs v [S]σs if and only if [S]σs is an
upper bound of {[T ]σs | T ∈T }, that is,[ ⋃
T∈T
T
]σ
s
v [S]σs ⇐⇒ ∀T ∈T : [T ]σs v [S]σs
Using this relationship, we get that
σ ′
( ⋃
T∈T
T
)
=
⋃
S∈2L ,
[
⋃
T∈T T ]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs
=
⋃
S∈2L ,
∀T∈T :[T ]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs
=
⋂
T∈T
 ⋃
S∈2L ,
[T ]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs

=
⋂
T∈T
σ ′(T )
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The construction from the statement of the theorem looks quite abstract, so we illustrate with a small
concrete logic.
Example 2.37. We reconsider the logic from Example 2.26. There,L = {a,b,c} and
[ /0]σs = { /0},
[{a}]σs = {{a}},
[{b}]σs = {{b}},
[{c}]σs = {{c}},
[{a,b}]σs = [{a,c}]σs = [{b,c}]σs = [{a,b,c}]σs = {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}.
The resulting lattice of strong equivalence classes is depicted below:
[ /0]σs
[{a}]σs [{b}]σs [{c}]σs
[{a,b,c}]σs
According to Theorem 2.36, the characterization logic σ ′ : 2L → 22L assigns as follows:
σ ′( /0) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[ /0]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs =
⋃
S∈2L
[S]σs = 2
L
σ ′({a}) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[{a}]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs = [{a}]σs ∪ [{a,b,c}]σs = {{a} ,{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
σ ′({b}) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[{b}]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs = [{b}]σs ∪ [{a,b,c}]σs = {{b} ,{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
σ ′({c}) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[{c}]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs = [{c}]σs ∪ [{a,b,c}]σs = {{c} ,{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
σ ′({a,b,c}) =
⋃
S∈2L ,
[{a,b,c}]σs v[S]σs
[S]σs = [{a,b,c}]σs = {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
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Now it holds for example that
σ ′({a})∩σ ′({b})
= {{a} ,{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}∩{{b} ,{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
= {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c} ,{a,b,c}}
= σ ′({a,b})
= σ ′({a}∪{b})
2.2.2 Finite-Theory Characterization Logics
In the field of knowledge representation it is a common assumption that knowledge bases are finite. This
is indeed not overly limiting, as finite knowledge bases will be most relevant for practical purposes. The
following definition translates this assumption into our setting: the finite-theory version of a given logic
(or simply, a finite-theory logic) considers only the finite knowledge bases of a language.
Definition 2.38. Given a full logic (L ,σ), the finite-theory version (L ,σfin) of (L ,σ) is defined by the
semantics
σfin :
(
2L
)
fin
→ σ
(
2L
)
with σfin(T ) = σ(T )
where
(
2L
)
fin
= {T ∈ 2L | T is finite}.
For finite-theory restrictions of logics, we adequately relax our requirements on characterization lo-
gics.
Definition 2.39. Let (L ,σ) be a full logic and (L ,σfin) its finite-theory version. We say that (L ,σ ′fin)
is a finite-theory characterization logic for (L ,σ) if and only if:
1. ∀T1,T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
: σ ′fin(T1) = σ ′fin(T2) iff [T1]σfins = [T2]σfins ; (finite-theory characterization)
2. ∀T1,T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
: σ ′fin(T1∪T2) = σ ′fin(T1)∩σ ′fin(T2). (finite-theory intersection)
The second item requires binary intersection only; this is due to the fact that arbitrary unions of (finite)
theories are not necessarily finite, and thus their semantics might not be well-defined.
As we did in the general case before, we first analyze the algebraic structure of the resulting model
theories. We show that the model theory of any finite-theory characterization logic forms a lattice, that
is, a partially ordered set where each non-empty finite subset has both a greatest lower bound and a least
upper bound. (This is in contrast to complete lattices in the general case.) The proof is, although similar
in procedure, slightly more involved than in the general case.
Proposition 2.40. Let (L ,σfin) be a finite-theory logic with characterization logic (L ,σ ′fin). Denoting
K =
{
σ ′fin(T )
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )fin}, the pair (K ,⊆) is a lattice where glb and lub are given such that for all
K1,K2 ∈K :
K1∧K2 = K1∩K2 and K1∨K2 =
∧
{K1,K2}u
where {K1,K2}u = {K ∈K | K1 ⊆ K,K2 ⊆ K}.
Proof. Let K1,K2 ∈K . Clearly there exist finite T1,T2 ⊆L with σ ′fin(T1) = K1 as well as σ ′fin(T2) = K2.
glb: Obviously T1∪T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
. Therefore, it follows that
K1∧K2 = σ ′fin(T1)∧σ ′fin(T2) = σ ′fin(T1)∩σ ′fin(T2) = σ ′fin(T1∪T2) ∈K
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lub: It follows from the finite intersection property that σ ′fin is antimonotone. Now /0⊆ T1 implies that
K1 = σ ′fin(T1) ⊆ σ ′fin( /0) and likewise for T2. Thus σ ′fin( /0) is an upper bound of K1 and K2, whence
the set {K1,K2}u is non-empty. We will now show that {K1,K2}u is finite. Clearly both T1 and
T2 have only finitely many subsets T ′1 and T
′
2 . For each of these subsets, σ
′
fin being antimonotone
means that /0⊆ T ′1 ⊆ T1 implies σ ′fin(T1) ⊆ σ ′fin(T ′1) ⊆ σ ′fin( /0). Thus both K1 and K2 have only finitely
many supersets in K , that is, the sets K↑1 and K
↑
2 are finite, whence {K1,K2}u ⊆ K↑1 ∪K↑2 is finite.
Consequently, {K1,K2}u is a finite, non-empty subset of K . It therefore possesses a greatest
lower bound Kl =
∧{K1,K2}u ∈K . Since {K1,K2}u is closed under intersection we have that
Kl =
∧{K1,K2}u = ⋂{K1,K2}u ∈ {K1,K2}u is the least element of {K1,K2}u and therefore the
least upper bound of K1 and K2 concluding the proof.
As before, we can show (with reasonable effort) that finite-theory characterization logics are unique up
to isomorphism.
Theorem 2.41. Let (L ,σ) be a finite-theory logic having two finite-theory characterization logics
(L ,σ ′fin) and (L ,σ ′′fin). Denoting the two carrier sets byK ′ =
{
σ ′fin(T )
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )fin} and accordingly
K ′′ =
{
σ ′′fin(T )
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )fin}, the lattices (K ′,⊆) and (K ′′,⊆) are isomorphic.
Proof. We provide a bijection φ :K ′→K ′′ such that for all K1,K2 ∈K ′, we find that φ (K1∧K2)
= φ (K1)∧φ (K2) and φ (K1∨K2) = φ (K1)∨φ (K2). Let K ∈K ′. By definition, there exists a finite
T ⊆L with σ ′fin(T ) = K. Define φ (K) = σ ′′fin(T ).
φ is bijective: The proof is as in the general case.
φ is structure-preserving: Let K1,K2 ∈K ′. Clearly there exist T1,T2 ⊆L such that σ ′fin(T1) = K1 and
σ ′fin(T2) = K2. We have
φ (K1∧K2) = φ (K1∩K2) (Def. ∧)
= φ (σ ′fin(T1)∩σ ′fin(T2)) (σ ′fin is ontoK ′)
= φ (σ ′fin(T1∪T2)) (intersection σ ′fin)
= σ ′′fin(T1∪T2) (Def. φ )
= σ ′′fin(T1)∩σ ′′fin(T2) (intersection σ ′′fin)
= φ (σ ′fin(T1))∩φ (σ ′fin(T2)) (Def. φ )
= φ (K1)∩φ (K2) (assumption)
= φ (K1)∧φ (K2) (Def. ∧)
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With reasonable effort, we can also show that
φ (K1∨K2)
= φ
(∧
{K1,K2}u
)
(Def. ∨)
=
∧
φ ({K1,K2}u)
(φ preserves ∧)
=
∧
φ
({
K ∈K ′ ∣∣ K1 ⊆ K,K2 ⊆ K})
(Def. ·u)
=
∧{
φ (K)
∣∣ K ∈K ′,K1 ⊆ K,K2 ⊆ K}
(notation)
=
∧{
φ (σ ′fin(T ))
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′fin(T1) ⊆ σ ′fin(T ),σ ′fin(T2) ⊆ σ ′fin(T )
}
(σ ′fin is ontoK
′)
=
∧{
φ (σ ′fin(T ))
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′fin(T1)∩σ ′fin(T ) = σ ′fin(T1),σ ′fin(T2)∩σ ′fin(T ) = σ ′fin(T2)
}
(elementary)
=
∧{
φ (σ ′fin(T ))
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′fin(T1∪T ) = σ ′fin(T1),σ ′fin(T2∪T ) = σ ′fin(T2)
}
(intersection σ ′fin)
=
∧{
φ (σ ′fin(T ))
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
, [T1∪T ]σs = [T1]σs , [T2∪T ]σs = [T2]σs
}
(characterization σ ′fin)
=
∧{
φ (σ ′fin(T ))
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′′fin(T1∪T ) = σ ′′fin(T1),σ ′′fin(T2∪T ) = σ ′′fin(T2)
}
(characterization σ ′′fin)
=
∧{
σ ′′fin(T )
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′′fin(T1)∩σ ′′fin(T ) = σ ′′fin(T1),σ ′′fin(T2)∩σ ′′fin(T ) = σ ′′fin(T2)
}
(intersection σ ′′fin)
=
∧{
σ ′′fin(T )
∣∣∣ T ∈ (2L )
fin
,σ ′′fin(T1) ⊆ σ ′′fin(T ),σ ′′fin(T2) ⊆ σ ′′fin(T )
}
(elementary)
=
∧{
K
∣∣ K ∈K ′′,σ ′′fin(T1) ⊆ K,σ ′′fin(T2) ⊆ K}
(σ ′′fin is ontoK
′′)
=
∧{
σ ′′fin(T1),σ
′′
fin(T2)
}u
(Def. ·u)
= σ ′′fin(T1)∨σ ′′fin(T2)
(Def. ∨)
= φ (σ ′fin(T1))∨φ (σ ′fin(T2))
(Def. φ )
= φ (K1)∨φ (K2)
(assumption)
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Thus φ is a structure-preserving bijection fromK ′ toK ′′, and the two lattices are isomorphic.
The following theorem shows that any logic possesses a finite-theory characterization logic. This
means that the most important case for knowledge representation behaves well in the sense that charac-
terization logics always exist.
Theorem 2.42. Let (L ,σ) be a full logic. Then a finite-theory characterization logic for (L ,σ) is given
by (L ,σ ′fin) with
σ ′fin :
(
2L
)
fin
→ 22L , T 7→
⋃
S∈(2L )fin,
T⊆S
[S]σfins
Proof. finite intersection: We show that for all T ∈ (2L )
fin
, we find σ ′fin(T ) =
⋂
t∈T σ ′fin({t}). Consider
T ∈ (2L )
fin
.
⊆: Let U ∈ σ ′fin(T ). Hence, there is an S ∈
(
2L
)
fin
such that U ∈ [S]σfins and T ⊆ S. Consequently,
for any t ∈ T , we find {t} ⊆ T ⊆ S and thus [S]σfins ⊆ σ ′fin({t}) showing U ∈
⋂
t∈T σ ′fin({t}).
⊇: Consider now U ∈⋂t∈T σ ′fin({t}). This means that for any t ∈ T there exists an St ∈ (2L )fin
such that U ∈ [St ]σfins (that is, [U ]σfins = [St ]σfins ) and {t} ⊆ St . It follows that for any t, t ′ ∈ T ,
we find [St ]σfins = [U ]
σfin
s = [St ′ ]
σfin
s . Let us fix a certain t ∈ T . In particular, U ∈ [St ]σfins . Now
consider the set
⋃
t∈T St , which is finite since T is finite and each St is finite. Furthermore,⋃
t∈T St ∈ [St ]σfins , that is, [
⋃
t∈T St ]
σfin
s = [St ]
σfin
s by Thoerem 2.29. Since for all t ∈ T we have
t ∈ St , we conclude that T = ⋃t∈T{t} ⊆⋃t∈T St . In turn, this yields U ∈ σ ′fin(T ).
finite-theory characterization: We show that for all T1,T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
, we find [T1]σfins = [T2]
σfin
s if and only
if σ ′fin(T1) = σ ′fin(T2).
if: Let T1,T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
with σ ′fin(T1) = σ ′fin(T2). Firstly, the definition of σ ′fin yields that for each
S ∈ (2L )
fin
we have [S]σfins ⊆ σ ′fin(S). In combination with the presumption, this means that
[T1]σfins ⊆ σ ′fin(T1) = σ ′fin(T2) and [T2]σfins ⊆ σ ′fin(T2) = σ ′fin(T1). Hence, there is a set S1 ∈ [T2]σfins
with T1 ⊆ S1, whence [T1]σfins v [T2]σfins . Likewise, there is a set S2 ∈ [T1]σfins with T2 ⊆ S2,
whence also [T2]σfins v [T1]σfins . By Theorem 2.31 (saying that v is antisymmetric), we get
[T1]σfins = [T2]
σfin
s .
only if: Let T1,T2 ∈
(
2L
)
fin
with [T1]σfins = [T2]
σfin
s and consider any T ∈ σ ′fin(T1). Then there is an
S ∈ (2L )
fin
such that T ∈ [S]σfins and T1 ⊆ S. Clearly there is a U ∈
(
2L
)
fin
with T1∪U = S.
Since [T1]σfins = [T2]
σfin
s by presumption, we can apply Lemma 2.29, which yields T ∈ [S]σfins
= [T1∪U ]σfins = [T2∪U ]σfins . Obviously, we have T2∪U ∈
(
2L
)
fin
with T2 ⊆ T2∪U and the
definition of σ ′fin yields T ∈ σ ′fin(T2). This shows σ ′fin(T1) ⊆ σ ′fin(T2); the reverse inclusion
σ ′fin(T2) ⊆ σ ′fin(T1) holds by symmetry.
Intuitively, in this canonical construction of a characterization semantics σ ′fin (akin to Herbrand interpret-
ations in first-order logic), the model set of a theory T is the set of all theories that are strongly equivalent
to some supertheory of T .
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2.3 Applying Canonical Constructions to Nonmonotonic Formal-
isms
In the previous section we have seen that (under certain condition) the existence of characterization logics
for knowledge representation formalisms are guaranteed. These results are achieved by defining in a
sense Herbrand-style canonical construction. More precisely, the characterization semantics of the new
logic is defined in terms of certain unions of strong equivalence classes of the original language. Such
a characterization semantics is usually far from being intuitive or self-explanatory. The intended role of
this semantics was to serve as a witness for the existence of characterization logics. Nevertheless, we will
discuss the application our general, abstract results to some of the formalisms presented in Example 2.1.
We start with abstract argumentation theory, which is a vibrant as well as immensely growing research
area in AI [Dung, 1995]. Surprisingly, we get a meaningful result very similar to the recently introduced
Dung logics [Baumann and Brewka, 2015a].
2.3.1 Abstract Argumentation Theory
We start with a very brief introduction to Dung’s argumentation theory which is sufficient for the moment
(cf. Section 3.1 for more detailed as well as more general definitions and [Baroni et al., 2018a] for a
recent and comprehensive overview).
An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair F = (A,R) such that R⊆ A×A. Although there exists
some work on unrestricted AFs [Baumann and Spanring, 2015; Baumann and Spanring, 2017] it is com-
mon to assume that A, the set of arguments, is a finite subset of a fixed infinite background set U . Let us
denote the class of all finite AFs by AFfin. An (extension-based) argumentation semantics is a function
ρ : AFfin→ 22U where elements of ρ(F) are called ρ-extensions of F. The most prominent one is stable
semantics (abbreviated by stb) which was already defined by Dung in 1995. A set E is a stb-extension of
F if 1. there are no a,b ∈ A, s.t. (a,b) ∈ R (conflict-freeness) and 2. for any c ∈ A \E, there is an a ∈ A,
s.t. (a,c) ∈ R (full range).
We proceed with some notational conventions and the precise definition of strong equivalence in case
of AFs. The union F ∪˙ G as well as subset-relation F ⊆˙ G of two AFs is understood to be pointwise, that
is, (A1,R1) ∪˙ (A2,R2) = (A1∪A2,R1∪R2), and, similarly, (A1,R1) ⊆˙ (A2,R2) if and only if A1 ⊆ A2 and
R1 ⊆ R2.
Definition 2.43. Given an argumentation semantics ρ . Two AFs F and G are strongly ρ-equivalent if for
any H ∈ AFfin, ρ(F ∪˙ H) = ρ(G ∪˙ H). For short, F ≡ρs G.
The first work regarding characterizing strong equivalence for AFs was [Oikarinen and Woltran,
2011]. It turned out that deciding this notion is deeply linked to the syntax of AFs. In general, any
argument being part of an AF may contribute towards future extensions. However, for each semantics,
there are patterns of redundant attacks captured by so-called kernels. Formally, a kernel is a function
k : AFfin→ AFfin where k(F) = Fk is obtained from F by deleting certain redundant attacks. Consider the
following definition and characterization theorem.
Definition 2.44. Given an AF F = (A,R). The stb-kernel Fk(stb) =
(
A,Rk(stb)
)
is defined with Rk(stb) =
R\{(a,b) | a 6= b∧ (a,a) ∈ R}.
Theorem 2.45 ( [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]). For two AFs F,G we have:
F ≡stbs G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb).
Let us illustrate the introduced concepts with an example.
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Example 2.46. Consider the following six AFs.
dcbaF : G : b c d
dcbaFk(stb) : Gk(stb) : b c d
dcb
e
aF ∪˙ H : G ∪˙ H : b
e
c d
The AFs F and G possess the same stable extensions, namely stb(F) = stb(G) = {{b,d}}. However,
both frameworks are not strongly stb-equivalent since Fk(stb) 6= Gk(stb). A witnessing framework is given
by H. Indeed stb(F ∪˙ H) = {{a,d,e}} 6= /0 = stb(G ∪˙ H).
Let us consider now argumentation theory in the general setup. In Example 2.1 we have seen that the
embedding of abstract argumentation in our setting is a bit more involved than in case of propositional
logic, logic programs or default logic. The main reason for this is that in contrast to the other considered
formalisms we have that abstract argumentation frameworks possess two sorts of building blocks, namely
arguments and attacks. Moreover, the latter are dependent since adding attacks requires the presence
of the corresponding arguments. In order to cast AFs into our general setup we have to have theories
which correspond to AFs, s.t. the standard set union ∪ of such theories correspond to ∪˙ on the AF-level.
Moreover, the semantics of theories has to correspond to the argumentation semantics of the associated
AFs.
We start with the introduction of a ρ-logic which formally captures a specific argumentation semantics
ρ on the level of theories.
Definition 2.47. Let U be a background set of arguments and ρ be an AF semantics. A ρ-logic is
a triple (LAF , I,σρ ) where LAF = {({a}, /0), ({a,b},{(a,b)}) | a,b ∈U }, I = 2U and σρ : 2LAF → 2I
with σρ (T ) = ρ
(⋃˙
t∈T t
)
.
The representational issue implies that two different theories may represent the same framework
which causes some additional effort. More precisely, in what follows it will be a typical task to show
that the presented results are independent of the concrete representation of a certain framework. Let us
start with an illustrating example.
Example 2.48. Let T = {({b,c},{(b,c)}), ({c,b},{(c,b)}), ({c,d},{(c,d)}), ({c},{(c,c)})} and S =
T ∪{({a}, /0), ({b}, /0), ({c}, /0)}. Please observe that ⋃˙t∈T t = ⋃˙s∈S s = G as depicted in Example 2.46.
Moreover by definition we have σstb(T ) = σstb(S) = stb(G) = {{b,d}}.
The following functions (restricted to the finite case) will be frequently used. First, we define the
associated AF of a given theory via AF :
(
2LAF
)
fin
→ AFfin where T 7→ ⋃˙t∈T t. As already discussed the
function AF(·) is not injective as demonstrated in Example 2.48. Secondly, the canonical represent-
ation of a given AF is defined by C : AFfin→
(
2LAF
)
fin
where (A,R) is represented by the LAF-theory
{({a}, /0) | a ∈ A}∪{({a,b},{(a,b)}) | (a,b) ∈ R}. Observe that for any AF H, we find AF(C(H)) = H.
Moreover, regarding Examples 2.46 and 2.48 we have C(G) = S 6= T .
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Note that the assumption of finiteness of AFs can be reflected by considering the finite-theory versions
of ρ-logics. Before applying our canonical construction presented in Theorem 2.42 we have to ensure
that a constructed ρ-logic correctly reflects AFs under semantics ρ . We start with two simple properties
showing that the concrete representation (of an AF via a theory) is not “seen” by set union as well as
semantics σρ .
Proposition 2.49. Let (LAF , I,σρ ) be a ρ-logic and consider any theories S,T ⊆LAF .
1. AF(S∪T ) = AF(S) ∪˙ AF(T ) and
2. σρ (S∪T ) = ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ AF(T )).
Proof. 1. Both statements can be easily seen. Consider the following equations.
AF(S∪T )
=
⋃˙
u∈S∪T
u (Definition AF)
=
⋃˙
s∈S
s ∪˙
⋃˙
t∈T
t (associativity
⋃˙
)
= AF(S) ∪˙ AF(T ) (Definition AF)
2.
σρ (S∪T )
= ρ
( ⋃˙
u∈S∪T
u
)
(Definition σρ )
= ρ(AF(S∪T )) (Definition AF)
= ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ AF(T )) (Item 1)
The following theorem shows that twoLAF-theories S and T are strongly equivalent under σρ if and
only if the AFs AF(S) and AF(T ) are strongly equivalent under ρ (denoted by AF(S) ≡ρs AF(T )). We
mention that the theorem does not require finiteness and is thus valid for arbitrary cardinalities of theories
as well as AFs.
Theorem 2.50. Let (LAF , I,σρ ) be a ρ-logic. For S,T ⊆LAF we have
AF(S) ≡ρs AF(T ) ⇐⇒ [S]σρs = [T ]σρs .
Proof. =⇒ : Let AF(S) ≡ρs AF(T ) and V ∈ 2LAF . We have to show that both theories are strongly
equivalent, i.e. σρ (S∪V ) = σρ (T ∪V ).
σρ (S∪V )
= ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ AF(V )) (Observation 2.49)
= ρ(AF(T ) ∪˙ AF(V )) (assumption AF(S) ≡ρs AF(T ))
= σρ (T ∪V ) (Observation 2.49)
33
2.3. Applying Canonical Constructions to Nonmonotonic Formalisms
⇐= : Let [S]σρs = [T ]σρs and H be an AF. We have to show that the corresponding AFs are strongly
equivalent, i.e. ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ H) = ρ(AF(T ) ∪˙ H).
ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ H)
= ρ(AF(S) ∪˙ AF(C(H))) (AF(C(H)) = H)
= σρ (S∪C(H)) (Observation 2.49)
= σρ (T ∪C(H)) (assumption [S]σρs = [T ]σρs )
= ρ(AF(T ) ∪˙ AF(C(H))) (Observation 2.49)
= ρ(AF(T ) ∪˙ H) (AF(C(H)) = H)
Due to Theorem 2.42 we are able to present finite-theory characterization logics for any ρ-logic.
Corollary 2.51. Let (LAF , I,σρ ) be a ρ-logic. The following logic (LAF ,κ) is a finite-theory character-
ization logic of (LAF , I,σρ ):
κ :
(
2LAF
)
fin
→ 22LAF , T 7→
⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
T⊆S
[S]
(σρ )fin
s
So far, so good, but how can we interpret these finite-theory characterization logics in terms of argu-
mentation theory? In other words, what is the corresponding characterization semantics on the level of
pure AFs (instead of theories associated with AFs)? We extend the function AF to sets of theories as usual,
namely AF : 22
LAF → 2AFfin where T 7→ {AF(T ) | T ∈T }.4 Consider the following definition. We will
see that all crucial properties of κ transfer to ρ ′, that is, ρ ′ satisfies finite intersection and furthermore, it
characterizes strong equivalence under ρ .
Definition 2.52. Given an argumentation semantics ρ : AFfin→ 22U . We define ρ ′ : AFfin→ 2AFfin with
F 7→ AF(κ(C(F))).
Proposition 2.53. For any argumentation semantics ρ and semantics ρ ′ as defined above we have:
1. ∀F,G ∈ AFfin : ρ ′(F) = ρ ′(G) ⇐⇒ F ≡ρs G; (finite-theory characterization)
2. ∀F,G ∈ AFfin : ρ ′(F ∪˙ G) = ρ ′(F)∩ρ ′(G). (finite-theory intersection)
Proof. finite-theory characterization: ⇐= : Let F ≡ρs G. Hence, AF(C(F))≡ρs AF(C(G)). Consequently,
[C(F)]σρs = [C(G)]
σρ
s (Theorem 2.50). Since (LAF ,κ) is a finite-theory characterization
logic of (LAF , I,σρ ) (Definition 2.51) we deduce that κ(C(F)) = κ(C(G)). Obviously,
AF(κ(C(F))) = AF(κ(C(G))) which means ρ ′(F) = ρ ′(G) (Definition 2.52).
4We do not introduce a new symbol for the new function. Which function is meant will be clear from the context.
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=⇒ : We prove the contrapositive. Hence, let F 6≡ρs G. This means, AF(C(F)) 6≡ρs AF(C(G)) and
we obtain [C(F)]σρs 6= [C(G)]σρs (Theorem 2.50). Consequently, κ(C(F)) 6= κ(C(G)) since
κ characterizes strong equivalence under σρ (Definition 2.51). Since equivalence classes
are disjoint we deduce the existence of a theory U , such that (without loss of generality)
[U ]σρs ⊆ κ(C(F))\κ(C(G)). Consequently, AF(U) ∈ AF(κ(C(F)))\AF(κ(C(G))) since
for all other representations of U ′, s.t. AF(U) =AF(U ′), we have U ′ ∈ [U ]σρs (Theorem 2.50).
Hence, AF(κ(C(F))) 6= AF(κ(C(G))) which means ρ ′(F) 6= ρ ′(G) (Definition 2.52).
finite-theory intersection:
ρ ′(F ∪˙ G)
= AF(κ(C(F ∪˙ G))) (Definition 2.52)
= AF(κ(C(F)∪C(G))) (C(F ∪˙ G) = C(F)∪C(G))
= AF(κ(C(F))∩κ(C(G))) (intersection κ)
= AF(κ(C(F)))∩AF(κ(C(G))) (can be seen)
= ρ ′(F)∩ρ ′(G) (Definition 2.52)
Finally, we present an equivalent definition of ρ ′ that does not rely on ρ-logics. This means the
evaluation of ρ ′ can be done purely on the level of AFs.
Proposition 2.54. Let ρ : AFfin→ 2AFfin be a semantics and ρ ′ as in Definition 2.52. For any F ∈ AFfin
we have:
ρ ′(F) =
⋃
G∈AFfin,
F⊆˙G
{H | H ≡ρs G}
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Proof.
ρ ′(F) = AF(κ(C(F))) (Definition 2.52)
= AF

⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
C(F)⊆S
[S]
(σρ )fin
s
 (Definition 2.51)
= AF

⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
C(F)⊆C(AF(S))
[S]
(σρ )fin
s
 (S⊆ C(AF(S)), [S](σρ )fins = [C(AF(S))](σρ )fins )
=
⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
C(F)⊆C(AF(S))
AF
(
[S]
(σρ )fin
s
)
(Definition AF(·))
=
⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
F⊆˙AF(S)
AF
(
[S]
(σρ )fin
s
)
(C(F) ⊆ C(AF(S)) ⇐⇒ F ⊆˙ AF(S))
=
⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
F⊆˙AF(S)
{
AF(T ) | T ∈ [S](σρ )fins
}
(Definition AF(·))
=
⋃
S∈(2LAF )fin,
F⊆˙AF(S)
{
AF(T ) | [T ](σρ )fins = [S](σρ )fins
}
(equivalence relation)
=
⋃
G∈AFfin,
F⊆˙G
{H | H ≡ρs G} (AF(S) = G,AF(T ) = H,Theorem 2.50)
Recently, so-called Dung-logics were introduced to be able to perform AGM-style revision for Dung’s
abstract argumentation frameworks [Baumann and Brewka, 2015a]. These Dung-logics are very similar
yet different from the characterization logics presented in Proposition 2.54. The main difference is that
theories in Dung-logics are sets of AFs in contrast to the newly presented characterization logic where
theories correspond to single AFs. We mention that Dung-logics possess the intersection property (Defin-
ition 2.55) and furthermore, two AFs F and G are strongly equivalent with respect to an argumentation
semantics ρ if and only if the singletons of F and G are ordinarily equivalent with respect to the semantics
defined by Theorem 3 of [Baumann and Brewka, 2015a].
We start with the formal definition of a Dung-logic in case of the most prominent argumentation
semantics, namely stable semantics.
Definition 2.55. The Dung-logic in case of stable semantics is a pair (AFfin,δ ) with
δ : 2AFfin → 2AFfin U 7→
⋂
F∈U
Modk(stb)(F)
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whereas Modk(stb)(F) =
{
G ∈ AFfin | Fk(stb) ⊆˙ Gk(stb)
}
.
In order to see the similarity we consider the above definition for singletons of AFs.
Observation 1. Let stb : AFfin→ 2AFfin be stable semantics and δ as in Definition 2.55. For any F ∈ AFfin
we have:
δ ({F}) =
⋃
G∈AFfin,
Fk(stb)⊆˙Gk(stb)
{H | H ≡stbs G}
The only difference in comparison to ρ ′ is that for δ , we include all equivalence classes of AFs G
whose kernels are in superset relation with the kernel of F , instead of having the superset relation on the
AFs themselves. A further analysis will be part of future work.
2.3.2 Normal Logic Programs
For normal logic programs under the stable model semantics as presented in Example 2.1, applying
Theorem 2.42 yields:
Corollary 2.56. For the finite-theory version of logic (LLP,σstb) of normal logic programs under stable
model semantics, a finite-theory characterization logic is given by
σ ′stb :
(
2LLP
)
fin
→ 2(2LLP)fin , T 7→
⋃
S∈(2LLP)fin,
T⊆S
[S]σstbs
An existing, well-known characterizing semantics is given by SE-models.
Definition 2.57. Let P be a normal logic program over A and X ⊆ Y ⊆ A. Define semantics
σSE :
(
2LLP
)
fin
→ 2A×A by
T 7→ {(X ,Y ) ∣∣ X ⊆ Y and X ,Y ∈ σmod(TY )}
where
TY = {a0← a1, . . . ,am | a0← a1, . . . ,am,∼am+1, . . . ,∼an ∈ T ,am+1, . . . ,an /∈ Y}
σmod(T ) = {M ⊆A | ∀a0← a1, . . . ,am,∼am+1, . . . ,∼an ∈ T :
(a1, . . . ,am ∈M∧am+1, . . . ,an /∈M) =⇒ a0 ∈M}
SE-models characterize strong equivalence of stable models [Turner, 2001b, Theorem 1]; SE-model
semantics also has the intersection property [Truszczyn´ski, 2006, Lemma 3].
Proposition 2.58. (LLP,σSE) is a characterization logic for (LLP,σstb).
Since finite-theory characterization logics are unique up to isomorphism (Theorem 2.41), there is a
one-to-one-correspondence between the model sets given by Corollary 2.56 (as well as any other model
set of a certain characterization logic) and sets of SE-models. More precisely, for any two logic programs
T1,T2 ∈LLP, we find σ ′stb(T1) ⊆ σ ′stb(T2) if and only if σSE(T1) ⊆ σSE(T2). However, please note that
the set of SE-models of a finite logic program is finite, while σ ′stb maps logic programs to infinite model
sets in general. So in the concrete case of logic programs, SE-models are much easier to work with.
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2.4 Discussion
We presented a general framework for analyzing strong equivalence of knowledge representation form-
alisms. The framework abstracts away from all language specifics other than that knowledge bases be
expressible as sets of atomic language elements. For two classes of formalisms, covered and finite-theory
logics, we showed that they always possess a classical characterization logic. We called characteriza-
tion logics classical because they have the intersection property (that is, the semantics of theories can
always be obtained by considering the semantics of its members independently). We called characteriz-
ation logics characterizing because their standard equivalence coincides with strong equivalence in the
characterized formalism. As an application of our results, we obtained a first characterization logic for
abstract argumentation where single AFs are interpreted as theories. This new logic complements the
already existing Dung-logics which consider single AFs as building blocks and hence, theories as sets of
AFs [Baumann and Brewka, 2015a].
Most previous work on characterizing strong equivalence in KR that we know of focused on specific
formalisms or on a handful of related formalisms, such as work on strong equivalence in logic programs
under stable models [Lifschitz et al., 2001; Turner, 2001a] and supported models [Truszczyn´ski and
Woltran, 2008], that also give rise to similar developments in default logic [Turner, 2001a; Truszczyn´ski,
2007] and autoepistemic logic [Truszczyn´ski and Woltran, 2008]. By considering and exploiting form-
alism specifics, more fine-grained views on classical, strong and intermediate equivalence notions are
possible [Eiter and Fink, 2003; Truszczyn´ski, 2007; Woltran, 2008]. Such notions are at present not
“visible” in our setting, but could be incorporated by restricting the set of theories that are allowed for
expansion.
We have chosen to consider as “classical” all logics whose model function possesses the intersection
property. Other characterizations might be possible when choosing consequence functions instead of
model functions as starting point. For those, we considered closure operators as a special class (imply-
ing, for example, cumulativity). Other properties for future consideration come to mind – for example
compactness, which is independent of the closure property and relevant to proof theory.
Our approach could be further generalized by abstracting away even from knowledge bases as sets
and knowledge base expansion as set union. We could assume a language as equipped with an expan-
sion operator ⊕ under which the language is closed and then derive our results completely algebraic-
ally. This would enable us to treat, for example, abstract dialectical frameworks [Brewka and Woltran,
2010a; Brewka et al., 2013a], a quite recent non-classical KR formalism encompassing both argument-
ation frameworks and logic programs [Strass, 2013], for which strong equivalence has not been studied
yet.
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Existence and Uniqueness of
Argumentation Semantics
Argumentation has become one of the major fields within AI over the last two decades [Rahwan and
Simari, 2009; Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007]. In particular, Dung’s argumentation frameworks (AFs)
[Dung, 1995] are widely used and act as integral concepts in several advanced argumentation formalisms.
They focus entirely on conflict resolution among arguments, treating the latter as abstract items without
logical structure. Hence, the only information available in AFs is the so-called attack relation that de-
termines whether an argument is in a certain conflict with another one. As already outlined by Dung, AFs
provide a formally simple basis to capture the essence of different nonmonotonic formalisms.
The subsequent sections and chapters are devoted to argumentation semantics which play the flagship
role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory. Almost all of them are motivated by an easily understand-
able intuition of what should be acceptable in the light of conflicts. However, although these intuitions
equip us with short and comprehensible formal definitions it turned out that their intrinsic properties such
as existence and uniqueness, expressibility, replaceability and verifiability are not that easily accessible.
We will consider all mentioned properties w.r.t. almost all semantics available in the literature. In doing
so we include two main axes: namely first, the distinction between extension-based and labelling-based
versions and secondly, the distinction of different kind of argumentation frameworks such as finite or
unrestricted ones.
3.1 Abstract Argumentation Theory
Phan Minh Dung introduced argumentation frameworks (AFs) as directed graphs [Dung, 1995, Defin-
ition 2]. This means, an AF F = (A,R) is simply a pair consisting of a set A, usually called set of
arguments, and a binary relation R ⊆ A×A, so-called attack relation. In order to judge the truth of sen-
tences like “For any AF F we have . . .” or “There is no AF F, s.t. . . .” we have to introduce a reference
setU , so-called universe of arguments and to require, that all possible AFs possess arguments of this set.
This means, sentences as mentioned above always refer to AFs F = (A,R) with A⊆U . In the following
we use FU as an abbreviation for the set of all AFs induced by U . In order to be able to consider
AFs possessing an arbitrary finite number of arguments or even infinitely many we have to request that
|U | ≥ |N|. No further conditions are imposed. For the rest of the thesis we assume that such a universe
of arguments is given, i.e. we use the set U as an arbitrary but fixed parameter. For this reason, we often
useF instead ofFU .
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3.1.1 Important Syntactical Classes of AFs
AFs can be classified by means of syntactical properties. In the following we list some features which will
be frequently used throughout the thesis. Most of them are self-explanatory and/or already well-known
from graph theory [Diestel, 2006]. Most of the research in abstract argumentation typically pertains to
finite AFs.
Definition 3.1. An AF F = (A,R) is called
1. empty if A = /0,
2. finite if |A| ∈N,
3. finitary if for any a ∈ A, |{b ∈ A | (b,a) ∈ R}| ∈N,
4. self-loop-free if R∩ idA = /0,
5. odd-cycle-free if there is no odd natural n, s.t. a0, ...,an ∈ A, a0 = an and (a0,a1), ..., (an−1,an) ∈ R,
6. symmetric if R = R−1,
7. arbitrary if F ∈F .
Example 3.2. The following AF is not empty, finite, finitary, self-loop-free, not odd-cycle-free, not
symmetric and arbitrary.
cb
a d e f
3.1.2 Argumentation Semantics - The Flagship of Dung’s Abstract Argumenta-
tion Theory
In order to formalize the notions of existence and uniqueness in the context of abstract argumentation
theory we have to clarify what we precisely mean by a semantics. In the literature two main approaches
to argumentation semantics can be found, namely so-called extension-based and labelling-based ver-
sions. The main difference is that extension-based versions return a set of sets of arguments (so-called
extensions) for any given AF in contrast to a set of sets of n-tupels (so-called labellings) as in case of
labelling-based approaches. However, from a mathematical point of view both kinds of semantics are
instances of Definition 3.3. More precisely, extension-based versions are covered by n = 1 and labelling-
based approaches can be obtained by setting n≥ 2. We use (2U )n to denote the n-ary cartesian power of
2U , i.e.
(
2U
)n
= 2U ×·· ·×2U︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
.
Definition 3.3. A semantics is a function σ : F → 2(2U )
n
for some natural n ∈ N, s.t.
F = (A,R) 7→ σ(F) ⊆ (2A)n.
In this chapter we are interested in definedness statuses w.r.t. finite, finitary and arbitrary frameworks.
Besides conflict-free and admissible sets (abbreviated by cf and ad) we consider a large number of mature
semantics, namely naive, stage, stable, semi-stable, complete, preferred, grounded, ideal, eager semantics
as well as the more exotic cf2 and stage2 semantics (abbreviated by na,stg,stb,ss,co,pr,gr, il,eg,cf2
and stg2 respectively). In the following we introduce the extension-based versions of these semantics
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(indicated by Eσ ). Any considered semantics possesses a 3-valued labelling-based version (denoted as
Lσ ). It is important to note that for all considered semantics we do not observe any differences between
the definedness statuses of their labelling-based and extension-based versions. For the mature semantics
this is due the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between σ -extensions and σ -labellings
implying that |Eσ (F)|= |Lσ (F)| for any AF F (for more details confer Section 5.4.1).
Before presenting the definitions we have to introduce some notational conventions. Given an AF
F = (A,R) and a set E ⊆ A. We use E+F or simply, E+ for {b | (a,b) ∈ R,a ∈ E}. Moreover, E⊕F or
simply, E⊕ is called the range of E and stands for E+∪ E. We say a attacks b (in F) if (a,b) ∈ R.
An argument a is defended by E (in F) if for each b ∈ A with (b,a) ∈ R, b is attacked by some c ∈ E.
Finally, ΓF : 2A→ 2A with I 7→ {a ∈ A | a is defended by I} denotes the so-called characteristic function
(of F) [Dung, 1995].
Definition 3.4. Let F = (A,R) be an AF and E ⊆ A.
1.E ∈ Ecf (F) iff for no a,b ∈ E, (a,b) ∈ R,
2.E ∈ Ena(F) iff E ∈ Ecf (F) and for no I ∈ Ecf (F), E ⊂ I,
3.E ∈ Estg(F) iff E ∈ Ecf (F) and there is no I ∈ Ecf (F), s.t. E⊕ ⊂ I⊕,
4.E ∈ Estb(F) iff E ∈ Ecf (F) and E⊕ = A,
5.E ∈ Ead(F) iff E ∈ Ecf (F) and E defends all its elements,
6.E ∈ Ess(F) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and there is no I ∈ Ead(F), s.t. E⊕ ⊂ I⊕,
7.E ∈ Eco(F) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and for any a ∈ A defended by E in F, a ∈ E,
8.E ∈ Epr(F) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and for no I ∈ Eco(F), E ⊂ I,
9.E ∈ Egr(F) iff E is the ⊆-least fixpoint of ΓF ,
10.E ∈ Eil(F) iff E ∈ Ead(F), E ⊆⋂Epr(F) and there is no I ∈ Eco(F) satisfying E ⊂ I ⊆⋂Epr(F),
11.E ∈ Eeg(F) iff E ∈ Ead(F), E ⊆⋂Ess(F) and there is no I ∈ Eco(F) satisfying E ⊂ I ⊆⋂Ess(F).
Finally, we introduce the recursively defined cf2 and stage2 semantics [Baroni et al., 2005; Dvorˇák
and Gaggl, 2012].
Definition 3.5. Let F = (A,R) be an AF and E ⊆ A.
1. E ∈ Ecf 2(F) iff
• E ∈ Ena(F) if |SCCsF = 1| and
• ∀S ∈ SCCsF(E ∩S) ∈ Ecf 2
(
F|UPF(S,E)
)
,
2. E ∈ Estg2(F) iff
• E ∈ Estg(F) if |SCCsF = 1| and
• ∀S ∈ SCCsF(E ∩S) ∈ Estg2
(
F|UPF(S,E)
)
.
Here SCCsF denotes the set of all strongly connected components of F, and for any E,S⊆A, UPF(S,E) =
{a ∈ S | @b ∈ E \S : (b,a) ∈ R}.
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The following proposition summarizes well-known subset relations between the considered semantics.
For two semantics σ , τ and a certain set of AFs C we use σ ⊆C τ as a shorthand for σ(F) ⊆ τ(F) for
any AF F ∈ C . The presented relations hold for both extension-based as well as labelling-based versions
of the considered semantics. In the interest of readability we present the relations graphically.
Proposition 3.6. For semantics σ and τ , σ ⊆F τ iff there is a path of solid arrows from σ to τ in Fig-
ure 3.1. A dotted arrow indicates that the corresponding subset relation is guaranteed for finite frame-
works only.
dstbp
dssp
dstgp
dstg2p
dprp
dnap
dcf2p
dcop dadp
dcf p
dgrp dilp degp
Figure 3.1: Subset Relations between Semantics
Detailed proofs can be found in [Baumann, 2014b, Proposition 2.7] as well as [Gaggl and Dvorˇák,
2016, Section 3.1]. Note that the shorthand σ ⊆C τ requires that both semantics are total functions on C
since a framework to which one of these semantics is undefined renders the subset shorthand undefined
itself. The following simple example shows that Definition 3.5 does not always provide a definite answer
on whether a certain candidate set is an cf2-extension or stg2-extension, respectively. This is due to the
fact that the defined recursion does not terminate necessarily in case of non-finite AFs.1 Consequently,
stg2 and cf2 are not total functions regarding arbitrary frameworks.
Example 3.7 (Infinite Recursion [Baumann and Spanring, 2017]). Consider the following AF
F = (A∪B,R) where
• A = {ai | i ∈N}, B = {bi | i ∈N} and
• R = {(bi,ai), (ai+1,ai), (ai,bi+1) | i ∈N}
a1F :
b1
a2
b2
a3
b3
a4
b4
a5
b5
a6
b6
. . .
. . .
Let σ ∈ {cf2,stg2}. We want to check whether the candidate set E = {bi | i ∈N} is a σ -extension.
Observe that the AF F possesses two SCCs, namely one consisting of the single argument b1 and the
1We mention that the inventors of both semantics considered finite AFs only [Baroni et al., 2005; Dvorˇák and Gaggl, 2012]. In
case of finite AFs any recursion will terminate no matter which candidate set is considered.
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other containing the remaining arguments, i.e. S1 = {b1} and S2 = (A∪B) \ {b1}. For S1 we end up
with the base case returning a positive answer. For S2 we have to consider the AF F′ = F|UPF(S2,E) =
F|(A∪B)\{a1,b1} (since a1 is attacked by b1 ∈E \S2) and the set S′= E∩S2 = {bi | i∈N, i≥ 2}. Obviously,
determining whether S′ is an σ -extension w.r.t. F′ is equivalent to decide whether S is an σ -extension
w.r.t. F. This means, the consideration of the candidate set E leads to infinite recursion.
3.1.3 Definedness Statuses of Argumentation Semantics
We now introduce the two main definedness statuses of argumentation semantics which capture the no-
tions of existence and uniqueness, namely so-called universal and unique definedness. Both versions are
relativized to a certain set of AFs. If clear from context, unimportant or if C =F we will not mention
explicitly the considered set of AFs.
Definition 3.8. Given a semantics σ and a set C of AFs. We say that σ is
1. universally defined w.r.t. C if ∀F ∈ C , |σ(F)| ≥ 1 and
2. uniquely defined w.r.t. C if ∀F ∈ C , |σ(F)|= 1.
Why are the introduced definedness statuses important? Let us consider an arbitrary logical formalism
L together with its semantics σL . One central question is whether the semantics provides anyL -theory
T with a formal meaning, i.e. |σL (T )| ≥ 1. A more demanding property than existence is uniqueness, i.e.
|σL (T )|= 1 for anyL -theory T . Clearly, these properties are interesting from several perspectives. For
instance, in case of uniqueness, we observe a coincidence of sceptical and credulous reasoning modes.
More precisely, if σL (T ) = {E}, then
⋂
σL (T ) =
⋃
σL (T ) = E. Furthermore, if a theory T is
interpreted as meaningful if and only if σL (T ) 6= /0, then existence might be a desired property. If the
latter has to be neglected in the general case, then one further challenge is to identify sufficient properties
ofL -theories guaranteeing their meaningfulness.
Let us come back to abstract argumentation frameworks [Dung, 1995]. Due to the practical nature
of argumentation most work in the literature restricts itself to the case of finite AFs, i.e. any considered
AF consists of finitely many arguments and attacks only. For this class of AFs a proof or disproof of
existence or uniqueness is mostly straightforward. In the general infinite case however conducting such
proofs is more intricate. It usually involves the proper use of set theoretic axioms, like the axiom of
choice or equivalent statements. Dung already proposed the existence of preferred extensions in the case
of infinite argumentation frameworks. It has later on (e.g. [Caminada and Verheij, 2010]) been pointed
out that Dung has not been precise with respect to the use of principles. The existence of semi-stable
extensions for finitary2 argumentation frameworks was first shown by Weydert with the use of model-
theoretic techniques [Weydert, 2011]. Later on, Baumann and Spanring presented a first comprehensive
overview of results regarding existence and uniqueness for a whole bunch of semantics considered in
the literature [Baumann and Spanring, 2015]. They provided complete or alternative proofs of already
known results and contributed missing results for the infinite or finitary case. We mention two interesting
results: Firstly, eager semantics is exceptional among the universally defined semantics since either there
is exactly one or there are infinitely many eager extensions. Secondly, stage semantics behaves similarly
to semi-stable in the sense that extensions are guaranteed as long as finitary AFs are considered. A further
step forward in the systematic analysis of argumentation semantics in the infinite case was presented
in [Spanring, 2015]. Spanring studied the relation between non-existence of extensions and the number of
non-finitary arguments. It was shown that there are AFs where one single non-finitary argument causes a
2An argument is called finitary if it receives finitely many attacks only. Moreover, an AF is said to be finitary if and only if it
consists of finitary arguments only (cf. Definition 6.11).
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collapse3 of semi-stable semantics. Interestingly, all known AFs which do not provide any stage extension
possesses infinitely many non-finitary arguments. It is an open question whether this observation applies
in general [Spanring, 2015, Conjecture 14].
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness w.r.t. Finite AFs
As a matter of fact, in order to show that a certain semantics σ is not universally defined w.r.t. a certain
set C it suffices to present an AF F ∈ C , s.t. σ(F) = /0. Contrastingly, an affirmative answer w.r.t.
universal definedness requires a proof involving all AFs in C . Let us consider finite AFs first. It is well-
known that stable semantics does not warrant the existence of extensions/labellings even in the case of
finite AFs. Witnessing examples are given by odd-cycles (cf. Example 3.9). Interestingly, in case of finite
AFs we have that being odd-cycle free is sufficient for warranting at least one stable extension/labelling.4
Example 3.9. The following minimalistic AFs cause a collapse of stable semantics, i.e. stb(F1) =
stb(F3) = /0.
a1F1 : a1F3 : a2
a3
Observe that both frameworks do possess semi-stable, stage2 as well as stage extensions/labellings.
The extensions are as follows: For any σ ∈ {ss,stg2,stg}, τ ∈ {stg2,stg}, Eσ (F1) = { /0} = Ess(F3) and
Eτ (F3) = {{a1},{a2},{a3}}.
Let us consider now semi-stable semantics. Example 3.9 shows that AFs may possess semi-stable
extensions even in the absence of stable extensions. Are semi-stable extensions possibly guaranteed in
case of finite AFs? Consider the following explanations about the existence of semi-stable extensions
taken from [Caminada, 2006]:
For every argumentation framework there exists at least one semi-stable extension. This is
because there exists at least one complete extension, and a semi-stable extension is simply a
complete extension in which some property (the union of itself and the arguments it defeats)
is maximal.
We would like to point out two issues. Firstly, the presented explanation should not be understood
as: Since any semi-stable extension is a complete one and complete semantics is universally defined we
conclude that semi-stable semantics is universally defined. Accepting this kind of (false) argumentation
would imply the universal definedness of stable semantics since also any stable extension is a complete
one. The second issue is that the presented explanation is not precise about why it is guaranteed that
the non-empty set of complete extensions possesses at least one range-maximal member. The following
statement gives a more precise explanation [Caminada et al., 2012]:
For every (finite) argumentation framework, there exists at least one semi-stable extension.
This is because there exists at least one complete extension (the grounded) and the fact that
the argumentation framework is finite implies that there exist at most a finite number of
complete extensions. The semi-stable extensions are then simply those complete extensions
in which some property (its range) is maximal.
3The term collapse was firstly introduced in [Spanring, 2015] and it refers to a semantics not providing any extension/labelling
for a given AF. In [Baumann and Ulbricht, 2018] the authors studied how to repair such a semantical defect.
4This is due to the fact that firstly, in case of finite AFs, being odd-cycle free coincides with being limited controversial [Dung,
1995, Definition 32] and secondly, any limited controversial AFs warrants the existence of at least one stable extensions [Dung,
1995, Corollary 36].
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This means, the additional argument that we have to compare finitely many complete extensions only
justifies the universal definedness of semi-stable extensions in case of finite AFs. Obviously, in case
of infinite AFs we cannot expect to have finitely many complete extensions implying that this kind of
argumentation is no longer valid for finitary as well as infinite AFs in general.
In the rest of this section we want to argue why all considered semantics except the stable one are
universally defined in case of finite AFs.5 Remember that many semantics are looking for certain ⊆-
maximal elements. The main advantage in case of finiteness is that it is simply impossible to have infinite
⊆-chains which guarantees the existence of ⊆-maximal elements. Consider the following more detailed
explanations. Given a finite AF F = (A,R), i.e. |A| = n ∈N. Consequently, 1 ≤ ∣∣2A∣∣ = 2n ∈N. By
definition of any extension-based semantics σ we derive 0≤ |Eσ (F)| ≤ 2n since Eσ (F) ⊆ 2A (cf. Defin-
ition 3.3). This means, for any finite F and any semantics σ we have at least one candidate set for being
a σ -extension (namely, the empty set) and at most finitely many σ -extensions. In any case, the empty
set is conflict-free as well as admissible, i.e.
∣∣Ecf (F)∣∣ , |Ead(F)| ≥ 1. Furthermore, naive and preferred
semantics are looking for ⊆-maximal conflict-free or admissible sets, respectively. Since we have fi-
nitely many conflict-free as well as admissible sets only we derive the universal definedness of naive and
preferred semantics in case of finite AFs. Combining Epr ⊆ Eco and
∣∣Epr(F)∣∣ ≥ 1 yields the universal
definedness of complete semantics in case of finite AFs. Moreover, since 1 ≤ ∣∣Ecf (F)∣∣ , |Ead(F)| ≤ 2n is
given we obtain the universal definedness of stage and semi-stable semantics in case of finite AFs because
the existence of ⊆-range-maximal is guaranteed. Let us consider ideal and eager semantics. Candidate
sets of both semantics are admissible sets being in the intersection of all preferred or semi-stable exten-
sions, respectively. Note that there is at least one admissible set satisfying this property, namely the empty
one since definitely /0⊆⋂Epr(F) ⊆U as well as /0⊆⋂Ess(F) ⊆U . This means, the sets of candidates
are non-empty and finite which guarantees the existence of ⊆-maximal elements implying the universal
definedness of ideal and eager semantics in case of finite AFs. The grounded extension, i.e. the ⊆-least
fixpoint of the characteristic function ΓF , is guaranteed due to the monotonicity of ΓF and the famous
Knaster-Tarski theorem [Tarski, 1955]. Finally, even the more exotic stage2 as well as cf2 semantics are
universally defined w.r.t. finite AFs. This can be seen as follows: Obviously, finitely many as well as
initial SCCs are guaranteed due to finiteness. Consequently, one may start with computing stage/naive
extension on these initial components and “propagate” the resulting extensions to the subsequent SCCs
and so on. This procedure will definitely terminate and ends up with stage2/cf2 extensions. Apart from
stable semantics we have argued that the extension-based versions of all considered semantics are univer-
sally defined w.r.t. finite AFs. In case of mature semantics, the result carry over to their labelling-based
versions since any of these semantics possesses a one-to-one-correspondence between extensions and la-
bellings. This property does not hold in case of admissible as well as conflict-free sets. However, since
any admissible/conflict-free set induce at least one admissible/conflict-free labelling the result applies to
their labelling versions too (cf. Section 5.4.1).
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness w.r.t. Arbitrary AFs
3.3.1 Non-well-defined Semantics
In contrast to all other semantics available in the literature, cf2 as well as stage2 semantics were originally
defined recursively. The recursive schema is based on the decomposition of AFs along their strongly
connected components (SCCs). Roughly speaking, the schema takes a base semantics σ and proceeds
along the induced partial ordering and evaluates the SCCs according to σ while propagating relevant
5We mention that grounded, ideal and eager semantics are even uniquely defined w.r.t. finite AFs. This will be a by-product of
Theorem 3.24, Corollary 3.23 as well as Theorem 3.26.
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results to subsequent SCCs. This procedure defines a σ2 semantics.6 Given so-called SCC-recursiveness
[Baroni et al., 2005] we have to face some difficulties in drawing conclusions with respect to infinite
AFs. Firstly, arbitrary AFs need not to possess initial SCCs which is granted for finite AFs. This makes
checking whether a certain set is an σ2-extension more complicated and in particular, especially due to the
recursive definitions not that easy to handle. Secondly, even worse, even if an AF as well as subsequent
subframeworks of it possess initial SCCs there is no guarantee that any recursion will stop in finitely
many steps. More precisely, as shown in Example 3.7 there might be candidate sets which lead to infinite
recursion, i.e. the base case will never be considered. In [Gaggl and Dvorˇák, 2016, Propositions 2.12 and
3.2] the authors considered alternative non-recursive definitions of cf2 as well as stage2 semantics in case
of finite AFs. It is an open question whether these definitions overcome the problem of undefinedness for
arbitrary frameworks.
3.3.2 Collapsing Semantics
Dealing with finite AFs is a common as well as attractive and reasonable restriction, due to their com-
putational nature. In the section before we have argued that apart from stable semantics all considered
semantics are universally defined w.r.t. finite AFs. It is an important observation that warranting the
existence of σ -extensions/labellings in case of finite AFs does not necessarily carry over to the infinite
case, i.e. the semantics σ does not need to be universally defined w.r.t. arbitrary AFs. Take for instance
semi-stable and stage semantics. To the best of our knowledge the first example showing that semi-stable
as well as stage semantics does not guarantee extensions/labellings in case of non-finite AFs was given
in [Verheij, 2003, Example 5.8.] and is picked up in the following example.
Example 3.10 (Collapse of Stage and Semi-stable Semantics). Consider the AF F = (A∪B∪C,R) where
• A = {ai | i ∈N}, B = {bi | i ∈N}, C = {ci | i ∈N} and
• R = {(ai,bi), (bi,ai), (bi,ci), (ci,ci) | i ∈N}∪{(bi,b j), (bi,c j) | i, j ∈N, j < i}
b1F :
a1
c1
b2
a2
c2
b3
a3
c3
b4
a4
c4
b5
a5
c5
. . .
The set of preferred and naive extensions coincide, in particular Epr(F) = Ena(F) = {A}∪{Ei | i ∈N}
where Ei = (A \ {ai}) ∪ {bi}. Furthermore, none of these extensions is ⊆-range-maximal since
A⊕ ( E⊕i ( E
⊕
i+1 for any i ∈N. In consideration of ss ⊆ pr and stg ⊆ na (cf. Figure 3.1) we conclude
that this framework possesses neither semi-stable nor stage extensions/labellings.
In Example 3.7 we have seen that cf2 as well as stage2 semantics are not well-defined in general.
This means, there are infinite AFs and candidate sets leading to an infinite recursion implying that there
is no definite answer on whether such a set is an extension. However, the following example shows that
even if for any candidate set a definitive decision is possible there need not to be an extension in contrast
to finite AFs.
6Following this terminology we have to rename cf2 semantics to na2 semantics since its base semantics is the naive semantics
and not conflict-free sets.
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Example 3.11 (Collapse of Cf2 and Stage2 Semantics). Taking into account the AF F = (A∪B∪C,R)
from Example 3.10. Consider the AF G = F|B, i.e. the restriction of F to B.
b1G : b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 . . .
Let σ ∈ {cf2,stg2}. Obviously, any argument bi constitutes a SCC {bi} which is evaluated as {bi}
by the base semantics of σ . Consequently, /0 cannot be a σ -extension. Furthermore, a singleton {b j}
cannot be a σ -extension either. The bi’s for i > j are not affected by {b j} and thus, the evaluation
of G|UPG({bi},{b j}) = G|{bi} = ({bi}, /0) do not return /0 as required. Finally, any set containing more
than two arguments would rule out at least one of them and thus, cannot be a σ -extension. Hence,
|Eσ (G)|= |Lσ (G)|= 0.
In Example 3.10 we have seen an AF F without any semi-stable and stage extensions/labellings.
In [Baumann and Spanring, 2015] the authors studied the question of existence-dependency between both
semantics in case of infinite AFs. More precisely, they studied whether it is possible that some AF does
have semi-stable but no stage extensions or vice versa, there are stage but no semi-stable extensions. The
following Example 3.12 shows that stage extensions might exist even if semi-stable semantics collapses.7
Example 3.12 (No Semi-Stable but Stage Extensions/Labellings).
Consider again the AF F depicted in Example 3.10. Using the components of F we define
G = (A∪B∪C∪D∪E,R∪R′) where
• D = {di | i ∈N} and E = {ei | i ∈N} and
• R′ = {(ai,di), (di,ai), (bi,di), (di,bi), (di,ci), (ei,di), (ei,ei) | i ∈N}
b1G :
d1
e1
a1
c1
b2
d2
e2
a2
c2
b3
d3
e3
a3
c3
b4
d4
e4
a4
c4
b5
d5
e5
a5
c5
. . .
In comparison to Example 3.10 we do not observe any changes as far as preferred and semi-stable
semantics are concerned. In particular, Epr(G) = {A}∪{Ei | i ∈N} where Ei = (A \ {ai})∪{bi} and
again, none of these extensions is ⊆-range-maximal. Hence, Ess(G) = /0. Observe that we do have
additional conflict-free as well as naive sets, especially the set D. Since any e ∈ E is self-defeating and
unattacked and furthermore, D⊕ = A∪B∪C∪D we conclude, Estg(G) = {D}. Due to the one-to-one
correspondence the collapse or non-collapse transfer to their labelling-based versions.
7The AF G = F|B depicted in Example 3.11 witnesses the reverse case. It can be checked that Ess(G) = { /0} and Estg(G) = /0
(cf. [Baumann and Spanring, 2015, Example 2] for further explanations).
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3.3.3 Universally Defined Semantics
We now turn to semantics which are universally defined w.r.t. the whole class of AFs. The first non-trivial
result in this line was already proven by Dung himself, namely the universal definedness of the extension-
based version of preferred semantics [Dung, 1995, Corollary 12]. He argued that the Fundamental Lemma
(cf. [Dung, 1995, Lemma 10]) immediately implies that the set of all admissible sets is a complete partial
order which means that any ⊆-chain possesses a least upper bound. Then (and this was not explicitly
stated in [Dung, 1995]), due to the famous Zorn’s lemma [Zorn, 1935] the existence of ⊆-maximal
admissible sets, i.e. preferred extensions, is guaranteed.
In order to get an idea how things work in the general case we illustrate some proofs in more detail.
We will see that a proof of universal definedness w.r.t. arbitrary AFs is completely different to the argu-
mentation in case of finite ones. In order to keep this section self-contained we start with Zorn’s lemma
and an equivalent version of it.
Lemma 3.13 ( [Zorn, 1935]). Given a partially ordered set (P,≤). If any ≤-chain possesses an upper
bound, then (P,≤) has a maximal element.
Lemma 3.14. Given a partially ordered set (P,≤). If any ≤-chain possesses an upper bound, then for
any p ∈ P there exists a maximal element m ∈ P, s.t. p≤ m.
Having Lemma 3.14 at hand we may easily argue that any conflict-free/admissible set is bounded by
a naive/preferred extension.
Lemma 3.15. Given F = (A,R) and E ⊆ A,
1. if E ∈ Ecf (F), then there exists E ′ ∈ Ena(F) s.t. E ⊆ E ′ and
2. if E ∈ Ead(F), then there exists E ′ ∈ Epr(F) s.t. E ⊆ E ′.
Proof. For F = (A,R) we have the associated power set lattice (2A,⊆). Consider now the partially
ordered fragments C = (Ecf (F),⊆) as well as A = (Ead(F),⊆). In accordance with Lemma 3.14 the
existence of naive and preferred supersets is guaranteed if any ⊆-chain possesses an upper bound in C
or A , respectively. Given a ⊆-chain E ⊆ Ecf (F) or E ⊆ Ead(F), respectively. Consider now E¯ = ⋃E .
Obviously, E¯ is an upper bound of E , i.e. for any E ∈ E , E ⊆ E¯. It remains to show that E¯ is conflict-free
or admissible, respectively. Conflict-freeness is a finite condition. This means, if there were conflicting
arguments a,b ∈ E¯ there would have to be some conflict-free sets Ea,Eb ∈ E¯, s.t. a ∈ Ea and b ∈ Eb.
Since E is a ⊆-chain we have Ea ⊆ Eb or Eb ⊆ Ea which contradicts the conflict-freeness of at least one
of them. Assume now E¯ is not admissible. Consequently, there is some a ∈ E¯ that is not defended by E¯.
Furthermore, there has to be an Ea ∈ E , s.t. a ∈ Ea contradicting the admissibility of Ea ∈ Ead(F).
According to the last lemma, we may deduce the universal definedness of the extension-based versions
of preferred as well as naive semantics as long as, for any AF F, the existence of at least one conflict-
free or admissible set is guaranteed. This is an easy task since the empty set is conflict-free as well as
admissible even in the case of arbitrary AFs. Consequently, universal definedness of both extension-
based semantics is given and the same applies to their labelling-based versions due to their one-to-one
correspondence.
Theorem 3.16. Let σ ∈ {pr,na}. The semantics σ is universally defined.
Remember that no matter which cardinality a considered AF possesses, we have that any preferred ex-
tension/labelling is a complete extension/labelling (Proposition 3.6). Thus, having the universal defined-
ness of preferred semantics at hand we deduce that even complete semantics is universally defined w.r.t.
the whole class of AFs .
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Theorem 3.17. The semantics co is universally defined.
Let us consider now eager and ideal semantics. An eager extension is defined as the ⊆-maximal
admissible set that is a subset of each semi-stable extension. This is very similar to the definition of
an ideal extension where the role of semi-stable extensions is taken over by preferred ones. On a more
abstract level, both semantics are instantiations of the following schema.
Definition 3.18. Let σ be a semantics (so-called base semantics). We define the σ -parametrized se-
mantics adσ as follows. For any AF F,
Eadσ = max⊆
E ∈ Ead(F)
∣∣∣∣∣∣E ⊆ ⋂S∈Eσ (F)S
 .
These kind of semantics were firstly introduced in [Dvorák et al., 2011]. The authors studied general
properties of these semantics in case of finite AFs with the additional restriction that the base semantics σ
has to be universally defined. The following general theorem requires neither finiteness of AFs, nor any
assumption on the base semantics.
Theorem 3.19. Any σ -parametrized semantics is universally defined.
Proof. Given an AF F = (A,R) and a σ -parametrized semantics adσ . Consider the following set Σ ={
E ∈ Ead(F) | E ⊆⋂S∈Eσ (F) S}. Note that in the collapsing case, i.e. Eσ (F) = /0, we have: ⋂S∈Eσ (F) S =
{x ∈ U | ∀S ∈ Eσ (F) : x ∈ S} = U . However, in any case Σ 6= /0 since for any F, /0 ∈ Ead(F) and
obviously, /0 ⊆ ⋂S∈Eσ (F) S ⊆ U . In order to show that Eadσ (F) 6= /0 it suffices to prove that (Σ,⊆)
possesses maximal elements. We will use Zorn’s lemma. Given a ⊆-chain E ∈ 2Σ. Consider now
E¯ =
⋃
E . Analogously to the proof of Lemma 3.15 we may easily show that E¯ is conflict-free and even
admissible. Moreover, since for any E ∈ E , E ⊆⋂S∈σ(F) S we deduce E¯ ⊆⋂S∈σ(F) S guaranteeing E¯ ∈Σ.
Now, applying Lemma 3.13, we deduce the existence of ⊆-maximal elements in Σ, i.e. |Eadσ (F)| ≥ 1
concluding the proof.
In particular, we obtain the result for the extension-based versions of eager and ideal semantics and
thus, due to the one-to-one correspondence for both labelling-based versions too.
Corollary 3.20. Let σ ∈ {eg, il}. The semantics σ is universally defined.
One obvious question is whether the statement above can be strengthened in the sense that both
semantics are even uniquely defined w.r.t. the whole class of AFs. The following proposition, in particular
the second item, shows that the unique definedness of eager semantics w.r.t. finite frameworks does not
carry over to the general unrestricted case.
Proposition 3.21. For any F we have:
1. ss(F) = /0⇒ eg(F) = pr(F) and
2. ss(F) = /0⇒ |eg(F)| ≥ℵ0 = |N|.
Proof. We show both assertions for the extension-based versions.
1. Given F = (A,R) and let Ess(F) = /0. Hence,
⋂
S∈Ess(F) S = U . Consequently we deduce
Ess(F) = max⊆ {E ∈ Ead(F) |E ⊆U } . This means, Ess(F) = Epr(F).
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2. We show the contrapositive. Assume
∣∣Eeg(F)∣∣ = n for some finite cardinal n ∈N. Due to the
first statement we derive,
∣∣Epr(F)∣∣ = n. Since ss ⊆ pr (cf. Proposition 3.6) we have finitely many
candidates only. Furthermore, among these preferred extensions has to be at least one ⊆-range-
maximal set implying Ess(F) 6= /0.
In a nutshell, if we observe a collapse of semi-stable semantics, then eager and preferred semantics co-
incide and moreover, we necessarily have infinitely many eager extensions/labellings. An AF witnessing
such a behaviour can be found in Example 3.10.
3.3.4 Uniquely Defined Semantics
Although eager and ideal semantics are instances of σ -parametrized semantics we have shown the non-
unique definedness (Proposition 3.21) for eager semantics only. This is no coincidence since preferred
semantics, the base semantics of ideal semantics is universally defined in contrast to semi-stable se-
mantics, the base semantics of the eager semantics. Moreover, the following theorem shows that any
σ -parametrized semantics warrants the existence of exactly one extension if σ -extensions are conflict-
free as well as guaranteed ( [Dvorák et al., 2011, Proposition 1]).
Theorem 3.22. Given a σ -parametrized semantics adσ , s.t. σ ⊆ cf and σ is universally defined w.r.t. a
class C , then adσ is uniquely defined w.r.t. C .
Proof. Given an AF F = (A,R). We already know |Eadσ (F)| ≥ 1 (Theorem 3.19). Hence, it suffices to
show |Eadσ (F)| ≤ 1. Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that for some I1 6= I2 we have I1, I2 ∈ Eadσ (F).
Consequently, by Definition 3.18, I1, I2 ∈ Ead(F) and I1, I2 ⊆ ⋂S∈Eσ (F) S as well as neither I1 ⊆ I2, nor
I2 ⊆ I1. Obviously, I1 ∪ I2 ⊆ ⋂S∈Eσ (F) S. Since Eσ (F) 6= /0 and I1 as well as I2 has to be subsets of
any σ -extension (which are conflict-free by assumption) we deduce I1, I2 ∈ Ecf (F) and thus, I1 ∪ I2 ∈
Ecf (F). Furthermore, since both sets are admissible in F we derive I1 ∪ I2 ∈ Ead(F) contradicting the
⊆-maximality of at least one of the sets I1 and I2.
Corollary 3.23. The semantics il is uniquely defined.
A further prominent representative of uniquely defined semantics w.r.t. the whole class of AFs is the
grounded semantics. Its unique definedness was already implicitly given in [Dung, 1995]. Unfortunately,
this result was not explicitly stated in the paper. Nevertheless, in [Dung, 1995, Theorem 25] it was shown
that firstly, the set of all complete extensions form a complete semi-lattice w.r.t. subset relation, i.e. the
existence of a ⊆-greatest lower bound for any non-empty subset S is implied. Secondly, it was proven
that the grounded extension is the ⊆-least complete extension. Consequently, the existence of such a
⊆-least extension is justified via setting S = Eco(F) for any given F. Alternatively, one may stick to the
original definition of the grounded extension, namely as ⊆-least fixpoint of the characteristic function
ΓF and argue that the monotonicity of ΓF as well as the Knaster-Tarski theorem [Tarski, 1955] imply its
existence.
Theorem 3.24. The semantics gr is uniquely defined.
3.4 Existence and Uniqueness w.r.t. Finitary AFs
Let us consider now finitary AFs, i.e. AFs where each argument receives finitely many attacks only. It
was already observed by Dung itself that finitary AFs possess useful properties. More precisely, if an AF
is finitary, then the characteristic function Γ is not only monotonic, but even ω-continuous [Dung, 1995,
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Lemma 28] (which does not hold in case of arbitrary AFs [Baumann and Spanring, 2017, Example 1]).
This implies that the least fixed point of Γ, i.e. the unique grounded extension, can be “computed” in at
most ω steps by iterating Γ on the empty set (cf. [Rudin, 1976] for more details). A further advantage of
finitary AFs is that for some semantics σ , the existence or even uniqueness of σ -extension is guaranteed
which cannot be shown in general.
Consider again the AF F depicted in Example 3.10. In contrast to finite AFs where the existence of
semi-stable as well stage extensions is guaranteed we observed a collapse of both semantics. Not that F
is not finitary since, for example, the argument b1 receives infinitely many attacks. A positive answer in
case of semi-stable semantics, i.e. universal definedness w.r.t. finitary AFs was conjectured in [Caminada
and Verheij, 2010, Conjecture 1] and firstly proven by Emil Weydert in [Weydert, 2011, Theorem 5.1].
Weydert proved his result in a first order logic setup using generalized argumentation frameworks. Later
on, Baumann and Spanring provided an alternative proof using transfinite induction. Moreover, they
showed that even stage semantics warrants the existence of at least one extension in case of finitary
AFs [Baumann and Spanring, 2015, Theorem 14]. For detailed proofs we refer the reader to the mentioned
scientific papers.
Theorem 3.25. Let σ ∈ {ss,stg}. The semantics σ is universally defined w.r.t. finitary AFs.
Applying Theorem 3.22 we derive that exactly one eager extension/labelling is guaranteed as long as
the AF in question is finitary.
Theorem 3.26. The semantics eg is uniquely defined w.r.t. finitary AFs.
3.5 Summary of Results and Conclusion
In this section we gave an overview on the question whether certain semantics guarantee the existence or
even unique determination of extensions/labellings. We have seen that these properties may vary from
subclass to subclass. The following table gives a comprehensive overview over results presented in this
section. The entry ′′∃′′ (′′∃!′′) in row certain and column σ indicates that the semantics σ is universally
(uniquely) defined w.r.t. the class of certain frameworks. No entry reflects the situation that a certain AF
can be found which do not provide any σ -extension/labelling, i.e. σ collapses. The two question marks
represent open problems. Note that we already observed that cf2 as well as stage2 semantics are not
well-defined in case of finitary as well arbitrary AFs. This means, there are infinite AFs and candidate
sets leading to an infinite recursion implying that there is no definite answer on whether such a set is
an extension (Example 3.7). Nevertheless, even if for any candidate set a definitive decision is possible
there are infinite (but non-finitary) AFs where both semantics collapse (Example 3.11). In [Baumann and
Spanring, 2015, Conjecture 1] it is conjectured that this is impossible in case of finitary frameworks.
dstbp dssp dstgpdcf2pdstg2pdprp dadp dcop dgrp dilp degp dnap dcf p
∃ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∃ ∃! ∃! ∃! ∃ ∃
∃ ∃ ? ? ∃ ∃ ∃ ∃! ∃! ∃! ∃ ∃
∃ ∃ ∃ ∃! ∃! ∃ ∃ ∃
finite
finitary
arbitrary
Table 3.1: Definedness Statuses of Semantics
For a detailed complexity analysis of the associated decision problems, i.e. Given an AF F. Is
|σ(F)| ≥ 1 or even, |σ(F)| = 1? we refer the reader to [Dvorˇák and Dunne, 2018]. The mentioned
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decisions problems are considered for finite AFs only since the input-length, i.e. the length of the formal
encoding of an AF has to be finite (for finite representations of infinite AFs we refer the reader to [Baroni
et al., 2013]). Due to the table above some complexity results are immediately clear. For instance,
the existence problem is trivial for all considered semantics except the stable one. An upper bound
for the complexity of the uniqueness problem can be obtained via the complexity of the corresponding
verification problem, i.e. Given an AF F and a set E. Is E ∈ Eσ (F)?. More precisely, an algorithm
which decides the uniqueness problem is the following two-step procedure: first, guessing a certain set E
non-deterministically and second, verifying whether this set is an σ -extension.
As already mentioned, most of the literature concentrate on finite AFs for several reasons, especially
due to their computational nature. However, allowing an infinite number of arguments is essential in
applications where upper bounds on the number of available arguments cannot be established a priori,
such as for example in dialogues [Belardinelli et al., 2015] or modeling approaches including time or
action sequences [Baumann and Strass, 2012]. Moreover, even actual infinite AFs frequently occur in
the instantiation-based context. More precisely, the semantics of so-called rule-based argumentation
formalisms (cf. Chapter 6 as well as [Prakken, 2010]) is given via the evaluation of induced Dung-style
AFs. In this context, even a finite set of rules may lead to an infinite set of arguments as observed in
(cf. [Caminada and Oren, 2014; Strass, 2015]).
In 2011, Baroni et al. wrote “As a matter of fact, we are not aware of any systematic literature analysis
of argumentation semantics properties in the infinite case.” [Baroni et al., 2011a, Section 4.4]. Since then
only few works have contributed to a better understanding of infinite AFs. In [Baroni et al., 2013] the
authors studied to which extent infinite AFs can be finitely represented via formal languages and con-
sidered several decision problems within this context. In [Baumann and Spanring, 2015] a detailed study
of the central properties of existence and uniqueness as presented in this chapter was given. Recently, the
same authors addressed several central issues like expressibility, intertranslatability or replaceability (cf.
Chapters 4 and 5) in the general unrestricted case [Baumann and Spanring, 2017].
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Given a certain logical formalism L used as knowledge representation language or modelling tool in
general. Depending on the application in mind, it might be interesting to know which kinds of model
sets are actually expressible in L ? More formally, if σL denotes the semantics of L , we are interested
in determining the set RL = {σL (T ) | T is anL -theory}. This task, also known as realizability or
defineability, highly depends on the considered formalism L . Clearly, potential necessary or sufficient
properties for being inRL , i.e. being σL -realizable, may rule out a logic or make it perfectly appropriate
for a certain application. For instance, it is well-known that in case of propositional logic any finite set
of two-valued interpretations is realizable. This means, given such a finite set I , we always find a set
of formulae T , s.t. Mod(T ) = I . Differently, in case of normal logic programs under stable model
semantics we have that any finite candidate set is realizable if it forms a ⊆-antichain, i.e. any two sets of
the candidate set have to be incomparable with respect to the subset relation. Remarkably, being such an
⊆-antichain is not only necessary but even sufficient for realizability w.r.t. stable model semantics [Eiter
et al., 2013; Strass, 2015]. One major application of realizability issues are dynamic evolvements of L -
theories like in case of belief revision (cf. [Alchourrón et al., 1985; Williams and Antoniou, 1998; Qi and
Yang, 2008; Delgrande and Peppas, 2015; Delgrande et al., 2008; Delgrande et al., 2013; Baumann and
Brewka, 2015a; Diller et al., 2015] for several knowledge representation formalisms). Roughly speaking,
belief revision deals with the problem of integrating new pieces of information to a current knowledge
base which is represented by a certainL -theory T . To this end, you are typically faced with the problem
of modifying the given theory T in such a way that the revised version S satisfies σL (S) = M for some
model set M. Now, before trying to do this revision in a certain minimal way it is essential to know
whether M is realizable at all, i.e. M ∈RL .
The first formal treatment of realizability issues w.r.t. extension-based argumentation semantics was
recently given by Dunne et al. [Dunne et al., 2013; Dunne et al., 2015]. They coined the term signature
for the set of all realizable sets of extensions. The authors provided simple criteria for several mature
semantics deciding whether a set of extensions is contained in the corresponding signature. For instance,
two obvious necessary conditions in case of preferred semantics (as well as many other semantics) is
that a candidate set S has to be non-empty, due to universal definedness of preferred semantics and
second, S has to be a ⊆-antichain, also known as I-maximality criterion [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b].
However, these conditions are not sufficient implying that further requirements has to hold. In case of
preferred semantics it turned out that adding the requirement of so-called conflict-sensitivity indeed yield
a set of characterizing properties. A ⊆-antichain S is conflict-sensitive if for each pair of distinct sets A
and B from S there are at least one a ∈ A and one b ∈ B, s.t. a and b do not occur together in any set
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of S. This implies that there exists an AF F in which the set of its preferred extension coincides with
S = {{a,b},{a,c},{b,d},{c,d}}. Furthermore, since {a,b} and {b,d} are already contained in S it is
impossible to realize the set T= S∪{{a,d}} under preferred semantics. From a practical point of view,
such realizability insights can be used to limit the search space when enumerating preferred extensions.
More precisely, applying the mentioned characterization result we obtain that not only {a,d}, but also
any other set A⊆ {a,b,c,d} can not be a further preferred extension of a certain AF given that we already
computed all sets contained in S. As a matter of fact, knowing that a certain set is realizable does not
provide one automatically with a witnessing AF. Fortunately, there exist canonical frameworks showing
realizability in a constructive fashion as shown in [Dunne et al., 2013; Dunne et al., 2015].
Later on, restricted versions of realizability were considered, namely compact as well as analytic
realizability in case of extension-based semantics [Baumann et al., 2014a; Baumann et al., 2014b; Lins-
bichler et al., 2015; Baumann et al., 2016a]. Both versions are motivated by typical phenomena that can
be observed for several semantics. First, there potentially exist arguments in a given AF that do not appear
in any extension, so-called rejected arguments. Second, most of the argumentation semantics possess the
feature of allowing implicit conflicts. An implicit conflict arises when two arguments are never jointly
accepted although they do not attack each other. In order to understand in which way rejected arguments
and implicit conflicts contribute to the expressive power of a certain semantics the notions of compact
AFs as well as analytic AFs were introduced. The former kind disallows rejected arguments whereas
the latter is free of implicit conflicts. It turned out that for many universally defined semantics the full
range of expressiveness indeed relies on the use rejected arguments and implicit conflicts. This means,
there are plenty of AFs which do not possess an equivalent AF which is in addition compact or analytic,
respectively.
Recently, a first study of extension-based realizability w.r.t. arbitrary frameworks was presented in
[Baumann and Spanring, 2017]. The authors compared the expressive power of several mature semantics
in the unrestricted setting. Interestingly, the results reveal an intimate connection between arbitrary and
finitely compact AFs in terms of expressiveness. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of realizability in the
unrestricted setting is still missing. For instance, necessary and sufficient properties for being realizable
are not considered so far.
There are only few works which have dealt with labelling-based realizability in the context of Dung-
style argumentation frameworks. Dyrkolbotn showed that, as long as additional arguments are allowed
any finite set of labellings is realizable under projection in case of preferred or semi-stable semantics
[Dyrkolbotn, 2014]. In order to realize a set of labellings S under projection it suffices to come up with
an AF F, s.t. its set of labellings modulo additional arguments coincide with S. The second work by
Linsbichler et al. deals with the standard notion of realizability adapted to labelling-based semantics
[Linsbichler et al., 2016]. The authors presented an algorithm which returns either “No” in case of non-
realizability or a witnessing AF F in the positive case. Remarkably, the algorithm is not restricted to the
formalism of abstract argumentation frameworks only. In fact, it can also be used to decide realizability in
case of the more general abstract dialectical frameworks as well as various of its sub-classes like bipolar
ones [Brewka and Woltran, 2010b; Brewka et al., 2013b; Baumann and Strass, 2017].
4.1 Realizability and Signatures
Let us start with the two central concepts of this section, namely realizability as well as signature. In
a nutshell, we say that a certain set S is realizable under the semantics σ , if there is an AF F such that
its set of σ -labellings/σ -extensions coincides with S. Collecting all realizable sets defines the concept
of a signature. In accordance with the existing literature the main part of this section is devoted to finite
realizability for extension-based semantics, i.e. signatures which contain set of σ -extensions of finite
AFs only. Realizability w.r.t. labelling-based semantics as well as the consideration of infinite AFs will
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be briefly outlined only. Consider the following general definition of realizability in the context of abstract
argumentation.
Definition 4.1. Given a semantics σ :F → 2(2U )
n
and a set C ⊆F . A set S ⊆ (2U )n is σ -realizable
w.r.t. C if there is an AF F ∈ C , s.t. σ(F) = S.
Definition 4.2. Given a semantics σ and a set C ⊆ F . The σ -signature w.r.t. C is defined as
ΣCσ = {σ(F) | F ∈ C }.
If clear from context or unimportant we simply speak of signatures and write Σ without mentioning
a semantics σ or set of AFs C . Similarly, we say that a certain set is realizable instead of σ -realizable
w.r.t. C . Please observe that both concepts are intimately connected via the following relation: for any
set S we have, S is realizable if and only if S ∈ Σ. Consequently, if S is not contained in Σ, then there
is no framework whose extensions/labellings are exactly S. Hence, instead of searching for witnessing
AFs (which might not exist) it is very attractive to find necessary as well as sufficient properties for the
containment of a set S to a certain signature locally, i.e. by properties of S itself.
4.2 Signatures w.r.t. Finite AFs
We start with finite realizability. Instantiating Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 with C = {F ∈ F | F finite}
formally capture the notions of realizability as well as signatures relativised to finite AFs. Consider
the following definitions.
Definition 4.3. Given a semantics σ :F → 2(2U )
n
. A set S ⊆ (2U )n is finitely σ -realizable if there is
an AF F ∈ {F ∈F | F finite}, s.t. σ(F) = S.
Definition 4.4. Given a semantics σ . The finite σ -signature is defined as {σ(F) | F ∈F ,F finite} ab-
breviated by Σ fσ .
We proceed with further notational shorthands (adjusted to the extension-based approach) which will
be used throughout the whole section.
Definition 4.5 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given S⊆ 2U , we use
• ArgsS to denote
⋃
S∈S S and ‖S‖ for |ArgsS|,
• PairsS to denote {(a,b) | ∃S ∈ S : {a,b} ⊆ S} and
• dcl(S) to denote (the so-called downward-closure) {S′ ⊆ S | S ∈ S}
Furthermore, we say that S is an extension-set if ‖S‖ is a finite cardinal.
In order to familiarize the reader with the introduced definitions we give the following example.
Example 4.6. Let S= {{a},{a,c},{a,b,d}}. Then
• ArgsS = {a,b,c,d} and ‖S‖= 4. This means, S is an extension-set.
• PairsS = {(a,a), (b,b), (c,c), (d,d), (a,b), (a,c), (a,d), (b,d)} ∪
{(b,a), (c,a), (d,a), (d,b)}
• dcl(S) = { /0,{a},{b},{c},{d},{a,b},{a,c},{a,d},{b,d},{a,b,d}}
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Furthermore, since naive extensions are defined as ⊆-maximal sets and obviously, {a} ⊂ {a,c} we
deduce that S is not na-realizable, i.e. S /∈ Σ fEna . Regarding complete semantics we obtain S ∈ Σ
f
Eco
witnessed by the following AF F.
aF : cb d
In the following we consider the signatures of the extension-based versions of stable, semi-stable,
stage, naive, preferred, complete as well as grounded semantics [Dunne et al., 2013; Dunne et al., 2015].
We provide a bunch of properties where certain subsets of them exactly matches the containment condi-
tions for certain signatures. All properties can be decided by looking on the set in question only.
4.2.1 Semantics based on Conflict-freeness
Our starting point are semantics based on conflict-free sets. Conflict-free sets by themselves inherited
their conflict-freeness to any subset of them. More formally, the downward-closure does not vary the set
of conflict-free sets for a given AF. A set possessing this property is called downward-closed. Clearly,
downward-closedness does not hold in case of admissible sets as well as any other reasonable semantics σ
where conflict-freeness is just one requirement among others for being a σ -extension. Take for instance
naive semantics. Naive extension are defined as ⊆-maximal conflict-free sets. Consequently, the set
of all naive extensions is a ⊆-antichain, i.e. any two naive extensions are incomparable w.r.t. subset
relation. This property also applies to many other semantics, such as stable and stage semantics as
well as any uniquely defined semantics. However, although incomparability is a necessary condition
for many considered semantics it is certainly not sufficient. Consider therefore the following example
taken from [Dunne et al., 2015, Example 1].
Example 4.7. Consider the ⊆-antichain S = {{a,b},{a,c},{b,c}} and a semantics σ which selects its
reasonable positions among the conflict-free sets, i.e. Eσ (F) ⊆ Ecf (F) for any AF F. Now suppose
there exists an AF F with Eσ (F) = S. Then F must not contain attacks between a and b, a and c, and
respectively b and c. This means, {a,b,c} ∈ Ecf (F). But then Eσ (F) typically contains {a,b,c}.
There are several ways to define the required property which excludes sets like S from above. It
turned out that in order to characterize conflict-free based semantics like stable, stage and naive semantics
a rather strong condition is required, so-called tightness. Roughly speaking, if an incomparable set is not
tight, then there is a set S ∈ S and an argument a not belonging to S, s.t. for any s ∈ S we find an other
S′ ∈ S with a and s being members of it. The idea behind the notion of being tight is simply that if an
argument a does not occur in some extension S there must be a reason for that. The most simple reason
one can think of is that there is a conflict between a and some s∈ S, i.e. a and s do not occur jointly in any
extension-set of S or, in other words, (a,s) /∈ PairsS. In a way, this limits the multitude of incomparable
elements of an extension-set.
We proceed with the formal definitions.
Definition 4.8 ( [Dunne et al., 2013]). Given S⊆ 2U . We call S
• downward-closed if S= dcl(S),
• incomparable if S is a ⊆-antichain and
• tight if for all S ∈ S and a ∈ ArgsS it holds that if S∪{a} /∈ S then there exists an s ∈ S such that
(a,s) /∈ PairsS.
Please observe that for incomparable S, the premise of the tightness condition, i.e. S∪{a} /∈ S, is
always fulfilled. However, tightness and incomparability are independent of each other, i.e. neither tight-
ness implies incomparability or comparability, nor incomparability implies tightness or non-tightness.
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Example 4.9. Consider again the extension-set S = {{a,b},{a,c},{b,c}} from Example 4.7. The set S
is incomparable but not tight which can be seen as follows. If setting S = {a,b} we observe S∪{c} /∈ S.
Moreover, for any s ∈ S we find an S′ ∈ S, s.t. {s,c}= S′ implying that (s,c) ∈ PairsS. More precisely, if
s = a, then we have S′ = {a,c} and similarly, if s = b we find S′ = {b,c}.
Furthermore, it can be checked that S′ = {{a,b},{a,c},{b,d},{c,d}} or S′′ = S∪ {{a,b,c}} are
witnessing examples for incomparability and tightness or tightness and comparability, respectively.
Clearly, subsets of incomparable sets are incomparable. Such a kind of inheritance does not hold in
case of tight sets (cf. S and S′′ as defined in Example 4.9). Nevertheless, there are non-trivial tight subsets
of any tight set. For instance, in any case the set of all ⊆-maximal elements is tight. Furthermore, if a
tight set is even incomparable, then any subset of it is tight too.
In the following we present the main statements only. However, in many cases we provide some short
comments indicating how to prove the statement in question. For full proofs we refer the reader to the
referenced papers.
Lemma 4.10 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For a tight extension-set S⊆ 2U we have:
1. the ⊆-maximal elements in S form a tight set, and
2. if S is incomparable then each S′ ⊆ S is tight.
Note that the second statement of Lemma 4.10 implies that if the downward-closure of an incompar-
able extension-set S is tight, then S itself has to be tight too.
We proceed with a specific AF and check which properties apply to its different sets of extensions.
Example 4.11. Consider the following AF F.
c1
a3
b3
a2
b2
a1
b1F :
Since c1 is self-defeating as well as unattacked we obtain Estb(F) = /0. Furthermore, Estg(F) =
{{a1,b2,b3},{a2,b1,b3},{a3,b1,b2}} and Ena(F) = Estg(F)∪{{b1,b2,b3}}. We observe,
1. Estb(F),Estg(F) as well as Ena(F) are incomparable,
2. Estb(F),Estg(F) as well as Ena(F) are tight and additionally,
3. dcl (Ena(F)) and dcl (Estb(F)) are tight and obviously,
4. Estg(F) and Ena(F) are non-empty.
The first and the last items are not surprising since firstly, all considered semantics satisfy the I-
maximality criterion which is just another name for incomparability and secondly, in Theorems 3.25 and
3.16 we have already seen that stage extensions are guaranteed for finitary (hence, for finite) frameworks
and naive semantics is even universally defined w.r.t. the whole class of AFs. This means, incomparability
or non-emptiness of the mentioned sets of σ -extensions do not depend on the specific AF F, but rather ap-
ply to any finite AF. Consequently, these properties represent necessary properties regarding realizability.
The tightness statements of the second and third items can be checked in a straightforward manner. We
now examine that dcl (Estg(F)) is non-tight. This can be seen as follows: Firstly, {b2,b3} ∈ dcl (Estg(F)).
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Now, for b1 the premise of Definition 4.8 is satisfied, i.e. {b1,b2,b3} /∈ dcl (Estg(F)). Consequently,
since {b1,b2},{b1,b3} ∈ dcl (Estg(F)) and therefore, (b1,b2), (b1,b3) ∈ Pairsdcl(Estg(F)) we deduce the
non-tightness of dcl (Estg(F)). This means, tightness of the downward-closure of a given set can not be a
necessary criterion for belonging to the stage signature.
We now present the characterization theorems for conflict-free, naive, stable as well as stage sig-
natures. It is somehow surprising that only a few simple properties are sufficient to characterize these
different signatures.
Theorem 4.12 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given a set S⊆ 2U , then
1. S ∈ Σ fEcf ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, downward-closed, and tight extension-set,
2. S ∈ Σ fEna ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable extension-set and dcl(S) is tight,
3. S ∈ Σ fEstb ⇐⇒ S is a incomparable and tight extension-set,
4. S ∈ Σ fEstg ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and tight extension-set.
We mention that a proof of the characterization theorem above requires two directions. Let us fix a
certain semantics σ ∈ {cf ,na,stb,stg}. The first part is to show that for any finite AF F, Eσ (F) satisfies
the mentioned properties. Now, for the second part, if a certain extension-set S satisfies the properties in
question, then we have to find a finite AF F, s.t. Eσ (F) = S.
Let us start with the first part. It suffices to consider tightness only since downward-closedness, non-
emptiness and incomparability are clear (cf. some explanations given in Example 4.11). It is easy to see
that Ecf (F) is tight because if augmenting a conflict-free set S with a non-conflicting argument a yields
a conflicting set, then obviously there has to be at least one element in s ∈ S, s.t. {a,s} is conflicting.
In order to prove that dcl (Ena(F)) is tight, it suffice to see that dcl (Ena(F)) = Ecf (F). Consequently,
applying Lemma 4.10 we obtain the tightness of Ena(F). Furthermore, with the same lemma, we get that
every S ⊆ Ena(F) is tight. In consideration of stb ⊆ stg ⊆ na (Proposition 3.6) it follows that Estb(F) as
well as Estg(F) are tight.
In order to show that the mentioned properties are not only necessary but even sufficient we have to
come up with witnessing AFs. Consider therefore the following prototype.
Definition 4.13 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given an extension-set S, we define the canonical argumentation
framework for S as
Fcf
S
=
(
ArgsS, (ArgsS×ArgsS) \PairsS
)
.
The idea behind the framework is simple: we draw a relation between two arguments iff they do not
occur jointly in any set S ∈ S. Consequently, for any S, Fcf
S
is symmetric. Moreover, in any case, it is
self-loop-free since a ∈ ArgsS implies (a,a) ∈ PairsS. Let us consider the following example.
Example 4.14. Let S= {{a1,b2,b3},{a2,b1,b3},{a3,b1,b2},{b1,b2,b3}} and consider the correspond-
ing canonical framework Fcf
S
.
a3
b3
a2
b2
a1
b1F
cf
S
:
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Please note that S is non-empty, incomparable as well as possesses a tight downward-closure (cf.
Example 4.11). Furthermore, Fcf
S
realizes S under the naive semantics, i.e. Ena
(
Fcf
S
)
= S.
The following proposition shows that this is no coincidence.
Proposition 4.15 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For each non-empty, incomparable extension-set S, where
dcl(S) is tight, Ena
(
Fcf
S
)
= S.
Moreover, the canonical framework can also be used as witnessing framework in case of conflict-free
sets as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.16 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For each non-empty, downward-closed and tight extension-
set S, Ecf
(
Fcf
S
)
= S.
We proceed with stable and stage semantics. In Theorem 4.12 the only difference between the char-
acterizations of stable and stage signatures is the non-empty requirement for stage semantics. Remember
that we are dealing with finite AFs and indeed in case of this restriction stable semantics is the only se-
mantics which does not warrant the existence of extensions (cf. Table 3.1).1 This means, stable semantics
is the only semantics which may realize the empty extension-set (which is incomparable and tight too).
The final step towards concluding Theorem 4.12 is to find witnessing frameworks for any non-empty,
incomparable and tight extension-sets. At first we will show that the canonical framework does not do
the job in case of these semantics. More precisely, given a non-empty, incomparable as well as tight
extension-set S, then the sets of stable as well as stage extensions of the canonical framework Fcf
S
do not
necessarily coincide with S.
Example 4.17. Consider again Example 4.14. We define T = S \ {{b1,b2,b3}}. Please note that FcfT
and Fcf
S
are identical since ArgsS = ArgsT and PairsS = PairsT. Furthermore, according to Example 4.11
we have that T is non-empty, incomparable and tight, but Estb
(
FcfT
)
= Estg
(
FcfT
)
= Ena
(
Fcf
S
)
= S 6= T.
In order to get rid of the undesired stable as well as stage extension E = {b1,b2,b3} we may simply
add a new self-defeating argument e to Fcf
S
, s.t. e is attacked by all other arguments excepting those
stemming from E. The following framework FstbT illustrates this idea. Convince yourself that Estb
(
FstbT
)
=
Estg
(
FstbT
)
= T.
e
a3
b3
a2
b2
a1
b1FstbT :
The following definition generalizes the construction idea from above to arbitrary many undesired
sets. The subsequent proposition states that we have indeed found witnessing examples for non-empty,
incomparable and tight extension-sets as required for Theorem 4.12.
Definition 4.18 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given an extension-set S and its canonical framework Fcf
S
=
(Acf
S
,Rcf
S
). Let X= Estb
(
Fcf
S
)
\S we define
FstbS =
(
Acf
S
∪{E¯ | E ∈X},Rcf
S
∪{(E¯, E¯), (a, E¯) | E ∈X,a ∈ ArgsS \E}
)
.
1For instance, F = ({a},{(a,a)}) yields Estb(F) = /0.
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Proposition 4.19 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For each non-empty, incomparable and tight extension-set S,
Estb
(
FstbS
)
= Estg
(
FstbS
)
= S.
4.2.2 Semantics based on Admissibility
Let us turn now to semantics based on admissible sets. In particular, we provide characterization the-
orems for the finite signatures w.r.t. admissible sets as well as preferred and semi-stable semantics. In
contrast to semantics based on conflict-free sets where the notion of tightness played a decisive role (cf.
Theorem 4.12) we have to introduce a new concept, so-called conflict-sensitivity. Conflict-sensitivity is a
very basic property in the sense that it is fulfilled by almost all semantics σ (or rather, their correspond-
ing sets of σ -extensions) available in the literature. Furthermore, it is strictly weaker than tightness, i.e.
tight extension-sets are always conflict-sensitive, but not necessarily vice versa. To explain the difference
between these two notions let us consider the following example taken from [Dunne et al., 2015].
Example 4.20. Consider the following framework F.
a′
F : b′
a
b d
c
f e
We have Epr(F) = Ess(F) = S = {A,B,C} = {{a,b},{a,d,e},{b,c,e}}. First, observe that S is not
tight. This can be seen as follows: Obviously, A∪{e} /∈ S, but both (a,e) and (b,e) are contained in
PairsS since {a,e} ⊆ B and {b,e} ⊆C. This means, although A∪{e} is not a reasonable position w.r.t.
preferred and semi-stable semantics we find witnessing extensions, namely B and C, showing that any
argument in A is compatible with e, i.e. they can be accepted together. Please observe that this is not true
for any two arguments in A and B or A and C, respectively. For instance, b,d ∈ A∪B, but (b,d) /∈ PairsS
as well as a,c ∈ A∪C, but (a,c) /∈ PairsS. Furthermore, the same applies to B and C, since c,d ∈ B∪C
and (c,d) /∈ PairsS.
The following definition precisely formalizes the observed property of the AF F presented in the
example above.
Definition 4.21 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). A set S⊆ 2U is called conflict-sensitive if for each A,B ∈ S such
that A∪B /∈ S it holds that ∃a,b ∈ A∪B : (a,b) /∈ PairsS.
As the name suggests, the property checks whether the absence of the union of any pair of extensions
in an extension-set S is justified by a conflict indicated by S. Note that for a,b ∈ A (likewise a,b ∈ B),
(a,b) ∈ PairsS holds by definition. Thus the property of conflict-sensitivity is determined by arguments
a ∈ A \B, b ∈ B \A, for A,B ∈ S. As already indicated tightness implies conflict-sensitivity as stated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.22 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Every tight extension-set is also conflict-sensitive.
Similarly to Lemma 4.10 one may show that the set of all ⊆-maximal elements of a conflict-sensitive
set is conflict-sensitive too. Moreover, if the initial set is incomparable in addition, then even any subset
of it is conflict-sensitive. Furthermore, in contrast to tight extension-sets it is possible to add the empty
set to a conflict-sensitive set without loosing conflict-sensitivity.2
2Note that any one-element extension-set S 6= { /0} is tight, whereas S∪{ /0} is not.
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Lemma 4.23 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For a conflict-sensitive extension set S ⊆ 2U ,
1. the ⊆-maximal elements in S form a conflict-sensitive set,
2. if S is incomparable then each S′ ⊆ S is conflict-sensitive, and
3. S∪{ /0} is conflict-sensitive.
Having conflict-sensitivity at hand, we are now ready to present characterization theorems for the
signatures w.r.t. admissible sets as well as preferred and semi-stable semantics. Interestingly, it turns out
that preferred and semi-stable semantics are equally expressive in case of finite AFs, i.e. Σ fEpr = Σ
f
Ess
.
Theorem 4.24 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given a set S⊆ 2U , then
1. S ∈ Σ fEad ⇐⇒ S is a conflict-sensitive extension set containing /0,
2. S ∈ Σ fEpr ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set,
3. S ∈ Σ fEss ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set.
Let us first argue that the mentioned properties are necessary conditions for being in the correspond-
ing signature. For admissible sets it suffices to recall the following two facts: First, the empty set is
admissible by definition; and second, if the union of two admissible sets is conflict-free, then the union
is admissible too. In other words, if the union fails to be admissible, then there has to be a conflict prov-
ing the conflict-sensitivity of any set of admissible sets. Now, for preferred and semi-stable semantics.
Non-emptiness is due to the already shown universal definedness of both semantics in case of finite AFs
(cf. Table 3.1). Moreover, incomparability is clear since both semantics satisfy the I-maximality criterion
(cf. [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b]) Finally, conflict-sensitivity of sets of admissible sets transfer to sets
of preferred extensions via statement 1 of Lemma 4.23 and therefore also to sets of semi-stable extensions
via statement 2 of Lemma 4.23 and the fact that ss⊆ pr (Proposition 3.6).
In order to show that the mentioned properties are not only necessary but even sufficient we have to
come up with witnessing AFs. In contrast to conflict-free based semantics we have to find AFs which
encode the central notion of admissibility. Please note that the already introduced canonical frameworks
Fcf
S
as well as FstbS (cf. Definitions 4.13 and 4.18) do not comply with the requirements. Consider therefore
the following example.
Example 4.25. Let us consider again the non-empty, incomparable as well as tight set T =
{{a1,b2,b3},{a2,b1,b3},{a3,b1,b2}} together with its corresponding canonical framework FstbT as presen-
ted in Example 4.17. Due to Lemma 4.22 we have that any tight extension-set is even conflict-sensitive
and thus, T satisfies the necessary requirements of Theorem 4.24. Inspecting the canonical framework
reveals that Epr
(
FstbT
)
= T∪{{b1,b2,b3}} 6= T. Although, Ess
(
FstbT
)
= T one may easily check that
non-empty, incomparable as well as conflict-sensitive set S = {{a,b},{a,d,e},{b,c,e}} mentioned in
Example 4.20 shows that this equality does not hold in general. Likewise, one may prove that the frame-
work Fcf
S
is not appropriated as a witnessing prototype for semi-stable as well as preferred semantics.
It turned out that suitable canonical AFs can be built by means of so-called defense-formulae as
introduced in the following definition.
Definition 4.26 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given an extension-set S, the defense-formulaDSa of an argument
a ∈ ArgsS in S is defined as:
DSa =
∨
S∈S,s.t.a∈S
∧
s∈S\{a}
s.
DSa given as (a logically equivalent) CNF is called CNF-defense-formula CD
S
a of a in S.
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The main idea of the formulaDSa is to describe the conditions for the argument a being in an extension.
Note that the variables coincide with the arguments. If S amounts to a set of admissible extensions,
then each disjunct represents a set of arguments A which allows a to join in the sense that A∪ {a}
is a reasonable position w.r.t. admissible semantics. Put it differently, propositional models of DSa ∧ a
represent (if considered as set of atoms) supersets of certain reasonable position. Please not that a defense-
formula DSa is tautological if and only if {a} ∈ S. We proceed with an example.
Example 4.27. Consider again the non-empty, incomparable as well as conflict-sensitive set S =
{{a,b},{a,d,e},{b,c,e}} stemming from Example 4.20. We obtain the following defense-formulae to-
gether with their corresponding CNF-defense-formulae (written in clause form).
• DSa = b∨ (d∧ e) ≡ (b∨d)∧ (b∨ e) and CDSa = {{b,d},{b,e}}
• DSb = a∨ (c∧ e) ≡ (a∨ c)∧ (a∨ e) and CDSb = {{a,c},{a,e}}
• DSc = b∧ e and CDSc = {{b,e}}
• DSd = a∧ e and CDSd = {{a,e}}
• DSe = (a∧d)∨(b∧c)≡ (a∨b)∧(d∨b)∧(a∨c)∧(d∨c) andCDSd = {{a,b},{a,c},{b,d},{c,d}}
One simple idea for the realization of a certain set S under admissible semantics is the following
two-step procedure. In the first step, we construct a framework F which maintains all elements of S as
conflict-free sets. This can be done via the the canonical framework Fcf
S
. In the second step, we augment
the initial framework Fcf
S
, s.t. only elements in S become admissible. The second step can be realized via
adding a certain amount of additional arguments. More precisely, for any argument a ∈ ArgsS we add n
self-conflicting arguments αaC1 , ...,αaCn if
∣∣∣CDSa∣∣∣ = |{C1, ...,Cn}| = n. Then, for any i ∈ {1, ..,n}, αaCi
attacks a and is in turn attacked by any argument in Ci. Consider therefore the following example.
Example 4.28. Again consider the extension-set S = {{a,b},{a,d,e},{b,c,e}} and its corresponding
CNF-defense-formulae as presented in Example 4.27. In accordance with the above mentioned two-step
procedure we obtain the dashed AF Fcf
S
first. Then, in view of the CNF-defense-formulae we have to add
10 additional self-defeating arguments which attacks their corresponding argument. This intermediate
step is depicted below.
a b c d e
αa{b,d} αa{b,e} αb{a,c} αb{a,e} αc{b,e} αd{a,e}
αe{c,d}αe{b,d}αe{a,c}αe{a,b}
Let us consider the set {a,b} ∈ S. In order for {a,b} to be admissible we have to add counter-attacks
for the arguments αa{b,d}, αa{b,e}, αb{a,c} and αb{a,e}. For instance, αa{b,d} is attacked by b and d and
so forth. The following figure (built on top of the previous one) depicts resulting counter-attacks for the
mentioned 4 arguments highlighted as densely dotted edges. For the sake of clarity we do not perform
this construction for the remaining arguments.
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a b c d e
αa{b,d} αa{b,e} αb{a,c} αb{a,e} αc{b,e} αd{a,e}
αe{c,d}αe{b,d}αe{a,c}αe{a,b}
The following definition precisely formalizes the mentioned two-step procedure.
Definition 4.29 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Given an extension-set S, the canonical defense-argumentation-
framework Fdef
S
= (Adef
S
,Rdef
S
) extends the canonical AF Fcf
S
= (ArgsS,R
cf
S
) as follows:
Adef
S
= ArgsS∪
⋃
a∈ArgsS
{
αaγ | γ ∈ CDSa
}
, and
Rdef
S
= Rcf
S
∪
⋃
a∈ArgsS
{
(b,αaγ ), (αaγ ,αaγ ), (αaγ ,a) | γ ∈ CDSa ,b ∈ γ
}
.
The subsequent proposition shows that not only all elements in S become admissible in the constructed
AF Fdef
S
, but rather that the set of admissible sets of Fdef
S
exactly coincides with S given that S is conflict-
sensitive as well as contains the empty set.
Proposition 4.30 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For each conflict-sensitive extension set S where /0 ∈ S, it holds
that Ead
(
Fdef
S
)
= S.
Interestingly, we may even use the canonical defense-AF to show that any non-empty, incomparable
and conflict-sensitive extension-set S can be realized under the preferred semantics. This can be seen
as follows: First, via Lemma 4.23 we obtain the conflict-sensitivity of S∪ { /0} since S is assumed to
be conflict-sensitive. Consequently, using Proposition 4.31 we obtain Ead
(
Fdef
S∪{ /0}
)
= S∪ { /0}. Since
Fdef
S
= Fdef
S∪{ /0} and due to the incomparability of S, we have Epr
(
Fdef
S
)
= S as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.31 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). For each non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive ex-
tension-set S, it holds that Epr
(
Fdef
S
)
= S.
Furthermore, due to a translation result by Dvorˇák and Woltran we obtain that any non-empty, incom-
parable and conflict-sensitive extension-set S can be realized under semi-stable semantics too. More pre-
cisely, in [Dvorˇák and Woltran, 2011] it is shown that for any AF F exists an AF F′, s.t.
Epr(F) = Ess(F′).
Proposition 4.32 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Each non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive exten-
sion-set S is ss-realizable.
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4.2.3 Uniquely Defined Semantics
Let us finally turn to grounded, ideal and eager semantics. Remember that all mentioned semantics war-
rants the existence of exactly one extension given that the frameworks in question are finite (cf. Table 3.1).
Furthermore, it is hardly surprising that this property is even sufficient for being in the corresponding sig-
nature, since any one-element extension-set S = {E} can be realized via FE = (E, /0). In particular, we
obtain that all three semantics are equally expressive.
Theorem 4.33 ( [Dunne et al., 2016]). Given a set S⊆ 2U , then
1. S ∈ Σ fEgr ⇐⇒ S is an extension-set with |S|= 1,
2. S ∈ Σ fEil ⇐⇒ S is an extension-set with |S|= 1 and
3. S ∈ Σ fEeg ⇐⇒ S is an extension-set with |S|= 1.
4.2.4 Summary of Results and Further Remarks
In this subsection we provide a comprehensive overview of characterization results w.r.t. extension-based
realizability in case of finite AFs. The following table collect and combine the results of the previous
three subsections. The table has to be interpreted as follows: Consider a certain column σ . Then, the
entries “×” in rows r1,...,rn indicate that for any extension-set S, S ∈ Σ fEσ ⇐⇒ r1, ...,rn. Moreover, an
entry “→” in row r reflects the fact that the collection of the properties r1, ...,rn imply property r.
dcf p dnap dstbp dstgp dadp dprp dssp dgrp dilp degp
× × × → × × → → →
→ ×
× × ×
× → → →
× × × × × → → →
× → × × → → →
→ → → → × × × → → →
×
S 6= /0
/0 ∈ S
|S|= 1
dcl(S) is tight
S is incomparable
S is tight
S is conflict-sensitive
dcl(S) = S
Table 4.1: Characterizing Properties for Realizable Extension-sets
Remember that the decision whether a certain extension-set S is realizable can not be done via brute
force (i.e., enumerating AFs and checking whether their extensions coincide with S) since there are no
a priori bounds on the number of required arguments. Consequently, the results depicted in Table 4.1
put us in a very good position since now, the question of realizability can be decided locally, i.e. by
inspecting the set in question itself. Moreover, all mentioned properties can checked in polynomial time
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w.r.t. the size of the extensions as shown in [Dunne et al., 2015, Theorem 6]. For the majority of the
properties tractability is immediately apparent. The only exception is tightness of the downward-closure
of a given extension-set S since its size is not polynomially bounded in the size of S (cf. [Dunne et al.,
2015, Proposition 12] for a way out of this problem).
By inspecting the respective properties as depicted in Table 4.1, we can immediately put the signa-
tures of different semantics in relation to each other. The following theorem includes the signature w.r.t.
complete semantics in addition. The reason why we did not included complete semantics in our con-
siderations is simply that a precise characterization of the complete signature is still an open problem.
Nevertheless, certain necessary properties are already found [Dunne et al., 2015, Proposition 4] justifying
items 3 and 4 of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.34 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). The following relations hold
1. Σ fEna ⊂ Σ
f
Estg
⊂ Σ fEss = Σ
f
Epr
,
2. Σ fEstb = Σ
f
Estg
∪{ /0},
3. Σ fEcf ⊂ Σ
f
Ead
⊂ Σ fEco ,
4. Σ fEσ ⊂ Σ
f
Eτ
where σ ∈ {gr, il,eg}, τ ∈ {na,stb,stg,pr,ss,co} and
5.
{
S∪{ /0} | S ∈ Σ fEpr
}
⊂ Σ fEad .
The following Venn-diagram provides a compact overview of subset relations between the considered
signatures. A bordered area represents a set of extension-sets. The outer ellipse ES = {S ⊆ 2U |
S is an extension set} stands for the set of all extension-sets overU . Clearly, all other signatures are sub-
sets of ES by definition. Furthermore, we use {{ /0}} or { /0} the set consisting of the single extension-
set { /0} (realizable by all considered semantics) or the set containing the empty extension-set (realiz-
able by stable semantics only), respectively. The right side of Figure 4.1 shows signatures of semantics
providing only incomparable extension-sets. The intersection of these signatures with Σ fEco exactly coin-
cides with Σ fEgr as well as Σ
f
Eil
and Σ fEeg which contain all extension-sets S with |S| = 1. Moreover, the
only extension-set they have in common with the signatures of conflict-free and admissible sets is the
extension-set containing the empty extension. This fact causes the “missing” intersection in the middle
of Figure 4.1.
ES
{{/0}} Σ fEna
Σ fEstg
=
Σ fEstb\{ /0}
Σ fEpr
=
Σ fEss
Σ fEcfΣ
f
Ead
Σ fEco
{ /0}
Figure 4.1: Subset Relations between Finite Signatures
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Finally, we want to mention that all considered finite signatures, apart from the complete signature, are
closed under non-empty intersections. More precisely, if two finitely σ -realizable sets S and T possess
a non-empty intersection, then S∩T is finitely σ -realizable too. This feature is mainly due to the fact
that subsets of incomparable and tight as well as incomparable and conflict-sensitive sets maintain these
properties (cf. Lemmas 4.10 and 4.23).
Theorem 4.35 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). Let σ ∈ {cf ,ad,na,stb,stg,pr,ss}. For any two finite AFs F1,F2
exists an finite AF F, s.t. Eσ (F) = Eσ (F1)∩Eσ (F2) given that Eσ (F1)∩Eσ (F2) 6= /0.3
4.3 Signatures w.r.t. Finite, Compact AFs
So far we considered realizibility without any restriction (apart from finiteness) for witnessing AFs. This
means, realizing AFs may contain rejected arguments, i.e. arguments which do not appear in any ex-
tension. Rejected arguments are natural ingredients in typical argumentation scenarios and it is a priori
completely unclear in which ways rejected arguments contribute to the expressibility of a particular se-
mantics. In order to have a handle for analyzing the effect of rejected arguments, the class of compact AFs
and its induced signatures were introduced and studied [Baumann et al., 2014a; Baumann et al., 2014b;
Baumann et al., 2016a]. An AF is compact with respect to a semantics σ , if it does not contain rejected
arguments, i.e. each of its arguments appears in at least one σ -extension. Now, the main question is
whether it is possible to get rid of rejected arguments without changing the outcome? or, in other words:
Under which circumstances can AFs be transformed into equivalent compact ones? Note that studying
compactness is far from being an academic exercise since there is a fundamental computational signific-
ance: When searching for extensions, arguments span the search space, since extensions are to be found
among the subsets of the set of all arguments. Hence the more arguments, the larger the search space.
Compact AFs are argument-minimal since none of the arguments can be removed without changing the
outcome, thus leading to a minimal search space.
Let us first have a brief look on the naive semantics, which is defined as ⊆-maximal conflict-free
sets: Here, it is rather easy to see that any AF can be transformed into an equivalent compact AF by
just removing all self-defeating arguments. In other words, the same outcome (in terms of the naive
extensions) can be achieved by a simplified AF without rejected arguments. This means, naive semantics
does not lose expressive power if we stick to compact AFs. However, it is not hard to find semantics
where this coincidence does not hold implying that for such semantics the full range of expressiveness
indeed relies on the concepts of rejected arguments. Consider therefore the following non-compact AF F.
a′F : a b b′
Let us consider admissible sets. We obtain S = Ead(F) = { /0,{a,b}}. Obviously, any attempt of
realizing S with a compact AF G = ({a,b},R) is doomed to failure since if {a,b} is admissible in G we
necessarily obtain the admissibility of {a} as well as {b} proving S 6= Ead(G). It was one main result
in [Baumann et al., 2014a] to show that the finite, compact signatures w.r.t. stable, preferred, semi-stable,
and stage semantics are strict subsets of their corresponding finite signatures. This means, in case of those
semantics, sticking to finite, compact AFs implies a loss of expressive power.
3The prerequisite of a non-empty intersection can be dropped in case of stable semantics.
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4.3.1 Central Definitions and Preliminary Observations
In the following we formally introduce the central notions of compact argumentation frameworks, com-
pact realizibility as well as compact signatures. As already stated, the main idea behind compact AFs is
the absence of rejected arguments. For labelling-based semantics σ (i.e., a semantics returning n-tuples)
we assume that the first component of their associated σ -labellings are interpreted as acceptable sets of
arguments in analogy to σ -extensions in case of extension-based semantics. This means, if a certain ar-
gument occur in no first component of given σ -labellings we classify it as rejected. For a given labelling
L we useL I to refer to its first component.
Definition 4.36. Given a semantics σ : F → 2(2U )
n
. An AF F = (A,R) is compact for σ (or simply,
σ -compact) if ArgsEσ (F) = A (in case of n = 1) or Args{L I|L∈Lσ (F)} = A (for n≥ 2), respectively.
Although extension-based and labelling-based semantics are formally different semantics (according
to Definition 3.3) we often speak of the extension-based version or labelling-based version of a certain
semantics. This can be formally justified for the considered semantics since there is a close relationship
between both versions (cf. Facts 5.38 and 5.39 for some formal relations). The following fact shows
that for all considered semantics σ there is no need to distinguish between σ -compactness w.r.t. the
extension-based version of σ and σ -compactness w.r.t. the labelling-based version of σ . As an aside, such
a coincidence does not require a one-to-one correspondence between the extension-based and labelling-
based version of a semantics σ . It suffices that any σ -extension induces a σ -labelling and vice versa in
such a way that accepted arguments are preserved (cf. statements 1 and 2 of Fact 5.38).
Fact 4.37. For any σ ∈ {stb,ss,stg,cf2,stg2,pr,ad,co,gr, il,eg,na,cf} and any4 AF F we have: F is
compact for Eσ iff F is compact forLσ .
In the following we use CAFσ for AFs compact for σ . Moreover, we use CAF fσ to indicate that the
considered frameworks are finite in addition. It is intuitively clear that there are AFs F being σ -compact
without being τ-compact for two different semantics σ and τ . The following example firstly presented
in [Baumann et al., 2014a, Figure 1] provides us with a witnessing framework.
Example 4.38. Consider the following AF F.5
a3 a1
a2 b3 b1
b2
x1F : x2 x3 y1 y2 y3
z
The preferred extensions of F are Epr(F) = {{z}, {x1,a1}, {x2,a2}, {x3,a3}, {y1,b1}, {y2,b2},
{y3,b3}}, meaning that F is pr-compact (F ∈CAF fpr) since each argument occurs in at least one preferred
extension. On the other hand observe that Ess(F) = Epr(F)\{{z}} and Estg(F) = {{xi,ai,b j},{yi,bi,a j} |
1≤ i, j ≤ 3}, i.e. z is not contained in any semi-stable or stage extension. Therefore F is neither compact
for semi-stable nor compact for stage semantics (i.e. F /∈ CAF fss and F /∈ CAF fstg).
How are the different sets of compact AFs related? We start with an easy observation.
Lemma 4.39 ( [Baumann et al., 2016a]). For any two semantics σ and τ such that for each AF F, for
every S ∈ Eσ (F) there is some S′ ∈ Eτ (F) with S⊆ S′, we have CAFσ ⊆ CAFτ .
4Indeed, no finiteness restriction is required here.
5The construct in the lower part of the figure represents symmetric attacks between each pair of distinct arguments. We will
make use of this style in illustrations throughout the whole section.
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Note that σ ⊆ τ is a special case of the premise of Lemma 4.39. Thus, CAFσ ⊆CAFτ , whenever σ ⊆ τ
(see Figure 3.1 for an overview). Strict subset relations have to be proven by providing a witnessing AF as
presented in Example 4.38. Moreover, CAFpr =CAFco =CAFad as well as CAFna =CAFcf is justified by
Lemma 3.15 and the fact that pr⊆ co⊆ ad and na⊆ cf . Finally, in case of the uniquely defined grounded
and ideal semantics we have, F = (A,R) is compact if and only if R = /0. This in turn implies that F is
compact for stable semantics. This means, CAFgr = CAFil ⊂ CAFstb. Remember that eager semantics is
uniquely defined w.r.t. finitary AFs only (Theorem 3.26, Example 3.10). Consequently, we may conclude
CAF fgr = CAF
f
eg only. Although, the majority of the results do not require the finiteness restriction we
present the following theorem in terms of finite AFs. Detailed proofs for the relations between stable,
semi-stable, preferred, stage and naive semantics can be found in [Baumann et al., 2016a, Theorem 2].
Theorem 4.40. The following relations hold:
1. CAF fgr = CAF
f
il = CAF
f
eg,
2. CAF fpr = CAF
f
co = CAF
f
ad,
3. CAF fna = CAF
f
cf ,
4. CAF fgr ⊂ CAF fstb ⊂ CAF fss ⊂ CAF fpr ⊂ CAF fna,
5. CAF fstb ⊂ CAF fstg ⊂ CAF fna and
6. CAF fstg 6⊆ CAF fσ as well as CAF fσ 6⊆ CAF fstg for any σ ∈ {pr,ss}.
The following figure concisely summarizes all relations mentioned in the theorem above. Directed
arrows between two boxes have to be interpreted as strict subset relations between the mentioned sets of
compact AFs in these boxes.
CAF fgr
=
CAF fil
=
CAF feg
CAF fstb
CAF fstg
CAF fpr
=
CAF fco
=
CAF fad
CAF fss
CAF fna
=
CAF fcf
Figure 4.2: Subset Relations between Finite, Compact AFs
Instantiating Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 with C = CAF fσ formalize the notions of realizibility as well as
signatures relativised to finite, compact AFs. Consider the following definitions.
Definition 4.41. Given a semantics σ :F → 2(2U )
n
. A set S⊆ (2U )n is finitely, compactly σ -realizable
if there is an AF F ∈ CAF fσ , s.t. σ(F) = S.
Definition 4.42. Given a semantics σ . The finite, compact σ -signature is defined as
{
σ(F) | F ∈ CAF fσ
}
abbreviated by Σ f ,cσ .
It is clear that Σc, fσ ⊆ Σ fσ holds for any semantics σ , i.e. finite, compact realizibility implies finite
realizibility. In the following we shed light on the question whether the mentioned subset relation is strict
for a given semantics? In other words, we answer the question whether we indeed lose expressive power
if sticking to compact AFs.
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4.3.2 The Loss or Stability of Expressive Power
Let us consider the uniquely defined grounded, ideal and eager semantics first. We already stated that a
set S is realizable w.r.t. these semantics if and if only if S is an one-element extension-set if considering
finite AFs (Theorem 4.33). Furthermore, it is immediate that an extension-set S= {E} can be compactly
realized via FE = (E, /0). This means, these semantics do not lose expressive power if we restrict ourselves
to compact AFs. Furthermore, the attentive reader may have noticed that the canonical argumentation
framework Fcf
S
, which was used as a witnessing framework for conflict-free sets and naive semantics (cf.
Definition 4.13 as well as Propositions 4.15 and 4.16), does not involve further artificial arguments. Thus,
it verifies finite, compact realizibility and shows that there is no expressive loss in case of conflict-free sets
and naive semantics. For the other considered semantics, namely admissible, stable, stage, semi-stable,
preferred as well as complete semantics we have to accept a strict weaker expressibility if we stick to
compact AFs. In order to prove that in case of these semantics the full range of expressiveness indeed
relies on the concept of rejected arguments we have to come up with witnessing extension-sets. Consider
therefore the following example.
Example 4.43. The extension-set S= {{a,b},{a,d,e},{b,c,e}} is realizable under preferred as well as
semi-stable semantics (cf. Example 4.20 for a realizing non-compact framework). Let σ ∈ {pr,ss}. Now
suppose there exists an AF F = ({a,b,c,d,e},R), s.t. Eσ (F) = S. Since {a,d,e},{b,c,e} ∈ S and σ ⊆ cf
we conclude that there is no attack in R involving e, i.e. e is an isolated argument in F. But then, e is
contained in each σ -extension of F contradicting {a,b} ∈ S. In Summary, S ∈ Σ fEσ \Σ
f ,c
Eσ
.
For further witnessing extension-sets we refer the reader to [Baumann et al., 2016a, Propositions 35
and 57] and proceed with the main theorem.
Theorem 4.44. It holds that
1. Σ f ,cEσ = Σ
f
Eσ
for σ ∈ {cf ,na,gr, il,eg}, and
2. Σ f ,cEσ ⊂ Σ
f
Eσ
for σ ∈ {ad,stb,stg,ss,pr,co}.
In both cases we may benefit of characterization theorems for finite signatures (cf. Theorems 4.12,
4.24 and 4.33). If both signatures are identical (first item), then necessary and sufficient properties for
being finitely σ -realizable immediately carry over to finite, compact σ -realizibility. If we observe a strict
subset relation (second item), then we obtain at least necessary properties for being in the finite, compact
σ -signature.
Theorem 4.45. Given a set S⊆ 2U , then
1. S ∈ Σ f ,cEcf ⇐⇒ S isa non-empty, downward-closed and tight extension set,
2. S ∈ Σ f ,cEna ⇐⇒ S isa non-empty, incomparable extension set and dcl(S) is tight,
3. S ∈ Σ f ,cEgr ⇐⇒ S isan extension set with |S|= 1,
4. S ∈ Σ f ,cEil ⇐⇒ S isan extension set with |S|= 1,
5. S ∈ Σ f ,cEeg ⇐⇒ S isan extension set with |S|= 1 and
6. S ∈ Σ f ,cEstb =⇒ S isan incomparable and tight extension set,
7. S ∈ Σ f ,cEstg =⇒ S isa non-empty, incomparable and tight extension set,
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8. S ∈ Σ f ,cEad =⇒ S isa conflict-sensitive extension set containing /0,
9. S ∈ Σ f ,cEpr =⇒ S isa non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set,
10. S ∈ Σ f ,cEss =⇒ S isa non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set.
4.3.3 Comparing Finite, Compact Signatures and Final Remarks
In the following we relate the finite, compact signatures of the semantics under consideration to each
other. Recall that for finite signatures it holds that Σ fEna ⊂ Σ
f
Estg
=
(
Σ fEstb \{ /0}
)
⊂ Σ fEss = Σ
f
Epr
(cf.
Figure 4.1). This picture changes dramatically when considering the relationships between finite, compact
signatures as depicted in Figure 4.3 (incomparable semantics only) and formally stated in Theorem 4.46.
The dashed areas represent particular intersections for which the question of existence of extension-sets
is still an open question.
Σ f ,cEna
Σ f ,cEpr
Σ f ,cEstg Σ
f ,c
Ess
Σ f ,cEstb
Figure 4.3: Subset Relations between Finite, Compact Signatures
We proceed with an enumeration of relationships between finite, compact signature including further
semantics like conflict-free and admissible sets as well as grounded, ideal, eager and complete semantics.
For formal proofs we refer the interested reader to [Baumann et al., 2016a, Theorem 36, Proposition 58].
Theorem 4.46. The following relations hold:
1. Σ f ,cEσ ⊂ Σ
f ,c
Ena
⊂ Σ f ,cEτ for σ ∈ {gr, il,eg} and τ ∈ {stb,stg,ss,pr},
2. Σ f ,cEstb ⊂ Σ
f ,c
Eσ
for σ ∈ {stg,ss},
3. Σ f ,cEcf ⊂ Σ
f ,c
Ead
,
4. Σ f ,cEco \Σ
f ,c
Eσ
6= /0 and Σ f ,cEσ \Σ
f ,c
Eco
6= /0 for σ ∈ {cf ,ad},
5. Σ f ,cEpr \ (Σ
f ,c
Estb
∪Σ f ,cEss ∪Σ
f ,c
Estg
) 6= /0,
6. Σ f ,cEstg \ (Σ
f ,c
Estb
∪Σ f ,cEpr ∪Σ
f ,c
Ess
) 6= /0,
7. Σ f ,cEstb \Σ
f ,c
Epr
6= /0,
8. (Σ f ,cEpr ∩Σ
f ,c
Ess
) \ (Σ f ,cEstb ∪Σ
f ,c
Estg
) 6= /0 and
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9. Σ f ,cEss \ (Σ
f ,c
Estb
∪Σ f ,cEpr ∪Σ
f ,c
Estg
) 6= /0.
Comparing the results on expressiveness of the considered semantics as stated in Theorems 4.34
and 4.46 we observe notable differences. When allowing rejected arguments, preferred and semi-stable
semantics are equally expressive and at the same time strictly more expressive than stable and stage
semantics. As we have seen, this property does not carry over to the compact setting (with the exceptions
Σ f ,cEstb ⊂ Σ
f ,c
Ess
and Σ f ,cEstb ⊂ Σ
f ,c
Estg
) where signatures become incomparable.
Finally, regarding the open issues represented as dashed areas in Figure 4.3. More precisely, it is
an open problem whether there are extension-sets lying in the intersection between Σ f ,cEpr (resp. Σ
f ,c
Ess
) and
Σ f ,cEstg but outside of Σ
f ,c
Estb
. In [Baumann et al., 2016a] it is conjectured that such extension-sets do not
exist.
Conjecture 4.47 ( [Baumann et al., 2016a]). It holds that Σ f ,cEpr ∩Σ
f ,c
Estg
⊂ Σ f ,cstb and Σ f ,cEss ∩Σ
f ,c
Estg
= Σ f ,cEstb .
4.4 Signatures w.r.t. Finite, Analytic AFs
We now turn to a further phenomenon, so-called implicit conflicts which can be frequently observed in
typical argumentation scenarios. Consider therefore the following AF F.
x1
y1
x2
y2
x3
y3F :
Let us consider stable semantics. Please note that any xi is jointly acceptable with one specific y j.
More precisely, Estb(F) = {{x1,y3},{x2,y1},{x3,y2}} implying that we do not have any rejected argu-
ments, i.e. F is stable compact. What can be said about the two pairs of arguments x1 and x2 as well
as y1 and y2? First of all, both pairs represent a semantical conflict in F since neither of those pairs
occur together in any stable extension. In case of x1 and x2, the conflict is even a syntactical one since
both arguments attack each other in contrast to the pair consisting of y1 and y2. This difference leads
to the distinction between syntactically underlined explicit conflicts and syntactically unfounded implicit
ones (indicated by dashed lines). In order to understand how implicit conflicts contribute to the express-
iveness of a certain semantics, the set of analytic AFs and its induced signatures were introduced and
studied [Linsbichler et al., 2015; Baumann et al., 2016a]. An analytic framework, i.e. a framework which
is free of implicit conflicts maximizes the information on conflicts. One main question is: under which
circumstances an arbitrary framework can be transformed into an equivalent analytic one? This question
is interesting from a theoretical as well as practical point of view. On the one hand, analytic frameworks
are natural candidates for normal forms of AFs, and on the other maximizing the number of explicit
conflicts might help argumentation systems to evaluate AFs more efficiently.
Let us consider again the extension-set S = {{x1,y3},{x2,y1},{x3,y2}} stemming from the AF F
depicted above. Replacing the dashed arrows with symmetric attacks in F shows that S can be analytically
realized under stable semantics. Interestingly, this is no coincidence, since it was shown that in case of
stable semantics any AF can be transformed into an equivalent analytical one. However, in general it is not
that easy to make implicit conflicts explicit since there are frameworks where any suitable transformation
requires the use of additional arguments as shown in [Linsbichler et al., 2015].
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4.4.1 Central Definitions and Preliminary Observations
In this section we consider the central notions of analytic argumentation frameworks, analytic realizab-
ility as well as analytic signatures. In order to define analytic AF we have to differentiate between the
concept of an attack (as a syntactical element) and the concept of a conflict (with respect to the evaluation
under a given semantics). More precisely, if two arguments cannot be accepted together, i.e. no reason-
able position contain them jointly as elements, we say that these arguments are in conflict. If this conflict
is syntactically underlined by an attack between them, we call this conflict explicit, otherwise implicit.
Now, an analytic framework is an AF which simply does not contain any implicit conflicts. Consider the
following definition.
Definition 4.48. Given a semantics σ :F → 2(2U )
n
, an AF F = (A,R) and two arguments a,b ∈ A. We
say that
1. a and b are in conflict for σ if (a,b) /∈ PairsEσ (F) (in case of n = 1) or (a,b) /∈ Pairs{L I|L∈Lσ (F)}
(for n≥ 2), respectively,
2. the conflict is explicit w.r.t. σ if (a,b)∈R or (b,a)∈R, otherwise implicit,
3. the AF F is analytic for σ (or σ -analytic) if all conflicts are explicit.
Please notice that Definition 4.48 does not require a and b to be different arguments. In particular, an
argument that is not contained in any reasonable position is in conflict with itself. This conflict is explicit
if the argument is self-attacking and implicit otherwise. Furthermore, for all considered semantics σ we
observe there is no need to distinguish between σ -analyticality w.r.t. the extension-based version of σ and
σ -analyticality w.r.t. the labelling-based version of σ (similarly as in case of σ -compactness as stated in
Fact 4.37). Please note that this coincidence is justified for any semantics σ whenever Eσ (F) = {L I |
L ∈Lσ (F)} is guaranteed.
Fact 4.49. For any σ ∈ {stb,ss,stg,cf2,stg2,pr,ad,co,gr, il,eg,na,cf} and any AF F we have: F is ana-
lytic for Eσ iff F is analytic forLσ .
In the following we denote the set of all σ -analytic AFs as XAFσ . To indicate that the frameworks
under consideration are finite we use XAF fσ . We proceed with an example illustrating the new definitions.
Example 4.50. As a simple example consider the following AF F depicted below.
c dF : a b
For σ ∈ {stb,pr,ss,stg} we have Eσ (F) = {{a,d},{b,c}}. Observe that there is only one implicit
conflict, namely the conflict between the arguments c and d, denoted by a dashed line. Hence, F is not
σ -analytic, i.e. F /∈ XAF fσ . However, since Ena(F) = Eσ (F)∪{{c,d}} we have that F is na-analytic, i.e.
F ∈ XAF fna.
As indicated in Example 4.50 the sets of analytic AFs can differ for different semantics. Just like in
case of compact AFs (cf. Lemma 4.39) one may easily verify the following lemma which allows to obtain
a plenty of subset relations between sets of analytic AFs.
Lemma 4.51 ( [Baumann et al., 2016a]). For any two semantics σ and τ such that for each AF F, for
every S ∈ Eσ (F) there is some S′ ∈ Eτ (F) with S⊆ S′, we have XAFσ ⊆ XAFτ .
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In line with the existing literature we restrict our considerations to finite AFs. Regarding univer-
sal (but not uniquely) defined semantics we obtain the same relations as in case of compact AFs (see
explanations below Lemma 4.39). In any case we have XAF fgr ⊆ XAF fil ⊆ XAF feg since ideal semantics
accepts more arguments than grounded semantics and eager semantics is even more credulous than ideal
semantics. Furthermore, XAF feg ⊆ XAF fss because the unique eager extension is contained in all semi-
stable extension by definition and moreover, semi-stable semantics guarantees reasonable positions in
case of finite AFs. Now, let F = (A,R) be analytic w.r.t. eager semantics and Eeg(F) = {E}. We de-
duce that all arguments in A\E have to be self-defeating. Consequently, its corresponding (conflict-free)
base semantics (cf. Definition 3.18) warrants exactly one extension for F. More precisely, Ess(F) = {E}.
Finally, due to the self-conflicting arguments and the admissibility of E we obtain Epr(F) = {E} and
thus, Eil(F) = {E} showing that F is even analytic w.r.t. ideal semantics, i.e. XAF fil = XAF feg. The AF
F = ({a,b},{(a,b), (b,a), (b,b)}) proves that a similar result in case of grounded and ideal semantics
does not hold. Detailed proofs for the relations between stable, semi-stable, preferred, stage and naive
semantics can be found in [Baumann et al., 2016a, Theorem 4].
Theorem 4.52. The following relations hold:
1. XAF fgr ⊂ XAF fil = XAF feg ⊂ XAF fss,
2. XAF fpr = XAF
f
co = XAF
f
ad,
3. XAF fna = XAF
f
cf ,
4. XAF fstb ⊂ XAF fss ⊂ XAF fpr ⊂ XAF fna,
5. XAF fstb ⊂ XAF fstg ⊂ XAF fna,
6. XAF fstg 6⊆ XAF fσ and XAF fσ 6⊆ XAF fstg for any σ ∈ {pr,ss},
7. XAF fσ 6⊆ XAF fτ and XAF fτ 6⊆ XAF fσ for any σ ∈{gr, il,eg}, τ∈{stb,stg}.
The following figure summarizes all relation in a compact way. Similarly to Figure 4.2, a directed
arrow between two boxes has to be interpreted as strict subset relation between the mentioned sets of
analytic AFs therein.
XAF fgr
XAF fil
=
XAF feg
XAF fstb
XAF fstg
XAF fpr
=
XAF fco
=
XAF fad
XAF fss
XAF fna
=
XAF fcf
Figure 4.4: Subset Relations between Finite, Analytic AFs
At this point we want to mention that although Figures 4.2 and 4.4 look very similar we have that
compactness and analyticality are sufficiently distinct properties. More precisely, apart from the uniquely
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defined semantics as well as naive semantics and conflict-free sets no subset relations between the sets
of compact and analytic frameworks can be stated in general. Sticking to self-loop-free AFs allows
one to draw further relations such as analyticality implies compactness for any considered semantics.
The main reason for this general relation is that rejected arguments has to be self-defeating in case of
analytic frameworks. A selection of proofs of relations listed below can be found in [Baumann et al.,
2016a, Proposition 5-8].
Proposition 4.53. Given an AF F, then
1. CAF fσ ⊂ XAF fσ for σ ∈ {gr, il,eg,na,cf},
2. CAF fσ 6⊆ XAF fσ and XAF fσ 6⊆ CAF fσ for σ ∈ {ad,stb,ss,pr,stg,co}.
If F is self-loop-free in addition, then
3. F ∈ XAF fσ and F ∈ CAF fσ for σ ∈ {na,cf},
4. F ∈ XAF fσ ⇐⇒ F ∈ CAF fσ for σ ∈ {gr, il,eg} and
5. F ∈ XAF fσ =⇒ F ∈ CAF fσ for σ ∈ {ad,stb,ss,pr,stg,co}.
We now precisely formalize the notions of realizibility as well as signatures relativised to finite,
analytic AFs. This can be formally done via instantiating Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 with C = XAF fσ .
Definition 4.54. Given a semantics σ : F → 2(2U )
n
. A set S ⊆ (2U )n is finitely, analytically σ -
realizable if there is an AF F ∈ XAF fσ , s.t. σ(F) = S.
Definition 4.55. Given a semantics σ . The finite, analytic σ -signature is defined as
{
σ(F) | F ∈ XAF fσ
}
abbreviated by Σ f ,xσ .
4.4.2 The Loss or Stability of Expressive Power
Clearly, every set in the finite, analytic signature of a semantics is also contained in the finite signa-
ture. Remember that in case of compact AFs we do not lose any expressive power if considering the
uniquely defined grounded, ideal and eager semantics as well as naive semantics and conflict-free sets
(Theorem 4.44). These equal expressiveness results carry over to analytic AFs and moreover, even stable
and stage semantics may realize the same sets. For instance, consider again the non-analytic AF F as
introduced in Example 4.50. One may easily verify that adding an attack from c to d or vice versa yields
an AF F′ analytic for stable semantics which does not change the set of stable extensions. However, in
general it is not that easy to make implicit conflicts explicit but it was shown that the use of additional
arguments indeed allows one to turn any finite framework in an analytical one without changing the set
of stable or stage extensions, respectively [Baumann et al., 2016a, Proposition 28, Theorem 29]. For the
sake of completeness, we mention that it was an open question for a while, known as Explicit Conflict
Conjecture [Baumann et al., 2014a], whether it is possible, under stable semantics, to translate a given
AF into an equivalent analytic one without adding further arguments. In [Baumann et al., 2016a] the
conjecture was refuted for stable and even stage semantics. For the remaining semantics, i.e. admissible,
semi-stable, preferred and complete semantics the conjecture does not hold either since in case of these
semantics we even have that the finite, analytic signature is a strict subset of the corresponding finite one.
This means, the full range of expressiveness indeed relies on the use of implicit conflicts. Consider the
following example firstly presented in [Baumann et al., 2016a, Example 6].
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Example 4.56. Take into account the AF F = (A,R) as depicted below.
a1
F : u3
b1 x1 u1
a2 b2 x2 u2
a3 b3 x3
Formally, we have
A ={ai,bi,xi,ui | i ∈ {1,2,3}} and
R ={(ai,bi), (bi,ai), (bi,xi), (xi,ui) | i ∈ {1,2,3}}∪{(x1,x2), (x2,x3), (x3,x1)} .
Regarding the extension-based version of preferred semantics we obtain the set S = Epr(F) =
{Sa,Sb,A1,A2,A3,B1,B2,B3} with
Sa = {a1,a2,a3} Sb = {b1,b2,b3,u1,u2,u3}
A1 = {a2,a3,b1,x2,u1,u3} B1 = {a1,b2,b3,x1,u2,u3}
A2 = {a1,a3,b2,x3,u1,u2} B2 = {a2,b1,b3,x2,u1,u3}
A3 = {a1,a2,b3,x1,u2,u3} B3 = {a3,b1,b2,x3,u1,u2}
We observe three implicit conflicts indicated by dashed lines. Consequently, F is not analytic w.r.t.
preferred semantics. Moreover, we claim that S is not analytically pr-realizable at all. For a contradiction
we assume that there exists an AF G ∈ XAF fpr, s.t. Epr(G) = S. We now investigate this hypothetical
AF G. The main idea is to show that if the conflict between a1 and x2 is made explicit, then S 6= Epr(G).
First, note that G contains at least all arguments in A since ArgsS = A. Due to A3 and B3 we deduce that
Sa ∪{u2} is conflict-free in G. Furthermore, due to A1, the admissibility of Sa in G and the assumption
that all conflicts has to be explicit, we infer that a1 attacks x2. Moreover, in consideration of S, it is easy
to see that x2 is the only possible attacker of u2 among ArgsS. This implies that Sa defends u2 against
all arguments in ArgsS. Finally, any additional argument z /∈ ArgsS in G must be attacked by Sa since G
is analytic w.r.t. preferred semantics and Sa must be admissible. This causes Sa ∪{u2} to be admissible
in G and hence, Sa cannot be preferred in G. In summary, any AF realizing S has to be non-analytic for
preferred semantics, i.e. S ∈ Σ fEpr \Σ
f ,x
Epr
.
We proceed with the main theorem comparing finite signatures with their corresponding analytical
ones.
Theorem 4.57 ( [Baumann et al., 2016a]). It holds that
1. Σ f ,xEσ = Σ
f
Eσ
for σ ∈ {cf ,na,gr, il,eg,stb,stg}, and
2. Σ f ,xEσ ⊂ Σ
f
Eσ
for σ ∈ {ad,ss,pr,co}.
In the following we present characterization theorems for finite, analytic signatures or at least ne-
cessary properties for being finitely, analytically realizable. All results can be verified via combining
the main theorem above as well as the already presented characterization theorems for finite signatures,
namely Theorems 4.12, 4.24 and 4.33.
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Theorem 4.58. Given a set S⊆ 2U , then
1. S ∈ Σ f ,xEcf ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, downward-closed and tight extension set,
2. S ∈ Σ f ,xEna ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable extension set and dcl(S) is tight,
3. S ∈ Σ f ,xEgr ⇐⇒ S is an extension set with |S|= 1,
4. S ∈ Σ f ,xEil ⇐⇒ S is an extension set with |S|= 1,
5. S ∈ Σ f ,xEeg ⇐⇒ S is an extension set with |S|= 1,
6. S ∈ Σ f ,xEstb ⇐⇒ S is a incomparable and tight extension set,
7. S ∈ Σ f ,xEstg ⇐⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and tight extension set and
8. S ∈ Σ f ,xEad =⇒ S is a conflict-sensitive extension set containing /0,
9. S ∈ Σ f ,xEpr =⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set,
10. S ∈ Σ f ,xEss =⇒ S is a non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension set.
4.4.3 Comparing Finite, Analytic Signatures and Final Remarks
So far we have compared finite signatures and finite, analytic signatures for the semantics under consid-
eration. We have seen, for example, that preferred and semi-stable semantics can realize strictly more
when allowing the use of implicit conflicts, while this is not the case for stable and stage semantics. In
the following we relate the finite, analytic signatures of all considered semantics. Remember that we
observed a considerable variety in the relations between incomparable semantics if sticking from finite to
finite, compact signatures (cf. Figures 4.1 and 4.3). However, in the analytic case we have slight differ-
ences only as illustrated in Figure 4.7 (for incomparable semantics) and formally stated in Theorem 4.60.
For instance, preferred and semi-stable signatures do not coincide anymore as shown by the following
example taken from [Baumann et al., 2016a, Figure 9, Proof of Theorem 34].
Example 4.59. Consider the following AF F as depicted below.
x1
x2
x3
F : x4
x5
x6
z1
z2
z3
z4
z5
z6
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
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The preferred extension of F can be compactly presented via a cyclic successor functions. More
precisely, if s(1) = 2,s(2) = 3,s(3) = 1 and s(4) = 5,s(5) = 6,s(6) = 4, then Epr(F) = S= S0∪S1∪S2
with
S0 =
{{
xi,y j,zs(i),zs( j)
}
| i ∈ {1,2,3}, j ∈ {4,5,6}or i ∈ {4,5,6}, j ∈ {1,2,3}
}
,
S1 =
{{
xi,yi,zs(i)
}
| i ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6}
}
and
S2 =
{{
xi,ys(i),zs(s(i))
}
,
{
xs(i),yi,zs(s(i))
}
| i ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6}
}
.
This means, F is pr-analytic and therefore, S ∈ Σ f ,xEpr . We show now that S /∈ Σ
f ,x
Ess
. Assume that there is
some G = (B,S) ∈ XAF fss with Epr(G) = S. We take a look at S1 and more specifically {x1,y1,z2} ∈ S1.
Now we need an explicit conflict between x1 and x4, but in the selected set only x1 can possibly defend
against this attack, hence (x1,x4) ∈ S. The same argument works for x1 and x3 as well as z2 and z3, mean-
ing that also (x1,x3), (z2,z3) ∈ S. For symmetry reasons {(xi,x j), (x j,xi), (yi,y j), (y j,yi) | i∈ {1,2,3}, j ∈
{4,5,6}} ⊆ S and {(xs(i),xi), (zi,zs(i)) | i ∈ {1,2 . . .6}} ⊆ S.
We take a look at S2 and more specifically {x1,y2,z3} ∈ S2. As there should be an explicit conflict
between x1 and x2 with only x1 possibly defending this extension against x2 we need (x1,x2) ∈ S. Further
as in this set only y2 and z3 can possibly attack z2 we have the set {y2,z3} attacking z2. For symmetry
reasons {(xi,xs(i)), (yi,ys(i)) | i ∈ {1,2 . . .6}} ⊆ S and each set {xi,zs(i)},{yi,zs(i)} for i ∈ {1,2 . . .6} at-
tacks zi.
Finally we take a look at S0 and specifically the set I = {x1,y4,z2,z5} ∈ S0. Since I necessarily is
an admissible extension in an analytic AF we have that I attacks all rejected arguments. By the above
observations we now have that I even attacks all arguments not being member of I in G, which means
that I is a stable extension and stable semantics and semi-stable semantics thus coincide on G. But then,
with J = {x1,y1,z2} ∈ S1 not being in conflict with for instance z4 we have that J can not be a stable or
semi-stable extension in G concluding S /∈ Σ f ,xEss .
Σ f ,xEna
Σ f ,xEprΣ
f ,x
Ess
Σ f ,xEstb\{ /0}= Σ
f ,x
Estg
Figure 4.5: Subset Relations between Finite, Analytic Signatures
Theorem 4.60 ( [Dunne et al., 2015]). The following relations hold:
1. Σ f ,xEσ ⊂ Σ
f ,x
Ena
⊂ Σ f ,xEstg ⊂ Σ
f ,x
Ess
⊂ Σ f ,xEpr for σ ∈ {gr, il,eg},
2. Σ f ,xEstb = Σ
f ,x
Estg
∪{ /0},
3. Σ f ,xEcf ⊂ Σ
f ,x
Ead
and
4. Σ f ,xEco \Σ
f ,x
Eσ
6= /0 and Σ f ,xEσ \Σ
f ,x
Eco
6= /0 for σ ∈ {cf ,ad}.
77
4.5. Remarks on Unrestricted AFs and Intertranslatability
4.5 Remarks on Unrestricted AFs and Intertranslatability
Recently, some first results regarding expressibility w.r.t. unrestricted frameworks were presented in [Bau-
mann and Spanring, 2017]. Remember that the set of unrestricted frameworks, abbreviated by F , con-
tains all AFs F = (A,R), s.t. A⊆U . This means,F contains finite as well as infinite AFs and especially,
AFs possessing all available arguments. It is obvious that signatures w.r.t. unrestricted frameworks con-
tain more realizable sets then their finite counterparts since finite AFs may realize finite as well as finitely
many extensions only. The following definition formally captures all considered types of signatures (cf.
Definitions 4.4, 4.42 and 4.55) without any finite assumption.
Definition 4.61. Given a semantics σ . We call the set S the
1. (unrestricted) σ -signature if S = {σ(F) | F ∈F} abbreviated by Σσ ,
2. compact σ -signature if S = {σ(F) | F ∈ CAF} abbreviated by Σcσ and
3. analytic σ -signature if S = {σ(F) | F ∈ XAF} abbreviated by Σxσ .
In [Baumann and Spanring, 2017] the authors were interested in a comparison of the expressive
power of several mature semantics in the unrestricted setting. The following result shows that the relation
between unrestricted signatures is intimately connected to their relation in case of finite, compact sig-
natures. More precisely, non-empty relative complements in case of finite, compact signatures between
two semantics carry over to their unrestricted versions. The main reason for this relation is the fact that
unrestricted frameworks may contain any available argument of the universe U .
Theorem 4.62 ( [Baumann and Spanring, 2017]). Given two semantics σ and τ with σ ,τ ∈
{na,stb,stg,ss,pr,co,gr, il,eg,cf ,ad} we have:
1. If Σ f ,cEσ \Σ
f ,c
Eτ
6= /0, then ΣcEσ \ΣcEτ 6= /0 and
2. If ΣcEσ \ΣcEτ 6= /0, then ΣEσ \ΣEτ 6= /0.
The following example illustrates the main proof idea.
Example 4.63. Let E ∈ Σ f ,cEpr \Σ
f ,c
Estb
(cf. Figure 4.3) and F = (A,R) a witnessing framework. This means,
F is finite, Epr(F) = E and pr-compact, i.e.
⋃
E = A. Consider now H = (U ,R). Obviously, E ′ =
Epr(H) = {E ∪ (U \A) : E ∈ E } and ⋃E ′ = U showing the σ -compactness of H. In particular, E ′ ∈
ΣcEpr . Note that any stb-realization of E
′ has to be compact too since there are no additional arguments
available. Assume E ′ ∈ ΣcEstb , i.e. there is an AF G′ = (U ,R′), s.t. Estb(G′) = E ′. We observe that due to
conflict-freeness there can not be attacks in G′ between arguments from A and U \A nor between any of
the arguments from U \A. Consequently, G = (A,R′) is finite, Estb(G) = E and stb-compact implying
that E ∈ Σ f ,cEstb in contradiction to the initial assumption.
Now we are prepared for a comparison in case of unrestricted frameworks. Ignoring the superscripts
in Figure 4.3 provides you with a graphical representation for selected semantics.
Theorem 4.64. For unrestricted signatures the following hold:
1. {{E} | E ⊆U }= ΣEσ ⊂ ΣEna ⊂ ΣEτ for σ ∈ {gr, il}, τ ∈ {stb,stg,ss,pr},
2. ΣEeg ⊂ ΣEpr ,
3. ΣEstb ⊂ ΣEσ for σ ∈ {stg,ss},
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4. ΣEpr \ (ΣEstb ∪ΣEss ∪ΣEstg) 6= /0,
5. ΣEstg \ (ΣEstb ∪ΣEpr ∪ΣEss) 6= /0,
6. ΣEstb \ΣEpr 6= /0,
7. ΣEss \ (ΣEstb ∪ΣEpr ∪ΣEstg) 6= /0,
8. ΣEco \ΣEσ 6= /0 and ΣEσ \ΣEco 6= /0 for σ ∈ {cf ,ad},
9. ΣEcf ⊂ ΣEad .
Finally, we briefly consider the closely related topic of intertranslatability. Intertranslatability re-
volves around the idea of mapping one semantics to another. One main motivation for studying this issue
is the possibility to reuse a solver for one semantics for another [Dvorˇák and Woltran, 2011]. The main
tool for this endeavour are functions mapping AFs to AFs, so-called translations formally defined as
follows.
Definition 4.65. [Dvorˇák and Woltran, 2011] Given two semantics σ ,τ . A function f :F →F is called
an exact translation for σ → τ , if σ(F) = τ( f (F)) for any AF F. It is called a faithful translation if for
any AF F first |σ(F)|= |τ( f (F))| and second σ(F) = {S∩A(F) | S ∈ τ( f (F))}.
Please note that for some semantics there are no exact translations available due to reasons inherent to
those semantics. For instance, preferred semantics satisfies I-maximality, i.e. for any AF F, Epr(F) forms
a ⊆-antichain [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b]. This implies that an exact translation Ead → Epr can not
exist since for F = ({a}, /0) we observe { /0,{a}} = Ead(F). Sticking to faithful translations provides us
with a positive answer if we consider finite AFs only [Spanring, 2012, Translation 3.1.85]. Interestingly,
the considered translation does not serve in the general unrestricted case and interestingly, it was shown
that a search for a suitable translation will never succeed (cf. [Baumann and Spanring, 2017, Example 6]).
The following theorem (a generalization of the finite version from [Dvorˇák and Spanring, 2016, Sec-
tion 6.1]) establishes a close relation between realizability and intertranslatability as promised, namely:
if τ is not less expressive than σ , then σ can be exactly translated to τ and vice versa.
Theorem 4.66 ( [Baumann and Spanring, 2017]). Given semantics σ , τ . We have: Σσ ⊆ Στ if and only
if there is an exact translation for σ → τ .
The following Figure 4.6 illustrates translational (im)possibilities in an eye-catching way. Figure 4.6b
summarizes known results regarding faithful translations in the finite case [Dvorˇák and Woltran, 2011;
Spanring, 2012; Dvorˇák and Spanring, 2016], augmented with obvious insights for unique status se-
mantics il and eg. For semantics σ ,τ , encirclement in the same component indicates bidirectional trans-
lations. An arrow from σ to τ means directional translations. If there is no directed path (for instance
for na to cf , or for cf to gr), then there is no translation. Figure 4.6a features the same visualization
for unrestricted AFs. Dropping the finiteness restriction has some further consequences for the con-
sidered semantics, namely exact and faithful intertranslatability coincide. It is an open question whether
both forms of translations are essentially the same in the general unrestricted setting. In consideration
of Theorem 4.66 we may interpret Figure 4.6a as a comparison of the expressiveness of the considered
semantics. That is, Σσ ⊂ Στ if and only if there is a directed path from σ to τ .
As a final note, in contrast to the unrestricted setting Baumann and Spanring observed that for slightly
restricted AFs F = (A,R), s.t. |A| ≤ |U \A| it is possible to provide exact and efficiently computable
translations from preferred to semi-stable semantics via f (F) = F′ = (A′,R′) with A′ = A∪{a′ |a ∈ A}
and R′ = R∪ {(a,a′), (a′,a′) | a ∈ A}. It is an interesting question whether this restriction allows for
similar translational possibilities as in case of finite AFs.
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(b) Finite AFs (faithful)
Figure 4.6: Translational (Im)Possibilities
4.6 Realizability and Signatures for Labelling-based Versions
Although any considered semantics σ possesses an extension-based version (indicated by Eσ ) as well as a
closely related 3-valued labelling-based version (indicated byLσ ) we formally have that both versions are
different semantics (or more precisely, functions) in the sense of Definition 3.3. This formal difference has
some impact on realizability as well as signatures. Let us consider realizability in the realm of finiteness.
As a matter of fact, for any considered 3-valued labelling-based version Lσ we have: if F = (A,R) and
L = (L I,L O,L U) ∈Lσ (F), then A =L I∪L O∪L U. This means, σ -labellings assign a status to any
argument in F. Now, in case of finite AFs we know that potentially realizable sets of labellings have to
involve finitely many arguments only. Moreover, these finitely many arguments precisely determine the
set A of witnessing AFs F = (A,R).6 Consider therefore the following example.
Example 4.67. Consider the following set of 3-valued labellings S = {({a}, /0,{b,c}), ({a,b},{c}, /0)}.
Is S co-realizable? Since {a}∪ /0∪{b,c} = {a,b,c} we deduce that candidates have to be members of
C = {F = (A,R) | A = {a,b,c}}. Note that |C |= 2|{a,b,c}|2 = 29 = 512. Clearly, this is a huge number,
but it is a finite one. Consequently, the question of realizability can be decided by computing the σ -
labellings of all AFs in C . Of course, any intelligent search algorithm would involve further information
like {a,b} has to be conflict-free in a witnessing AF. Such an observation would decrease the number of
candidates to 25 = 32. However, in both cases one would find the unique witnessing framework F, i.e.
Lco(F) = S, as depicted below.
aF : b c
The example above shows that the search space can be very large even in case of small numbers
of arguments. Consequently, locally verifiable necessary as well as sufficient properties for realizability
just like in case of extension-based semantics are of high interest too. To the best of our knowledge
only two papers have dealt with labelling-based realizability in the context of AFs. The first study was
presented by Dyrkolbotn [Dyrkolbotn, 2014]. The author showed that, as long as additional arguments
are allowed any finite set of labellings is realizable under preferred and semi-stable semantics. It is
important to emphasize that Dyrkolbotn uses a more relaxed notion of realizibility, namely realizibility
under projection (cf. Definition 4.72). The other work [Linsbichler et al., 2016] deals with the standard
6This is exactly the point which does not carry over to finite realizability in case of extension-based semantics (cf. statement 2
of Theorem 4.44).
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notion of finite realizability (Definition 4.3). The authors presented an algorithm which returns either
“No” in case of non-realizibility or a witnessing AF F in the positive case. The algorithm is not purely
a guess-and-check method since it also includes a propagation step where certain necessary properties of
witnessing AFs are processed. Remarkably, the algorithm is not restricted to the formalism of abstract
argumentation frameworks only. In fact, it can also be used to decide realizability in case of the more
general abstract dialectical frameworks as well as various of its sub-classes [Brewka and Woltran, 2010b;
Brewka et al., 2013b].
4.6.1 Preliminary Results for Labelling-based Signatures
In the following we shed light on general relations between the labelling-based and extension-based
signatures of the considered semantics. Fortunately, due to former characterization results we will even
achieve characterizing or at least necessary properties for finite realizability regarding labelling-based
versions. We proceed with the definition of an labelling-set which is the n-valued analogon (for n≥ 2) to
an extension-set as introduced in Definition 4.5. A labelling-set is a finite set of n-tuples which are dealing
with the same set of arguments and moreover, any n-tuple assigns exactly one status to each argument in
question.
Definition 4.68. Given S ⊆ (2U )n. ArgsS denotes ⋃L=(L1,...,Ln)∈S⋃ni=1Li and ‖S‖ stands for |ArgsS|.
We say that S is a labelling-set if
1. ‖S‖ is a finite cardinal,
2. for anyL = (L1, . . . ,Ln) ∈ S, ArgsS =
⋃n
i=1Li and
3. for anyL = (L1, . . . ,Ln) ∈ S,L1, . . . ,Ln are pairwise disjoint.
The following proposition establishes a connection between extension-based and labelling-based real-
izibility for any considered semantics. Roughly speaking, it states that labelling-based realizability re-
quires extension-based realizability of the corresponding sets of in-labelled arguments. For a 3-tuple
L = (L1,L2,L3) we also write (L I,L O,L U) as usual.
Proposition 4.69. Given a set of 3-tuples S⊆ (2U )3. For any semantics
σ ∈ {stb,ss,stg,cf2,stg2,pr,ad,co,gr, il,eg,na,cf} we have,
1. S ∈ ΣLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ ΣEσ (unrestricted realizability)
2. S ∈ ΣcLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ ΣcEσ (compact realizability)
3. S ∈ ΣxLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ ΣxEσ (analytic realizability)
4. S ∈ Σ fLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ Σ
f
Eσ
(finite realizability)
5. S ∈ Σ f ,cLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ Σ
f ,c
Eσ
(finite, compact realizability)
6. S ∈ Σ f ,xLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ Σ
f ,x
Eσ
(finite, analytic realizability)
Please note that the implications above are justified for any semantics σ whenever the different ver-
sions of it satisfy Eσ (F) = {L I |L ∈Lσ (F)} for any relevant AF F. In the former sections we already
presented characterization theorems or at least necessary properties for being finitely realizable regarding
extension-based versions (cf. Theorems 4.12, 4.24 and 4.33). Combining these results with the propos-
ition above yields the following necessary properties for finite realizability in the labelling-based case.
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Note that the mentioned implications apply to finite, compact as well as finite, analytic signatures too
since Σ f ,cLσ ⊆ Σ
f
Lσ
as well as Σ f ,xLσ ⊆ Σ
f
Lσ
by definition. In case of grounded, ideal and eager semantics
we have that being an one-element labelling-set is necessary and even sufficient for being finitely realiz-
able. One may easily verify that the only-if-directions of these semantics are justified by the witnessing
framework FL = (L I∪L O∪L U,{(i,o) | i ∈L I,o ∈L O}∪{(u,u) | u ∈L U}) given that S= {L }.
Theorem 4.70. Given a set of 3-tuples S⊆ (2U )3, then
1. S ∈ Σ fLcf =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a non-empty, downward-closed and tight extension-set,
2. S ∈ Σ fLna =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a non-empty, incomparable extension-set and dcl(S) is tight,
3. S ∈ Σ fLgr ⇐⇒ S is a labelling-set with |S|= 1,
4. S ∈ Σ fLil ⇐⇒ S is a labelling-set with |S|= 1,
5. S ∈ Σ fLeg ⇐⇒ S is a labelling-set with |S|= 1,
6. S ∈ Σ fLstb =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a incomparable and tight extension-set,
7. S ∈ Σ fLstg =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a non-empty, incomparable and tight extension-set,
8. S ∈ Σ fLad =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a conflict-sensitive extension set containing /0,
9. S ∈ Σ fLpr =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a non-empty, incomparable and conflict-sensitive extension-set,
10. S ∈ Σ fLss =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} is a non-empty, incomparable andconflict-sensitive extension-set.
4.6.2 Realizibility under Projection
We turn now to realizability under projection which was firstly considered in [Dyrkolbotn, 2014]. In
order to realize a set of labellings S under projection it suffices to come up with an AF F, s.t. its set of la-
bellings restricted to the relevant arguments coincide with S. Consider therefore the following illustrating
example.
Example 4.71. Given S = {({a},{b}, /0), ({b},{a}, /0), ( /0,{a,b}, /0)}. We observe that the correspond-
ing set of sets of in-labelled arguments SI = { /0,{a},{b}} violates incomparability. Thus, applying state-
ment 9 of Theorem 4.70 we derive that S is not finitely pr-realizable. Consider now the following AF F.
c
b
aF :
We obtain Lpr(F) = {({a},{b,c}, /0), ({b},{a,c}, /0), ({c},{a,b}, /0)}. Now, if we restrict any la-
belling L = (L I,L O,L U) ∈ Lpr(F) to the arguments a and b, i.e. L |{a,b} = (L I ∩ {a,b},L O ∩
{a,b},L U ∩ {a,b}) we obtain exactly all labellings in S. In this sense, S is pr-realizable under pro-
jection.
We proceed with the formal definitions. For the sake of completeness we introduce realizability under
projection and its corresponding signatures w.r.t. any kind of semantics as defined in Definition 3.3.
82
Chapter 4. Expressibility of Argumentation Semantics
Definition 4.72. Given a semantics σ :F → 2(2U )
n
. A set S⊆ (2U )n is σ -realizable under projection
if there is an AF F, s.t. σ(F)|ArgsS = {E|ArgsS | E ∈ Eσ (F)} = S (in case of n = 1) or σ(F)|ArgsS ={L |ArgsS |L ∈Lσ (F)}= S (for n≥ 2), respectively.
Definition 4.73. Given a semantics σ . The unrestricted as well as finite σ -projection-signatures are
defined as follows:
1. Σpσ = {σ(F)|B | F = (A,R) ∈F ,B⊆ A} and
2. Σ f ,pσ = {σ(F)|B | F = (A,R) ∈F ,F is finite, B⊆ A}
Analogously to Proposition 4.69 we state the following relation between labelling-based and extension-
based versions of the considered semantics.
Proposition 4.74. Given a set of 3-tuples S⊆ (2U )3. For any semantics
σ ∈ {stb,ss,stg,cf2,stg2,pr,ad,co,gr, il,eg,na,cf} we have,
1. S ∈ ΣpLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ Σ
p
Eσ
(unrestricted realizability under projection)
2. S ∈ Σ f ,pLσ =⇒ {L I |L ∈ S} ∈ Σ
f ,p
Eσ
(finite realizability under projection)
As a matter of fact, any projection signature is a superset of the corresponding signature. The fol-
lowing question then arises naturally: how much more sets can be generated if we stick to realizability
under projection? For instance, we have already seen that even comparable sets are realizable under pro-
jection by semantics satisfying incomparability (Example 4.71). It was the main result in [Dyrkolbotn,
2014, Theorem 3.1] that in case of semi-stable and preferred semantics indeed any 3-valued labelling-set
is finitely realizable under projection. The proof relies on two basic constructions. The first step generates
an AF, consisting of so-called circuits, s.t. its set of preferred as well as semi-stable labellings restricted
to the relevant arguments contains any possible labelling. The second construction eliminates undesired
labellings step by step. Combining this realizability result with statement 2 of Proposition 4.74 yields the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.75. Let σ ∈ {pr,ss}. We have,
1. Σ f ,pLσ =
{
S⊆ (2U )3 | S is a labelling-set} and
2. Σ f ,pEσ =
{
S⊆ 2U | S is an extension-set}.
4.7 Final Remarks and Conclusion
We have dealt with different forms of realizability in the context of abstract argumentation frameworks.
In accordance with the existing literature the main part of this section was devoted to finite realizability
for extension-based semantics. However, for any semantics σ we may state the following general subset
relations depicted as Venn-diagram.
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Figure 4.7: Subset Relations between Different Kinds of Signatures
In case of the extension-based versions of naive, grounded, ideal, eager, stable, stage, preferred and
semi-stable semantics as well as conflict-free and admissible sets we provided exact characterizations
for their corresponding general signatures. We have seen that for some semantics we do not lose any
expressive power if sticking to compact or analytic AFs, i.e. Σ fσ = Σ
f ,c
σ or Σ
f
σ = Σ
f ,x
σ , respectively.
However, for certain prominent semantics, e.g. preferred semantics we have that the expressive power
indeed relies on the use of rejected arguments or implicit conflicts. For such semantics, it remains an open
problem to present exact characterizations for finite, compact or finite, analytic realizability, respectively.
In case of labelling-based versions of semi-stable and preferred semantics we have seen that any labelling-
set is realizable under projection. In [Dyrkolbotn, 2014] it was already noted that this equality does not
hold for any semantics. For instance, the empty labelling is admissible for any AF F. Hence, in case
of admissible semantics, no labelling-set is realizable under projection if it fails to include the empty
labelling.
Finally, let us mention some computational issues not considered so far. It can be said that on the one
hand, the classes of finite, compact and finite, analytic provide computational benefits both in practice
and in terms of theoretical worst-case analysis. On the other hand testing for membership in one of
the classes is, for most of the semantics, of rather high complexity and thus these classes cannot be
directly used to improve systems. We refer the interested reader to [Baumann et al., 2016a] for more
details. Moreover, in general, given an extension-set S, deciding whether S is compactly realizable is a
hard problem, that is, by definition of the decision problem there are no good reasons to believe that we
can do any better than guessing a compact AF and checking whether its extension-set coincides with S.
Nevertheless, for some semantics we have seen that finite, compact realizability can be characterized
locally, i.e. by properties of S itself (as shown in Theorem 4.45). In this case, finite, compact realizability
can be checked in polynomial time as for standard finite realizability [Dunne et al., 2015, Theorem 6].
Moreover, in [Baumann et al., 2016a] a huge number of shortcuts to detect non-compactness are provided.
By shortcut we mean a property of the given extension-set S that is easily computable (preferably in
polynomial time) which (sometimes) provides us with a definitive answer to the decision problem. These
shortcuts are related to numerical aspects of argumentation frameworks like results concerning maximal
number of extensions [Baumann and Strass, 2013].
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Replaceability of Subframeworks
Given a certain logical formalism L and two syntactically different L -theories T1 and T2. One central
question is whether, and if so, how to decide that these L -theories represent the same information? Of
course, in order to answer this question we have to clarify what we exactly mean by sharing the same
information first. Note that there is neither a uniquely determined, nor a certain preferred interpretation
by the formalismL itself. For instance, equating information with possessing the same semantics yields
to the well-known notion of ordinary or standard equivalence. This means, assuming that σL is the
semantics ofL we might answer that T1 and T2 are equivalent if and only if σL (T1) = σL (T2). A more
demanding interpretation of sharing the same information is to require that T1 and T2 are semantically
indistinguishable even if furtherL -theories T are added to both simultaneously. More formally, we may
state: T1 and T2 are considered to be equivalent if and only if σL (T1∪T ) = σL (T2∪T ) for any theory T .
This notion is known as strong equivalence and is of high interest for any logical formalism since it allows
one to locally replace, and thus give rise for simplification, parts of a given theory without changing the
semantics of the latter. In contrast to classical logics where standard and strong equivalence coincide
(cf. Chapter 2), it is possible to find ordinary but not strongly equivalent objects for any nonmonotonic
formalism available in the literature. Consequently, much effort has been devoted to characterizing strong
equivalence for nonmonotonic formalisms such as logic programs [Lifschitz et al., 2001], causal theories
[Turner, 2004], default logic [Turner, 2001a] as well as nonmonotonic logics in general [Truszczyn´ski,
2006].
In [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] the authors introduced the notion of strong equivalence for abstract
AFs. They provided a series of characterization theorems for deciding strong equivalence of two AFs
with respect to several semantics. In view of the fact that strong equivalence is defined semantically it is
the main and quite surprisingly insight that being strongly equivalent can be decided syntactically. More
precisely, they introduced the notion of a kernel of an AF F which is (informally speaking) a subgraph of
F where certain attacks are deleted and showed that syntactical identity of suitably chosen kernels char-
acterizes strong equivalence w.r.t. the considered semantics. Strong equivalence is, as its name suggests,
a very (and often unnecessarily to) strong notion of equivalence if dynamic evolvements are considered.
In many argumentation scenarios the type of modification which may potentially occur can be anticip-
ated and furthermore, more importantly, does not range over arbitrary expansions as required for strong
equivalence. Let us consider the instantiation-based context where AFs are built from an underlying
knowledge base. Here, we typically observe that older arguments and their corresponding attacks survive
and only new arguments which may interact with the previous ones arise given that a new piece of inform-
ation is added to the underlying knowledge base. This type of dynamic evolvement is a so-called normal
expansion and its corresponding equivalence notion were firstly studied in [Baumann, 2012a]. Over the
last five years several equivalence notions taking into account specific types of evolvements reflecting
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the nature of various argumentation scenarios were defined and characterized. The considered dynamic
scenarios range from the most general form, so-called updates [Baumann, 2014a] where arguments and
attacks can be deleted and added to different types of expansions [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Bau-
mann, 2012a; Baumann and Brewka, 2010] and deletions [Baumann, 2014a] where arguments and/or
attacks are allowed to be added or deleted in a certain way only.
Into the year 2015 all characterization theorems were stated in terms of extension-based semantics.
Recently, Baumann presents their labelling-based counterparts and showed that, although labelling-based
semantics contain more information then there extension-based counterpart, there is a majority of equi-
valence relations where labelling-based and extension-based versions coincide [Baumann, 2016]. Even
more recently, a first consideration of strong equivalence regarding unrestricted frameworks were presen-
ted in [Baumann and Spanring, 2017]. It turned out that there are no characterizational differences com-
pared to the finite case as long as the AFs in question are jointly expandable, i.e. that the existence of
fresh arguments is guaranteed.
Another approach somehow complementary to the ones mentioned before is presented in [Baroni
et al., 2014] where sharing the same information is interpreted as possessing the same Input/Output beha-
vior. Roughly speaking, the main idea is to consider an argumentation framework as a kind of black box
which receives some input from the external world (i.e, a set of external arguments) via incoming attacks
and produces an output to the external world via outgoing attacks. Such an interacting module is called
an argumentation multipole. Two multipoles connected with the same external world are considered as
Input/Output equivalent if the effects, i.e. the produced labellings for external arguments are the same for
any reasonable input-labelling. This notion yields the possibility of replacing a multipole with another
one embedded in a larger framework without affecting the labellings of the unmodified part of the initial
framework. The interested reader is referred to [Baroni et al., 2018b] for further information. In the
following we shed light on equivalence notions induced by certain dynamic scenarios.
5.1 Dynamic Scenarios and Corresponding Equivalence Notions
There are two main classes of dynamic scenarios, namely expansions and deletions. Both of them can be
further divided in normal and local versions. These scenarios are motivated by real-world argumentation
as well as instantiation-based argumentation [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]. For instance, let us consider
the dynamics of a discussion or dispute illustrated by the following citation [Besnard and Hunter, 2009]:
How does argumentation usually take place? Argumentation starts when an initial argument
is put forward, making some claim. An objection is raised, in the form of a counterargument.
The latter is addressed in turn, eventually giving rise to a counter-counterargument, if any.
And so on.
This means, in order to strengthen the own point of view or to rebut the opponents arguments it is
natural that one tries to come up with stronger arguments, i.e. new arguments which are not attacked
by the former arguments. This type of dynamics is formally captured by so-called strong expansions
[Baumann and Brewka, 2010]. The formal counterpart of it, so-called weak expansions [Baumann and
Brewka, 2010], where the new arguments do not attack (but may be attacked by) the old ones seem to be
more an academic exercise than a task with practical relevance with regard to real-world argumentation.1
Let us turn to instantiation-based argumentation where arguments and attacks stem from an underlying
knowledge base (cf. Chapter 6 for detailed information as well as Figure 2 in Chapter 4 for an illustration).
What happens on the abstract level if a new piece of information is added? It turns out that in almost
all deductive argumentation systems older arguments and their corresponding attacks survive and only
1We mention that they do play a decisive role w.r.t. computational issues, so-called splitting methods (cf. [Baumann, 2011;
Baumann et al., 2011; Baumann et al., 2012]).
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new arguments which may interact with the previous ones arise. This type of dynamic evolvement is
formally captured by so-called normal expansions. Local expansions in contrast, i.e. expansions where
new attacks are added only correspond to re-instantiations if we change to a less restrictive notion of
attack (cf. [Besnard and Hunter, 2001] for different attack notions).
We start with the definition of the different types of expansions together with some introducing ex-
amples.
Definition 5.1 ( [Baumann and Brewka, 2010]). An AF G is an expansion of AF F = (A,R) (for short,
F E G) iff G = (A ∪˙ B,R ∪˙ S) for some (maybe empty) sets B and S, s.t. A∩B = R∩ S = /0. An
expansion is called
1. normal (F N G) iff ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ S→ a ∈ B∨b ∈ B),
2. strong (F S G) iff F N G and ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ S→¬(a ∈ A∧b ∈ B)),
3. weak (F W G) iff F N G and ∀ab ((a,b) ∈ S→¬(a ∈ B∧b ∈ A)),
4. local (F L G) iff B = /0.
For short, being a normal expansion means that new attacks must involve at least one new argument
in contrast to local expansions where new attacks involve old arguments only. Moreover, strong and weak
expansions are normal and their names refer to properties of the additional arguments, namely arguments
which are never attacked by former arguments (so-called strong arguments) and arguments which do not
attack former arguments (so-called weak arguments).
Observe that any arbitrary expansion can be splitted up in a normal and a local part. This can be
nicely seen in the following example.
Example 5.2. The AF F is the initial framework. An arbitrary, normal, strong, weak or local expansion
of it are given by FE , FN , FS, FW and FL, respectively. Grey-highlighted arguments or attacks represent
added information.
aF : b aFE : b
c d
aFN : b
c d
aFS : b
c d
aFW : b
c d
aFL : b
Figure 5.1: Different Kinds of Expansions
In 2014 the natural counter-parts (or more precisely, inverse operations) to arbitrary, normal and
local expansions, so-called deletions were introduced [Baumann, 2014a]. Furthermore, the most general
form of a dynamic scenario (where expansion and deletion can be combined) a so-called update were
considered too. Analogously to expansions, any arbitrary deletion can be splitted in a normal and a local
part. This means, a normal deletion retract arguments and their corresponding attacks. Local deletions in
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contrast delete attacks only.2 The main motivation behind these notions stems from instantiation-based
context. More precisely, a normal deletion on the abstract level correspond to deleting information of a
given knowledge base. Changing to a more restrictive notion of attack correspond to a local deletion and
a combination of both of them give rise to an arbitrary deletion on the abstract level. We proceed with the
formal definitions as well as introductory examples.
Definition 5.3 ( [Baumann, 2014a]). Given an AF F = (A,R), a set of arguments B and a set of attacks S
as well as a further AF H. The AF
G = (F \ [B,S]) ∪˙ H = ((A,R\S)|A\B) ∪˙ H
is called an update of F (for short, F U G). An update is called a
1. deletion (F D G) iff H = ( /0, /0),
2. normal deletion (F ND G) iff (F D G) and S = /0,
3. local deletion (F LD G) iff F D G and B = /0.
Let us take a closer look at the definition of G = (F \ [B,S]) ∪˙ H. The AF H plays the role of added
information, i.e. it contains new arguments and attacks. Consequently, for all kind of deletions we have
H = ( /0, /0) which leaves us with G = F \ [B,S]. The set B contains arguments which have to deleted.
Since attacks depend on arguments we have to delete the attacks which involve arguments from B too.
This operation is formally captured by the restriction of F to A \ B. Furthermore, the set S contains
particular attacks which have to be deleted. This means, the pair [B,S] does not necessarily have to be
an AF. Therefore we use [B,S] instead of (B,S). If clear from context we use B and S instead of [B, /0] or
[ /0,S], i.e. we simply write F \B as well as F \S for normal or local deletions, respectively.
Example 5.4. The AF F represents the initial situation. An update as well as arbitrary, normal or
local deletion of it are given by FU , FD, FND and FLD. Grey-highlighted arguments or attacks rep-
resent added information in contrast to dotted arguments and attacks which represent deleted objects.3
More formally, in accordance with Definition 5.3 we have that FU = (F \ [B,S]) ∪˙ H, FD = F \ [B,S],
FND = F \B, FLD = F \S where the set of arguments B = {c}, the set of attacks S = {(b,a)} and the AF
H = ({b,d,e, f},{(d,b), (e, f ), ( f ,d)}).
aF : b
c d
aFU : b
c d
e
f
aFD : b
c d
aFND : b
c d
aFLD : b
c d
Figure 5.2: An Update and Different Kinds of Deletions
2We mention that strong as well as weak deletions are not introduced/considered so far. They could be easily defined as
inverse operations of their expansion counterparts. Before doing so, it would be interesting to identify real-world situations or
instantiation-based dynamics were such kind of evolvements naturally occur.
3This convention will be used throughout the whole chapter.
88
Chapter 5. Replaceability of Subframeworks
We now turn to the corresponding equivalence notions (cf. [Baumann and Strass, 2015, Section 3.8]
for chronological order). Two AFs F and G are said to be ordinarily equivalent w.r.t. a semantics σ if
they possess the same σ -extensions/labellings. In this case, we say that F and G possess the same explicit
information. In contrast, sharing the same implicit information, i.e. being semantically indistinguishable
w.r.t. any suitable future scenario is a much more demanding property which allows to replace F and G
by each other without loss of semantical information.
Example 5.5. Consider the following AFs F and G. We have Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a}}. This means,
F and G possess the same explicit information w.r.t. preferred semantics or in other words, they are
ordinarily equivalent.
aF : b c aG : b c
Assume that expansions as well deletions are the dynamic scenarios of interest. This means, we
ask whether the AFs F and G even possess the same implicit information w.r.t. expansions or deletions,
respectively? In order to give a negative answer one has to come up with one single dynamic scenario were
the revised versions possess different preferred extensions. A positive answer in contrast is a statement
about infinitely many dynamic scenarios (even in case of finite AFs). In this example, we give a negative
answer for both modification types.
In case of expansions, we conjoin to both the AF H = ({a,b},{(b,a)}). Consider the resulting
frameworks below. We have Epr(F ∪˙ H) = {{a},{b}} and since G ∪˙ H = G we obtain Epr(G ∪˙ H) =
{{a}} without re-computing.
aF ∪˙ H : b c aG ∪˙ H : b c
To reveal the inherent difference between F and G in case of deletions we may retract with the argu-
ment c. Consider the resulting (normal) deletions F \{c} and G\{c} of F or G, respectively. Now, {b}
becomes a preferred extension in F \{c} but still not in G\{c}.
aF \{c} : b c aG\{c} : b c
We now formally define what we precisely mean by possessing the same implicit information. As
already stated, the first paper in this line of work was [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] engaged with char-
acterizing strong equivalence. For the sake of clarity and comprehensibility we use the term expansion
equivalence since strong equivalence [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Definition 2] corresponds to se-
mantical indistinguishability w.r.t. arbitrary expansions.
Before presenting the definitions let us introduce some further notational convention which will be
extensively used throughout the whole chapter. For a given AF G = (B,S), we use A(G) = B, R(G) = S,
L(G) = {a ∈ B | (a,a) ∈ S} and NL(G) = B\L(G).
Definition 5.6. Given a semantics σ . Two AFs F and G are
1. ordinarily equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σ G) iff σ(F) = σ(G),
2. expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σE G) iff for each AF H we have, F ∪˙ H ≡σ G ∪˙ H,
3. normal expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σN G) iff for each AF H, such that F N F ∪˙ H
and GN G ∪˙ H we have, F ∪˙ H ≡σ G ∪˙ H,
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4. strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σS G) iff for each AF H, such that F S F ∪˙ H
and GS G ∪˙ H we have, F ∪˙ H ≡σ G ∪˙ H,
5. weak expansion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σW G) iff for each AF H, such that F W F ∪˙ H
and GW G ∪˙ H we have, F ∪˙ H ≡σ G ∪˙ H,
6. local expansion equivalent4 w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σL G) iff for each AF H with A(H) ⊆ A(F ∪˙ G)
we have, F ∪˙ H ≡σ G ∪˙ H.
7. update equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σU G) iff for any pair [B,S] and any AF H we have,
(F \ [B,S]) ∪˙ H ≡σ (G\ [B,S]) ∪˙ H,
8. deletion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F≡σD G) iff for any pair [B,S] we have, F\ [B,S]≡σ G\ [B,S],
9. normal deletion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σND G) iff for any set of arguments B we have,
F \B≡σ G\B,
10. local deletion equivalent w.r.t. σ (for short, F ≡σLD G) iff for any set of attacks S we have,
F \S≡σ G\S,
Remember that there are several relations between the considered dynamic scenarios. For instance,
in accordance with Definitions 5.1 and 5.3, any normal expansion (deletion) is an arbitrary expansion
(deletion). Furthermore, in the light of Definition 5.6, we certainly affirm that expansion equivalence is
much more demanding then local expansion equivalence. In other words, local expansion equivalence
of two AFs is an immediate and unavoidable consequence of being expansion equivalent. Finally, any
considered equivalence notion is at least as demanding then ordinary equivalence.5 Please note that
these relations do not depend on certain properties of a considered semantics. Consequently, Figure 5.3
gives a preliminary overview for such interrelations (arising from the definitions) between the introduced
equivalence notions for any possible semantics. For reasons, which will become clearer later, we also
consider the identity relation. For two equivalence notion Φ and Ψ we have Φ⊆Ψ iff there is a link from
Φ to Ψ.
In the remainder of this section we shed light on the question of how to determine whether two AFs
are equivalent w.r.t. certain scenarios? As a by-product of these characterization results we will see that
for many semantics the preliminary relations between the introduced equivalence notions depicted above
can be delineated in a much more compact way. The majority of the presented characterization results is
devoted to finite AFs as well as extension-based semantics. We will see that there are some differences if
sticking to unrestricted frameworks or the corresponding labelling-based versions.
5.2 Characterization Theorems for Extension-based Semantics
5.2.1 The Central Notion of Expansion Equivalence
In order to get an idea of how to find a characterization we start with some reflections. For this purpose
we consider the most restrictive semantics, namely the stable one as well as the most prominent type
of equivalence, namely expansion equivalence. What are necessary features of expansion equivalence
w.r.t. stable semantics, i.e. which properties are implied if two AFs F and G are expansion equivalent?
In consideration of Figure 5.3 we deduce their ordinary equivalence, i.e. Estb(F) = Estb(G). Note that
4Note that a suitable AF H is not necessarily a local expansion of F and G in the sense of Definition 5.1. Nevertheless, we may
loosely speak about local expansions.
5The empty framework ( /0, /0) as well as the empty pair [ /0, /0] justifies this assertion for any type of expansions or deletions,
respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Preliminary Subset Relations between Equivalence Notions
possessing the same set of extensions neither imply sharing the same arguments nor sharing the same
self-loops as shown in the following example.
Example 5.7. Consider the AFs F, G and H. Each two of them are ordinarily equivalent since Estb(F) =
Estb(G) = Estb(H) = {{a}}.
aF : b c aG : b aH : b c
The AFs I1 = ({c}, /0) and I2 = ({a,b,c},{(b,a), (b,c)}) witness that neither F and G, nor F and
H are expansion equivalent w.r.t. stable semantics. Convince yourself that Estb(F ∪˙ I1) = {{a}} 6=
{{a,c}}= Estb(G ∪˙ I1) and Estb(F ∪˙ I2) = {{a},{b}} 6= {{a}}= Estb(G ∪˙ I2).
Restricting ourselves to finite AFs, it is not difficult to see that in case of expansion equivalence
w.r.t. stable semantics the observed relation between non-sharing the same arguments/loops and non-
equivalence does hold in general. In other words, possessing the same arguments as well as possessing
the same loops are indeed necessary conditions for being expansion equivalent in the finite setting.
Let us summarize our observations in the following fact.
Fact 5.8. Given two finite AFs F and G. If F ≡EstbE G, then
1. Estb(F) = Estb(G),
2. A(F) = A(G) and
3. L(F) = L(G).
As already stated in Figure 5.3, being identical (i.e. A(F) = A(G) and R(F) = R(G)) is sufficient
for being expansion equivalent. Combining this undeniable fact together with the second and third items
of Fact 5.8 encourages one to search for syntactical properties sufficient as well as necessary for being
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expansion equivalent. In order to guarantee the first item of Fact 5.8 we have to identify attacks which do
not contribute anything when computing stable extensions. Moreover, these attacks which do not affect
the evaluation of a given AF F have to be redundant, no matter how F is extended. Remember that being
a stable extension can be simply verified by checking whether the set in question is conflict-free and
possesses a full range.6 This means, good candidates for “useless” attacks w.r.t. stable semantics should
fulfill the following two properties: firstly, having or not having such an attack does not change the status
of a set from being conflict-free to conflicting or vice versa and secondly, having or not having such an
attack does not affect the range of a conflict-free set. Certainly, an attack (a,b) stemming from a self-
defeating argument a does not change the conflict status of a certain set E. This can be seen as follows: If
a ∈ E, then E was conflicting as well as remains conflicting after deleting or adding (a,b). Furthermore,
if a /∈ E, then E might be conflicting or not. In either case the conflict status of E does not change if (a,b)
is added or removed since {a,b}* E. Finally, such an attack (a,b) might have an influence on the range
of conflicting sets but it definitely has not in case of conflict-free sets since a /∈ E can not be questioned.
Example 5.9. Consider the following AF F. We have, Estb(F) = {{a}}.
aF : b c
According to our considerations above adding or deleting an attack stemming from the self-defeating
argument b does not change the semantics. Consider therefore the following three possible “manipula-
tions”.
aG1 : b c aG2 : b c aG3 : b c
Indeed, Estb(F) = Estb(G1) = Estb(G2) = Estb(G3) = {{a}} support our claims for the static case.
We encourage the reader to try to do the impossible, namely semantically distinguish the AFs F and its
manipulations by an arbitrary expansion.
It was the main result in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] that expansion equivalence can be indeed de-
cided by looking at the syntax only. The authors introduced so-called kernels which are simply functions
mapping each AF F to its redundancy-free version. This means, the kernel of an AF F does not possess
any redundant attack. Put it differently, for any surviving attack exist at least one dynamic scenario were
deleting this attack would cause a semantical difference. We proceed with the formal definition of the
very first kernels already introduced in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. We sometimes call them classical.
Definition 5.10. Let σ ∈ {stb,ad,gr,co}. The σ -kernel k(σ) : F → F with k(σ)(F) = Fk(σ) =(
A,Rk(σ)
)
for a given AF F = (A,R) is defined as:
Rk(stb) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, (a,a) ∈ R},
Rk(ad) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, (a,a) ∈ R,{(b,a), (b,b)}∩R 6= /0},
Rk(gr) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, (b,b) ∈ R,{(a,a), (b,a)}∩R 6= /0},
Rk(co) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R}.
In order to get an idea of how the classical kernels work we proceed with an example.
6The topic of verifiability of argumentation semantics σ will be considered in Chapter 6. The main question is which (minimal
amount of) information on top of conflict-free sets is exactly needed to determine whether a certain set is a σ -extension.
92
Chapter 5. Replaceability of Subframeworks
Example 5.11. Consider again the AF G3 depicted in Example 5.9. We apply now all classical kernels.
aGk(stb)3 : b caG3 : b c
aGk(gr)3 : b caG
k(ad)
3 : b c
The stable kernel deletes all attacks (a,b) stemming from a self-defeating argument a. A deletion
of (a,b) in case of the grounded kernel additionally requires that a is counter-attacked by b or b is self-
defeating or both. Interchanging a and b yields the condition for deletion in case of the grounded kernel.
Finally, Gk(co)3 =G3 since deleting an attack (a,b) w.r.t. the complete kernel requires that both arguments
a and b are self-defeating.
Before turning to characterization theorems, we collect some useful properties of the introduced ker-
nels. The following fact contains intrinsic properties of the classical kernels.7 More precisely, any clas-
sical kernel k is node-preserving and loop-preserving, i.e. the sets of arguments and self-defeating argu-
ments do not change if applying k. Moreover, in the absence of self-loops, each AF coincides with its
classical kernels. Furthermore, the decision whether an attack (a,b) has to be deleted does not depend on
further arguments than a and b. Put differently, the reason of being redundant is context-free, i.e. it stems
from the arguments themselves. The last two properties claim that equality of kernels is robust w.r.t. fur-
ther compositions as well as deleting arguments and corresponding attacks. For a given AF F = (B,S) we
use A(F),R(F) and L(F) to refer to its arguments, attacks and self-defeating arguments, i.e. A(F) = B,
R(F) = S and L(F) = {a ∈ A(F) | (a,a) ∈ R(F)}.
Fact 5.12 (cf. [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Baumann, 2014a]). Given k ∈ {k(stb),k(ad),k(gr),k(co)}.
For any finite AF F we have:
1. A(F) = A
(
Fk
)
, (node-preserving)
2. L(F) = L
(
Fk
)
, (loop-preserving)
3. L(F) = /0 =⇒ F = Fk and (sufficient condition for identity)
4. (a,b) ∈ R(Fk) ⇐⇒ (a,b) ∈ R((F|{a,b})k) . (context-freeness)
Furthermore, for finite AFs F and G we have:
5. If Fk = Gk, then (F ∪˙ H)k = (G ∪˙ H)k for any finite AF H and (∪˙-robustness)
6. If Fk = Gk, then (F \B)k = (G\B)k for any finite set of args B. (\-robustness)
We proceed with extrinsic properties, i.e. features of kernels in presence of semantics. More precisely,
stable, admissible, grounded and complete semantics are insensitive w.r.t. the application of their corres-
ponding classical σ -kernel, i.e. the set of σ -extensions remains unchanged. Furthermore, the admissible
kernel neither effects semi-stable, eager, preferred and ideal semantics. Similarly in case of stable kernel
and stage semantics.
7Although most of the properties are immediately clear even in case of unrestricted frameworks we will state all of them for
finite AFs only as done in the existing literature. The same applies to Fact 5.18. Some results regarding unrestricted frameworks
can be found in Section 5.3.
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Fact 5.13 ( [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Gaggl and Woltran, 2013]). For any finite AF F we have:
1. Eσ (F) = Eσ
(
Fk(σ)
)
for σ ∈ {stb,ad,gr,co},
2. Eσ (F) = Eσ
(
Fk(ad)
)
for σ ∈ {ss,eg,pr, il} and
3. Estg(F) = Estg
(
Fk(stb)
)
.
As already mentioned, kernels play a decisive role in deciding expansion equivalence. In general,
we say that an equivalence notion ≡ is characterizable through k or simply, k is a characterizing kernel
(of ≡) if for any two AFs F and G, F ≡ G iff Fk = Gk. This means, proving whether two frameworks
are equivalent can be done by simply checking whether the corresponding kernels are identical. Note that
all classical kernels can be efficiently constructed from a given AF. The following main theorem states
that for all nine considered semantics σ there is a certain classical kernel k, s.t. expansion equivalence
w.r.t. σ is characterizable through k in the finite setting. This is a very remarkable result since expansion
equivalence is defined semantically. For instance, two finite AFs F and G are expansion equivalent w.r.t.
stable semantics if and only if the associated stable kernels Fk(stb) and Gk(stb) are syntactically equal.
Observe that there is no need to introduce further kernels since one single kernel may serve for different
semantics.
Theorem 5.14. [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Gaggl and Woltran, 2013] For finite AFs F,G we have:
1. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ Fk(σ) = Gk(σ) for any σ ∈ {stb,ad,co,gr},
2. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for any σ ∈ {pr, il,ss,eg} and
3. F ≡EstgE G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb).
Having Theorem 5.14 at hand we can now formally verify that all AFs depicted in Example 5.9 are
expansion equivalent w.r.t. stable semantics. This means, the recommended search for arbitrary expan-
sions revealing semantical difference between them will never succeed. As an aside, one might get the
impression that the syntactical characterization presented in Theorem 5.14 is somehow unique. This
is not true. Consider therefore the equivalence class [F]EstbE = {G | F ≡EstbE G} induced by F. Math-
ematically speaking, the stable kernel Fk(stb) represents the least (w.r.t. subgraph-relation) element in
[F]EstbE . It is not difficult to prove that [F]
Estb
E even possesses a greatest element, namely F
k′(stb) =
(A(F),R(F)∪{(a,b) | a 6= b, (a,a) ∈ R(F)}), i.e. the framework resulting from F by adding (instead
of deleting) all redundant attacks. In case of finite AFs it can be shown with reasonable effort that ex-
pansion equivalence w.r.t. stable semantics is characterizable through k′(stb) too. In the same manner,
all other semantics considered in Theorem 5.14 possess alternative “greatest elements” characterizations.
We will see that the so-called naive kernel (compare Definition 5.17) provides such a kind of characteriz-
ation for naive semantics. The reason for this “choice” is simply that the induced equivalence classes do
not necessarily possess a least element in case of naive semantics.
Finally, let us turn to the more exotic cf2 as well as stage2 semantics which are defined via a re-
cursive schema based on the decomposition of AFs along their strongly connected components (SCCs).
These semantics are exceptional regarding expansion equivalence since in contrast to all other semantics
considered in this section we have that even attacks between two self-attacking arguments are meaning-
ful. This means, the presence or absence of such attacks may change the outcome of an AF. Moreover,
it turned out that any attack is non-redundant. In summary, expansion equivalence coincides with syn-
tactical identity or more formally, for any finite AF F,
∣∣∣[F]Ecf2E ∣∣∣= ∣∣∣[F]Estg2E ∣∣∣= |{F}|= 1.
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Theorem 5.15. [Gaggl and Woltran, 2013; Gaggl and Dvorˇák, 2016] Given σ ∈ {cf2,stg2}. For finite
AFs F and G we have,
F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ F = G.
5.2.2 Further Equivalence Notions Characterizable through Kernels
Let us turn to the remaining equivalence notions? Are there similar syntax-based characterization results?
5.2.2.1 Weaker Notions of Expansion Equivalence
Let us consider less demanding notions than expansion equivalence, e.g. normal and local expansion
equivalence. In consideration of Definition 5.1 we do not have good reasons to believe that two AFs
could be semantically distinguished by normal or local expansions, given that we only have a witnessing
arbitrary expansion showing their non-equivalence. It was one surprising result in this line of research,
that for many semantics, expansion equivalence coincide with definitorially weaker notions of it. This
implies that weaker notions than expansion equivalence can be characterized by classical kernels too.
The first results in this respect were already given in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 8]. The
authors showed that for some semantics expansion equivalence and local expansion equivalence coincide
if considering finite AFs. It is worthwhile to gain a thorough understanding of this relation since it actually
means that if there is an arbitrary expansion which semantically distinguish two finite AFs, than there has
to be a local expansion doing likewise. Later it was shown that even normal expansion equivalence
coincides with expansion equivalence for a whole bunch of semantics [Baumann, 2012a]. Interestingly,
in contrast to local expansion equivalence, there are (to the best of our knowledge) no semantics together
with witnessing AFs known which show that this coincidence does not hold in general.
Example 5.16. Consider the following AFs F and G. According to Theorem 5.14 they are not expansion
equivalent w.r.t. preferred semantics since Fk(ad) = F 6= G = Gk(ad).
aF : b c aG : b c
As already stated (up to now) normal expansion equivalence coincides with expansion equivalence for
any considered semantics. One possible scenario which makes the predicted different behaviour explicit
is the following.
aF ∪˙ H : b c
d
aG ∪˙ H : b c
d
Formally, we define H = ({b,c,d},{(b,d), (d,c)}) and we obtain {{a,d}} = Epr(F ∪˙ H) 6= { /0} =
Epr(G ∪˙ H). We encourage the reader to try to find a witnessing example showing that F and G are not
local expansion equivalent w.r.t. preferred semantics. Due to Theorem 5.20 there has to be at least one
distinguishing local expansion.
How do the semantics behave in case of strong expansion equivalence? Remember, a special feature
of strong expansions is that a former attack between old arguments will never become a counterattack
to an added attack. In this sense, former attacks do not play a role with respect to being a potential
defender of an added argument. Hence, in contrast to arbitrary expansions where such attacks might be
relevant, we may delete them without changing the behavior with respect to further evaluations. To make
this point clearer consider again the AF F ∪˙ H depicted in Example 5.16. Note that the already existing
attack (a,b) in F becomes a defending attack of the newly added argument d. This means, such attacks
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in fact play an important role with respect to further evaluation in case of arbitrary expansions. It was one
main result in [Baumann, 2012a] that for some semantics attacks like (a,b) in F are indeed redundant
w.r.t. strong expansions. Even more surprising, strong expansion equivalence is characterizable through
kernels. Therefore, more involved kernel definitions, so-called σ -*-kernels had to be introduced. These
kernels allow more deletions than their classical counterparts for expansion equivalence. In contrast to
them, σ -*-kernels are context-sensitive, i.e. the question whether an attack (a,b) is redundant can not be
answered by considering the arguments a and b only [Baumann, 2014a].
The first three kernels presented in the definition below were firstly introduced in [Baumann, 2012a]
with the objective to characterize strong expansion equivalence with respect to certain semantics. For
the sake of completeness we also present the so-called stg-*-kernel as well as na-kernel [Baumann and
Woltran, 2016; Baumann et al., 2016c].8
Definition 5.17. Let σ ∈ {ad,gr,co,stg}. The σ -*-kernel k∗(σ) :F →F with k∗(σ)(F) = Fk∗(σ) =(
A,Rk
∗(σ)
)
for a given AF F = (A,R) is defined as:
Rk
∗(ad) = R \{(a,b) | a 6= b, ((a,a) ∈ R∧{(b,a), (b,b)}∩ R 6= /0)
∨ ((b,b) ∈ R∧∀c ((b,c) ∈ R→{(a,c), (c,a), (c,c), (c,b)}∩R 6= /0))},
Rk
∗(gr) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, ((b,b) ∈ R∧{(a,a), (b,a)}∩ R 6= /0)
∨ ((b,b) ∈ R∧∀c ((b,c) ∈ R→{(a,c), (c,a), (c,c)}∩R 6= /0))},
Rk
∗(co) = R\{(a,b) | a 6= b, ((a,a), (b,b) ∈ R)∨ ((b,b) ∈ R∧ (b,a) /∈ R
∧∀c ((b,c) ∈ R→{(a,c), (c,a), (c,c), (c,b)}∩R 6= /0))},
Rk
∗(stg) = R \{(a,b) | a 6= b, (a,a) ∈ R∨∀c (c 6= a→ (c,c) ∈ R)}
Rk(na) = R∪{(a,b) | a 6= b,{(a,a), (b,a), (b,b)}∩R 6= /0}.
The latter represents the so-called na-kernel Fk(na) =
(
A,Rk(na)
)
.
For an illustrating example we refer the reader to Example 5.19. Analogously to Fact 5.12 we collect
some properties of the newly introduced kernels. The first three properties are immediately clear by
definition.9 The robustness w.r.t. deletions and corresponding attacks is less obvious but it is already
shown for all considered kernels (except the stg-*-kernel) in case of finite AFs (cf. [Baumann, 2014a,
Theorems 6 and 14]).
Fact 5.18. Given k ∈ {k∗(ad),k∗(gr),k∗(co),k∗(stg),k(na)} and k∗ ∈ {k∗(ad),k∗(gr),k∗(co),k∗(stg)}.
For two finite AFs F and G we have:
1. A(F) = A
(
Fk
)
, (node-preserving)
2. L(F) = L
(
Fk
)
, (loop-preserving)
3. L(F) = /0 =⇒ F = Fk∗ and (sufficient condition for identity)
4. If Fk = Gk, then (F \B)k = (G\B)k for any finite set of arguments B. (\-robustness)
8As an aside, we use the supplement “*”, whenever the kernel in question is non-classical and expansion equivalence is already
characterized by another kernel.
9The AF F = ({a,b},{(a,b)}) shows that the naive kernel has to be excluded from item 3 of Fact 5.18 since Fk(na) =
({a,b},{(a,b), (b,a)}) 6= F.
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Let us consider the ad-*-kernel (which, as we shall see, characterizes strong expansion equivalence
for preferred semantics) in more detail. Consider the first disjunct. This first condition is exactly the
same as in case of the ad-kernel (compare Definition 5.10), i.e. an attack (a,b) has to be deleted if a is
self-attacking and at least one of the attacks (b,a) or (b,b) exist. The second disjunct provides one with
further options to delete an attack (a,b), namely if b is self-defeating and furthermore, for all arguments
c which are attacked by b at least one of the following conditions has to be fulfilled:
1. a attacks c,
2. c attacks a,
3. c attacks c,
4. c attacks b.
The motivation for the second disjunct is the following: At first observe that b cannot be an element
of any conflict-free set. Consequently, in case of strong expansions the attack (a,b) may only be relevant
with respect to the defense of c. In the first three cases this relevance becomes unimportant since {a,c} is
conflicting. In the fourth case the redundancy of (a,b) with respect to the defense of c is given by the fact
that c already defends itself against b. Please note that the consideration of c = a or c = b is not excluded
by Definition 5.17. The following frameworks exemplify different cases.
Example 5.19. The following graphs show six frameworks and their corresponding ad-*-kernels. The
dotted attacks represent initial attacks which have to be deleted if applying the ad-*-kernel.
aF1 : b c aF2 : b c
aF3 : b c aF4 : b c
aF5 : b c aF6 : b c
Consider the formal description of Rk
∗(ad) as given in Definition 5.17. The AF F1 is somehow the
base case since the only argument c, s.t. (b,c) ∈ R(F1) is b itself. Since (b,b) ∈ R(F1) we deduce that
the considered intersection is non-empty and thus, the deletion of (a,b) is justified. The subsequent four
frameworks F2, F3, F4 and F5 are the base case plus one further argument c different from a and b, s.t. for
any i∈ {2,3,4,5}, (b,c) ∈ R(Fi). The last framework F6 illustrates the case b counterattacks a. Note that
the reason to delete (a,b) is somehow self-referential since (additionally to the base case) it is justified
by (a,b) ∈ R(F6). Due to the first disjunct (i.e. just like in case of the classical ad-kernel) even the attack
(b,a) has to be deleted.
We proceed with further characterization theorems.10 An comprehensive overview of equivalence
notion and their characterizing kernels in case of finite AFs and extension-based semantics is presented
in Figure 5.4.
10Please note that the results in case of cf2 and stage2 semantics have never been published before.
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Theorem 5.20. [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Baumann, 2012a; Baumann and Woltran, 2016; Bau-
mann et al., 2016b] For finite AFs F and G we have the following coincidences.
1. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσN G for σ ∈ {stg,stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co,na,cf2,stg2},
2. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσL G for σ ∈ {ss,eg,ad,pr, il,na} and
3. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσS G for σ ∈ {stg,stb,ss,eg,na}.
Furthermore, for any two finite AFs F and G we have the following non-classical characterizations.
4. F ≡EstgL G ⇐⇒ Fk
∗(stg) = Gk
∗(stg),
5. F ≡EσS G ⇐⇒ Fk
∗(ad) = Gk
∗(ad) for σ ∈ {ad,pr, il},
6. F ≡EσS G ⇐⇒ Fk
∗(σ) = Gk
∗(σ) for σ ∈ {co,gr} and
7. F ≡EnaE G ⇐⇒ Fk(na) = Gk(na).
At this point we want to highlight a very surprising relation. Remember that normal expansion
equivalence and normal deletion equivalence are completely unrelated in the general picture (cf. Fig-
ure 5.3). The observation that the characterizing kernels (including the identity map in case of cf2 and
stage2 semantics) of normal expansion equivalence w.r.t. all considered semantics in this section satisfy
\-robustness (cf. Facts 5.12 and 5.18) reveals that normal expansion equivalence implies normal deletion
equivalence for these semantics.
Corollary 5.21. Given σ ∈ {stg,stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co,na,cf2,stg2} and two finite AFs Fand G. We
have: F ≡EσN G =⇒ F ≡EσND G.
The attentive reader may have noticed that we do not have characterized local expansion equivalence
w.r.t. stable, complete as well as grounded extension-based semantics. We mention that all three equi-
valence notions are already characterized but the characterization theorems are not purely kernel-based
(cf. [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Theorems 9,10,11]). Furthermore, it can be checked that none of the
kernels presented in Definitions 5.10 and 5.17 serve as a characterizing kernel. Consider therefore the
following example [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Example 15].
Example 5.22. The AFs F and G are local expansion equivalent w.r.t. stable semantics. This can be
seen as follows. Given an AF H, s.t. A(H) ⊆ {a,b}. If (a,b) ∈ R(H) and (a,a) /∈ R(H), we obtain
Estb(F ∪˙ H) = Estb(G ∪˙ H) = {{a}}. Otherwise, Estb(F ∪˙ H) = Estb(G ∪˙ H) = /0.
aF : b bG :
Remember that all introduced kernels are node-preserving (Facts 5.12 and 5.18). Consequently, none
of them may serve as a characterizing kernel for local expansion equivalence w.r.t. stable semantics.
We mention that weak expansion equivalence is already characterized in case of stable semantics
[Baumann, 2012a, Proposition 3] as well as admissible, preferred and complete semantics [Baumann and
Brewka, 2015b, Theorem 1]. All characterization results are not kernel-based. For instance, two AFs
are weak expansion equivalent w.r.t. stable semantics iff both do not possess stable extensions at all or if
they share the same arguments and at the same time possess the same stable extensions. Consequently,
F = ({a},{(a,a)}) and G = ({a,b,c},{(a,b), (b,c), (c,a)}) are weak expansion equivalent w.r.t. stable
semantics. Both frameworks witness that any potential characterizing kernel k is necessarily neither node-
nor loop-preserving.
As a final note, we are not aware of any study of weaker notions of expansion equivalence in case of
cf2 as well as stage2 semantics.
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5.2.2.2 Notions of Deletion Equivalence and Update Equivalence
We start with local deletion equivalence. Remember that local deletion equivalent AFs cannot be se-
mantically distinguished by deleting a certain set of attacks in both simultaneously. How “strong” is this
notion? Are there redundant attacks or even redundant arguments?
Example 5.23. Consider the following AFs F, G and H.
aF : b c aG : b aH : b c
The AFs F and G do not possess the same arguments. Let us delete all occurring attacks, i.e. SA =
R(F)∪R(G). We obtain the following local deletions where {a,b,c} ∈ Eσ (F \ SA) \Eσ (G \ SA) for all
semantics σ considered in this section.
aF \SA : b c aG\SA : b
The AFs F and H possess the same arguments but differ in their attack-relation, e.g. (b,c) ∈ R(H) \
R(F). This difference can be made more explicit if defining SR = (R(F)∪R(H))\{(b,c)}. Consider the
resulting local deletions.
aF \SR : b c aH \SR : b c
Once again we have {a,b,c} ∈ Eσ (F \ SR) for all known semantics σ and {a,b,c} /∈ Eσ (H \ SR) if
assuming conflict-freeness of the considered semantics.
The observations above indicate that there is not much space for redundancy in case of local expansion
equivalence and indeed, it was one main result in [Baumann, 2014a] that local expansion equivalence
collapse to identity for all semantics considered in this section. Moreover, instead of proving this one by
one for any semantics the author followed the line in [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b] and provide abstract
criteria guaranteeing the coincidence with syntactical identity. These criteria are very weak requirements,
namely conflict-freeness (CF ) and the principle of isolate-inclusion (II ). The latter is fulfilled by a
semantics σ iff for any AF F, the set of all isolated arguments is contained in at least one σ -extension.
Observe that any considered semantics apart from stable semantics satisfy II .11
Theorem 5.24 ( [Baumann, 2014a]). Given a semantics σ satisfying CF and II . For two finite AFs
F and G we have:
F ≡EσLD G ⇐⇒ F = G.
Since being identical implies local deletion equivalence we deduce that all equivalence notion “in-
between” them collapse to identity too (cf. Figure 5.3).
Proposition 5.25. Given a semantics σ satisfying CF and II . For two finite AFs F and G we have:
F ≡EσU G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσD G ⇐⇒ F = G.
This means, for semantics satisfying conflict-freeness and isolate-inclusion any argument/attack may
play a crucial role with respect to further evaluations if updates, deletions or local deletions are con-
sidered. Note that the results may apply to future semantics. In order to refine the general picture (as
depicted in Figure 5.3) for the semantics considered in this section we state the following relations.12
11A counter-example in case of stable semantics is given by F = ({a,b},{(b,b)}). Obviously, a is isolated but Estb(F) = /0.
Nevertheless, local expansion equivalence in case of stable semantics collapse to identity too.
12The results in case of cf2 and stage2 semantics have never been published before. It can be checked that both semantics satisfy
the preconditions of Theorem 5.25.
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Corollary 5.26. Let σ ∈ {stg,stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co,na,cf2,stg2}. For two finite AFs F ,G we have:
1. F ≡EσU G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσD G ⇐⇒ F ≡EσLD G ⇐⇒ F = G, (k = id)
2. F ≡EσD G =⇒ F ≡EσE G, (deletion vs. expansion)
3. F ≡EσLD G =⇒ F ≡EσL G. (local versions)
5.2.3 The Exceptional Case of Normal Deletion Equivalence
Normal deletion equivalence, where the retraction of arguments and corresponding attacks is considered,
is exceptional in several regards. Firstly, the characterization theorems for admissible, complete and
grounded semantics partially rely on σ -*-kernels. Remember that these kernels were originally intro-
duced to characterize strong expansion (cf. Theorem 5.20). Secondly, normal deletion equivalent AFs do
not even have to share the same arguments and thus give space for simplifications.
Example 5.27. Consider the following AFs F and G. We have Ead(F) = Ead(G) = { /0,{a}}. Even
more, for any set of arguments B, Ead(F \B) = Ead(G \B) showing their normal deletion equivalence,
i.e. F ≡EadND G.
aF : b c
d
e
aG : b c
f
Observe that the non-shared arguments d, e and f do not play a role for the evaluation w.r.t. admissible
semantics since firstly, they are self-defeating and thus cannot be part of an admissible set; and secondly, if
they attack a non-looping argument shared by both arguments, e.g. e attacks c in F or f attacks a in G, then
they are counter-attacked by the same argument, i.e. c attacks e in F and a attacks f in G. Consequently,
they cannot influence potential admissible sets being a subset of {a,b}. Finally, let us consider the ad-*-
kernel of both frameworks (cf. Example 5.19 and the comments above for more details).
aFk
∗(ad) : b c
d
e
aGk
∗(ad) : b c
f
Obviously, F and G do not possess the same kernels but note that their restrictions to the shared
arguments do, i.e.
(
F|{a,b,c}
)k∗(ad)
=
(
G|{a,b,c}
)k∗(ad).
It turned out that the issues raised in Example 5.27 are essential to characterize normal deletion
equivalence w.r.t. admissible semantics. In case of complete and grounded semantics slightly differ-
ent conditions have to be fulfilled, namely w.r.t. the non-shared arguments we have “it is forbidden to
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be attacked” instead of “counter-attack if attacked” like in case of admissible semantics and further-
more, instead of the ad-*-kernel the corresponding σ -*-kernels are used. Consider therefore the fol-
lowing definition and the characterization theorem. We use ∆ to denote the symmetric difference, i.e.
A∆A′ = A\A′∪A′ \A. Moreover, NL(F) = A(F) \L(F), i.e. NL(F) contains all arguments of F which
are not self-defeating.
Definition 5.28. Given F = (A,R) and G = (A′,R′) and let σ ∈ {co,gr}.
1. Loop(F,G) ⇐⇒ de f L (F ∪˙ G|A∆A′) = A∆A′, (“non-shared args are self-defeating”)
2. Attad(F,G) ⇐⇒ de f∀b ∈ A\A′ ∀a ∈ NL(F|A∩A′) : ((b,a)∈R→ (a,b)∈R)
∧∀b ∈ A′ \A ∀a ∈ NL(G|A∩A′) : ((b,a)∈R′→ (a,b)∈R′), (“counter-attack if attacked”)
3. Attσ (F,G) ⇐⇒ de f∀b ∈ A\A′ ∀a ∈ NL(F|A∩A′) : (b,a) /∈R
∧∀b ∈ A′ \A ∀a ∈ NL(G|A∩A′) : (b,a) /∈ R′. (“it is forbidden to be attacked”)
Theorem 5.29 ( [Baumann, 2014a]). Let σ ∈ {ad,co,gr}. Given two finite AFs F = (A,R) and G =
(A′,R′) and let I = A∩A′,
F ≡EσND G ⇐⇒ Loop(F,G), Attσ (F,G), (F|I)k
∗(σ) = (G|I)k
∗(σ) .
In contrast to admissible, complete and grounded semantics where normal deletion equivalence is
indeed weaker than normal expansion equivalence we observe that these notions coincide in case of
stable semantics. This means, normal deletion equivalence w.r.t. stable semantics is characterized by the
classical stable kernel too.
The following theorem corrects the corresponding result in [Baumann, 2014a, Theorem 10] which
did not take into account that an empty framework possess a stable extension, namely the empty one.13
Theorem 5.30. For finite AFs F and G we have:
F ≡EstbND G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb).
Proof. ( =⇒ ) We show the contrapositive, i.e. Fk(stb) 6= Gk(stb) =⇒ F 6≡EstbND G.
1st case: Assume A
(
Fk(stb)
)
6= A
(
Gk(stb)
)
and w.l.o.g. let a ∈ A
(
Fk(stb)
)
\A
(
Gk(stb)
)
. Since the stable
kernel is node-preserving (Fact 5.12) we obtain G \B = ( /0, /0) and F \B ∈ {({a}, /0), ({a},{(a,a)})} if
B = (A(F)∪A(G))\{a}. In either case, /0 ∈ Estb(G)\Estb(F) since Estb(F) ∈ { /0,{{a}}}. From now on
we assume A
(
Fk(stb)
)
= A
(
Gk(stb)
)
.
2nd case: Consider R
(
Fk(stb)
)
6= R
(
Gk(stb)
)
and w.l.o.g. let (a,b) ∈ R
(
Fk(stb)
)
\R
(
Gk(stb)
)
. Let a= b.
Remember that the stable kernel is loop-preserving (Fact 5.12). Therefore, (a,a) ∈ R (F) \R (G). We
obtain G\B = ({a}, /0) and F \B = ({a},{(a,a)}) if B = (A(F)∪A(G)) \{a}. Hence, /0 = Estb(F) 6=
Estb(G) = {{a}}. From now on we assume L
(
Fk(stb)
)
= L
(
Gk(stb)
)
. Consider now a 6= b. Con-
sequently, (a,b) ∈ R(F) and (a,a) /∈ R(F). Hence, (a,a) /∈ R(G) and furthermore, (a,b) /∈ R(G). Define
B = (A(F)∪A(G)) \{a,b}. In any case, {a} ∈ Estb(F \B) \Estb(G\B) concluding the if-direction.
(⇐= ) Given Fk(stb) = Gk(stb). Applying Theorems 5.14 and 5.20 one after the other yields F ≡EstbE G and
then F ≡EstbN G. Finally, Corollary 5.21 justifies F ≡EstbND G concluding the proof.
13We mention that Theorem 10 in [Baumann, 2014a] hold, given that resulting AFs have to be non-empty. The claimed normal
deletion equivalence of the AFs F and G depicted in [Baumann, 2014a, Example 4] can be disproved by setting B = {a,b,c, f}.
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5.2.4 Characterization Theorems in Case of Self-loop-free AFs
We already observed that apart from naive kernel any mentioned kernel k does not change anything if the
considered AF F is self-loop-free, i.e. F = Fk (cf. Facts 5.12 and 5.18). Consequently, any equivalence
relation characterizable through such a kernel collapses to identity if we restrict ourselves to self-loop-free
AFs. This is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.31. Given any binary relation ≡ ⊆ F × F characterizable through k where
k ∈ {k(stb),k(ad),k(gr),k(co),k∗(ad),k∗(gr),k∗(co),k∗(stg)}. For any self-loop-free AFs F and G,
F ≡ G ⇐⇒ F = G.
We will refrain from listing all combinations of semantics and equivalence notions characterizable
through a kernel mentioned in the theorem above. Please confer Figures 5.4 and 5.7 for compact over-
views. For all such combinations, self-loop-free AFs are redundancy-free, i.e. all attacks as well as
arguments may play a crucial role w.r.t. further evaluations and thus, there is no space for simplification.
In the introductory part of this section we noted that many equivalence notions, e.g. normal and local
expansion equivalence are motivated by the instantiation-based context where AFs are built from an un-
derlying knowledge base. However, we want to mention that there are some formalisms like classical
logic-based argumentation where self-attacking arguments do not occur [Besnard and Hunter, 2001, The-
orem 4.13], while for other systems, e.g. ASPIC self-defeating arguments indeed may arise [Prakken,
2010, Section 7].
5.2.5 Summary of Results and Conclusion
In the presented results the notion of a kernel played a crucial role. Indeed, kernels are interesting from
several perspectives: First, they allow to decide the corresponding notion of equivalence by a simple
check for topological (i.e. syntactical) equality. Moreover, all kernels we have obtained so far can be
efficiently constructed from a given argumentation framework. This means, if a certain equivalence notion
is characterizable through such a kernel, then we have tractability of the associated decision problem.
The following Figure 5.4 provides a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in case of extension-
based semantics. The entry “k” in row M and column σ indicates that ≡EσM is characterizable through k.
The abbreviation “id” stands for identity map and the question mark represents an open problem. Further
abbreviations like “L” and “Attσ” refer to additional conditions relevant in case of normal deletion equi-
valence (cf. Theorem 5.29). The entry “[m,n]” indicates three facts. First, the characterization problem
is already solved in Theorem/Proposition n in m.14 Second, the characterization result is not (purely)
kernel-based and third, it can be checked that none of the introduced kernels serve as a characterization.
Remember that any arbitrary expansion (deletion) can be split into a normal and local part. So one
natural conjecture is that normal and local expansion (deletion) equivalence jointly imply expansion (de-
letion) equivalence. Using the results presented in this section we can not only verify the addressed
conjecture but even give a significantly stronger result. In fact, the main and quite surprisingly relations
for the considered semantics can be briefly and concisely stated in the following two equations, namely
“normal expansion equivalence = expansion equivalence” and “local deletion equivalence = deletion equi-
valence”. The fact that different notions of equivalence might or might not coincide is interesting from
14For m we use the following assignments: 1 = [Baumann, 2011], 2 = [Baumann and Brewka, 2015b], 3 = [Baumann and
Brewka, 2013a] and 4 = [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]
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dstgp dstbp dssp degp dadp dprp dilp dgrp dcop dnap dcf2p dstg2p
? [1,3] ? ? [2,1] [3,1] ? ? [2,1] ? ? ?
k∗(stg) [4,9] k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) [4,10] [4,11] k(na) ? ?
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co) k(na) id id
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co) k(na) id id
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(gr) k∗(co) k(na) ? ?
? k(stb) ? ?
k∗(ad)
L,Attad
? ?
k∗(gr)
L,Attgr
k∗(co)
L,Attco
? ? ?
id id id id id id id id id id id id
id id id id id id id id id id id id
id id id id id id id id id id id id
W
L
E
N
S
ND
D
LD
U
Figure 5.4: Extension-based Characterizations for Finite AFs
a conceptual point of view. To illustrate this let us have a look at normal and strong expansion equi-
valence. Recall that normal expansions add new arguments and possibly new attacks which involve at
least one of the fresh arguments, while strong expansions (a subclass of normal expansions) restrict the
possible attacks between the new arguments and the old ones to a single direction. In dynamic settings,
both concepts can be justified in the sense that new arguments might be raised but this will not influence
the relation between already existing arguments. For strong expansions, only strong arguments will be
raised, i.e. arguments which cannot be attacked by existing ones. The corresponding equivalence notions
now check whether two AFs are “equally robust” to such new arguments, and indeed, normal expansion
equivalence always implies strong expansion equivalence but the other direction is only true for some of
the semantics, namely stage, stable, semi-stable, eager and naive semantics. One interpretation is that
when two AFs are not normal expansion equivalent, then this can be made explicit by only posing strong
arguments (not attacked by existing ones), while for the other semantics this is not the case. For this
particular example, it seems that the notion of admissibility which is more “explicit” in the admissible,
preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics is responsible for the fact that frameworks might be
strong expansion equivalent but not normal expansion equivalent.
In Figure 5.3 we presented preliminary relations between several notions of equivalence which hold
for any semantics. The refinement depicted in Figure 5.5 applies to any extension-based semantics con-
sidered in this section.
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Figure 5.5: Relations for σ ∈ {stg,stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co,na,cf2,stg2} - Extension-based Versions and
Finite AFs
Finally, we present the overall picture for the most prominent semantics, namely the stable one.
Interestingly, in contrast to Figure 5.5 all equivalence notions are comparable, i.e. they are totally ordered
w.r.t.⊆. Comprehensive overviews for single semantics can be found in [Baumann, 2014b, Section 5.5.2]
or [Baumann and Brewka, 2015b]. The latter also contains a comparison to different notions of minimal
change equivalence which are related to the so-called minimal change problem considered [Baumann,
2012b; Baumann and Brewka, 2013b]. As an aside, very recently the authors of [Baumann et al., 2017]
introduced so-called C-relativized equivalence that subsumes ordinary and expansions equivalence as its
extreme corner cases. The set C represents so-called core arguments which will not be directly touched
by the possible expansions. This means, for any set C we obtain a further intermediate notion between
expansion and ordinary equivalence. However, due to its recency further relations are not studied so far.
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Figure 5.6: Stable Semantics - Extension-based Version and Finite AFs
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5.3 Equivalence in the Light of Unrestricted Frameworks
Recently, a first study of several abstract properties in the unrestricted setting were presented in [Baumann
and Spanring, 2017]. The main result regarding expansion equivalence can be summarized as follows:
All characterization results carry over to the unrestricted setting as long as the AFs in question are jointly
expandable (w.r.t.U ). Consider therefore the following definition and the corresponding characterization
theorem.
Definition 5.32. F and G are jointly expandable if U \ (A(F)∪A(G)) 6= /0.
Theorem 5.33. [Baumann and Spanring, 2017] For jointly expandable AFs F and G we have:
1. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ Fk(σ) = Gk(σ) for any σ ∈ {stb,ad,co,gr,na},
2. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for any σ ∈ {pr, il,ss,eg} and
3. F ≡EstgE G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb).
The main proof strategies are straightforward extensions of those presented in [Oikarinen and Woltran,
2011]. However, finiteness assumptions are often used implicitly and one has to pay attention whether a
certain reasoning step (e.g. subset relation between semantics, definedness statuses of semantics, finitely
many extensions etc.) carry over to the infinite setting.
Interestingly, in case of the admissible as well as naive kernel we may even drop the restriction of
joint expandability as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.34. [Baumann and Spanring, 2017] For unrestricted AFs F and G we have:
1. F ≡EnaE G ⇐⇒ Fk(na) = Gk(na) and
2. F ≡EσE G ⇐⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for any σ ∈ {ad,pr, il,ss,eg}.
The following two examples taken from [Baumann and Spanring, 2017] show that this assertion does
not hold for all kernels considered in this section. The main reason for this different behaviour is that for
some semantics it plays a decisive role whether AFs can be expanded by “fresh” arguments which is not
given for unrestricted frameworks in general but guaranteed for jointly expandable AFs .
Example 5.35. Given c∈U and define the following two AFs, F = (U \{c}, {(a,a) | a ∈ U \ {c}})
and G = (U ,{(a,a) | a ∈U \{c}}). For any H we observe Estb(F ∪˙ H) = Estb(G ∪˙ H). In particular,
Estb(F ∪˙ H) =
{
{{c}}, if {(c,a) | a ∈U \{c}} ⊆ R(H)and (c,c) /∈ R(H)
/0, otherwise
Consequently, F≡EstbE G although A(F) 6= A(G) (and thus, Fk(stb) 6= Gk(stb)).
Example 5.36. Consider the AFs F = (U ,{(a,a) | a ∈ U }) and G = (U ,{(a,b) | a,b ∈ U ,a 6= b).
Applying the grounded kernel does not change anything for either framework, i.e. Fk(gr)=F and G=
Gk(gr). Due to the absence of unattacked arguments we deduce Egr(F ∪˙H) = Egr(G ∪˙H) = { /0} for any
AF H. Consequently, F≡EgrE G although Fk(gr) 6= Gk(gr).
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5.4 Characterization Theorems for Labelling-Based Semantics
We now return to the finite setting and consider the second main approach used for evaluating argument-
ation scenarios, namely labelling-based semantics. As a matter of fact, the labelling-based versions of all
considered semantics provides one with more information than their extension-based counter-parts. More
precisely, the defined 3-valued labellings assign a status to any argument of the considered AF F, i.e. in
addition to the information which arguments are accepted we also have labels for the remaining argu-
ments indicating that they are either rejected or undecided with respect to F. It is well known that many
semantics establish a one-to-one correspondence between their extension-based and labelling-based ver-
sions (for more details see the subsequent Section 5.4.1). This means, any labelling is associated with
exactly one extension and vice versa. It is not immediately apparent whether this property guarantees
that there is a coincidence of the extension-based and labelling-based equivalence notions. In [Baumann,
2016] a negative answer was given. The main reason for the invalidity is that AFs may possess the same
extensions without sharing the same arguments which is impossible in case of labellings since any argu-
ment has to be labelled. Furthermore, even sharing the same arguments does not ensure the validity of
the converse direction. Consider therefore the following example.
Example 5.37. Consider the AFs F and G as depicted below. Although both frameworks possess
the same unique preferred extension, they do not share the same preferred labellings. More precisely,
Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a}} but {({a},{b}, /0)}=Lpr(F) 6=Lpr(G) = {({a}, /0,{b})}.
aF : b aG : b
Moreover, observe that Fk
∗(ad) = G = Gk
∗(ad). Consequently, both frameworks are even strong ex-
pansion equivalent w.r.t. preferred extension-based semantics (Theorem 5.20). This means, equivalence
notions may differ considerably if considered under the extension-based or labelling-based approach.
In contrast to extension-based semantics where characterization results are spread over a high num-
ber of publications there is only one reference, namely [Baumann, 2016] concerned with labelling-based
semantics. The author considered 8 different equivalence notions w.r.t. 8 prominent labelling-based se-
mantics in the finite setting. In effect, similarly to extension-based semantics, almost all labelling-based
equivalence notions can be decided syntactically. Differently from the extension-based approach we
observe a much more homogeneous picture. For instance, there is no need for the more sophisticated
σ -*-kernels as we will see.
5.4.1 Basic Properties and a Fundamental Relation
Before turning to the main results we start with some preliminary facts relating σ -extensions and σ -
labellings. In the following we restrict ourselves to the semantics considered in [Baumann, 2016]. For
any 3-valued labellingL = (L1,L2,L3) we useL = (L I,L O,L U) as usual.
Fact 5.38. Given a finite AF F = (A,R) and E ⊆ A. We write EL for (E,E+,A \E⊕)). For all σ ∈
{stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co} we have,
1. IfL ∈Lσ (F), thenL I ∈ Eσ (F), (extension induced by labelling)
2. If E ∈ Eσ (F), then EL ∈Lσ (F) and (labelling induced by extension)
3. Obviously, (EL )I = E. (I ◦L = id)
We point out that the first two properties mentioned in Fact 5.38 do not ensure that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between σ -labellings and σ -extensions. This desirable feature (which would
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indeed justify the terms σ -labellings and σ -extensions) is given if additionally, labellings are uniquely
determined by their in-labelled arguments.
Fact 5.39. Given a finite AF F = (A,R) and a set E ⊆ A. For all semantics σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg,pr, il,gr,co}
we have,
1. For anyL ,M ∈Lσ (F),L I = MI iffL = M, (uniquely determined by in-labels)
2. GivenL ∈Lσ (F), then (L I)L =L and (L ◦ I = id)
3. |Lσ (F)|= |Eσ (F)|. (same cardinality)
As an aside, we mention that (although not immediately apparent) the first two items of Fact 5.39 are
equivalent independently of any semantics definition. Please note that admissible labellings are excluded
from Fact 5.39. The AF F depicted in Example 5.37 shows that this is no coincidence. It possesses two
admissible labellings associated with one admissible extension. More precisely, the admissible labellings
({a},{b}, /0) as well as ({a}, /0,{b}) refer to the same admissible extension {a}.
We proceed with a general relation between labelling-based and extension-based versions of certain
equivalence notion. More precisely, for any considered semantics and any equivalence notion presented
in Definition 5.6 we have that being equivalent w.r.t. labellings implies being equivalent w.r.t. extensions.
The main reason for this fundamental relation is the following lemma stating that possessing the same
labellings implies sharing the same extensions. We mention that this property is already guaranteed if
the semantics σ in question satisfies that any σ -extension induces an σ -labelling and vice versa (cf.
statements 1 and 2 of Fact 5.38).
Lemma 5.40 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given two finite AFs F,G. For any σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co} we
have,
Lσ (F) =Lσ (G) =⇒ Eσ (F) = Eσ (G).
Proof. Reductio ad absurdum. Assume Eσ (F) 6= Eσ (G). Then, w.l.o.g. exists E ∈ Eσ (F) \ Eσ (G).
Consequently, EL ∈Lσ (F) (item 2 of Fact 5.38). Thus, EL ∈Lσ (G) (assumption). Hence, (EL )I ∈
Eσ (G) (Item 1 of Fact 5.38). Furthermore, (EL )I = E ∈ Eσ (G) (item 3 of Fact 5.38). Contradiction!
We now present the fundamental relation between labelling-based and extension-based equivalence
notion.
Theorem 5.41 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given two finite AFs F and G. For any σ ∈{stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co}
and any M ∈ {W ,L,E,N,S,ND,D,LD,U} we have,
F ≡LσM G =⇒ F ≡EσM G.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Assume F 6≡EσM G. This means, there is a certain scenario S accord-
ing to M, s.t. Eσ (S(F)) 6= Eσ (S(G)).15 Consequently, Lσ (S(F)) 6=Lσ (S(G)) (Lemma 5.40) proving
F 6≡LσM G.
In Example 5.37 we have seen that the converse direction does not hold in general. Nevertheless, there
is huge number of equivalence notions where labelling-based and extension-based versions do indeed
coincide (cf. Figure 5.7 for an overview).
15For instance, in case of expansion equivalence (i.e. M = E) a scenario S is simply the union with a further AF H, i.e. S(F) =
F ∪˙ H and S(G) = G ∪˙ H.
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5.4.2 Coincidences of Extension-based and Labelling-based Versions
Remember that the identity relation is the finest equivalence relation. Furthermore, it is already shown
that deletion, local deletion as well as update equivalence w.r.t. Eσ collapse to identity (see Figure 5.5).
Consequently, applying the fundamental relation stated in Theorem 5.41 we obtain the identical charac-
terization results w.r.t. labelling-based semantics.
Theorem 5.42 ( [Baumann, 2016]). For finite AFs F and G, a scenario M ∈ {D,LD,U} and a semantics
σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co} we have,
F ≡LσM G ⇐⇒ F = G.
Analogously to extension-based semantics (cf. Fact 5.13) we have that there are combinations of
kernels and semantics σ , s.t. the application of a kernel does not vary the set of σ -labellings.
Fact 5.43. For any finite AF F,
1. Lσ (F) =Lσ
(
Fk(σ)
)
for σ ∈ {co,stb,gr} and
2. Lτ (F) =Lτ
(
Fk(ad)
)
for τ ∈ {ss,eg,pr, il}.
The fact above is the decisive property which allows one to carry over further kernel-based charac-
terization results for extension-based semantics to their labelling-based version. In order to show this
result it was necessary to find a condition for equality of two complete labellings of different AFs. Re-
member that two complete labellings of the same framework are identical if and only if they possess the
same in-labelled arguments (Fact 5.39). In case of different AFs we have to require additionally that both
frameworks share the same arguments and the same range w.r.t. the set of in-labelled arguments.
Fact 5.44. Given two finite AFs F and G as well as L ∈ Lco(F) and
M ∈Lco(G). We haveL = M iff simultaneously A(F) = A(G),L I = MI and R+F (L I) = R+G (MI).
Please observe that admissible labellings do not fulfill Fact 5.44. Consider for instance again the AF
F depicted in Example 5.37 and its two admissible labellings ({a},{b}, /0) and ({a}, /0,{b}).
We proceed with the main coincidence theorem. It stipulates that several expansion equivalence
relations as well as weaker notions do not distinguish between their labelling-based and extension-based
version. This means, kernel-based characterization results (depicted in Figure 5.3) carry over to labelling-
based semantics. Similarly to extension-based semantics we present an overview of characterizing kernels
at the end of this section (cf. Figure 5.7).
Theorem 5.45 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given finite AFs F and G. We have,
1. F ≡EσM G ⇐⇒ F ≡LσM G for σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg,pr, il,gr,co},M ∈ {E,N},
2. F ≡EσL G ⇐⇒ F ≡LσL G for σ ∈ {ss,eg,pr, il} and
3. F ≡EσS G ⇐⇒ F ≡LσS G for σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg}.
5.4.3 Non-Coincidence of Extension-based and Labelling-based Versions
We now leave the realm of uniformity of extension-based and labelling-based characterizations. This
section is divided into three parts. We start with characterization theorems for admissible labellings.
In particular, we will see that the admissible kernel (originally introduced to characterize equivalence
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notions w.r.t. admissible extension-based semantics) does not serve as characterizing kernel for admissible
labellings. We then proceed with strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. labellings. We will see that the
remaining notions are characterizable via traditional kernels instead of σ -*-kernels. In the third part we
consider normal deletion equivalence w.r.t. labelling-based semantics. In contrast to their extension-based
versions where many notions has defied any attempt of solving, we present characterization theorems
based on traditional kernels for all eight considered semantics.
5.4.3.1 Expansion Equivalence w.r.t. Admissible Labellings
Expansion equivalence as well as its local, normal and strong versions w.r.t. admissible extensions are
characterizable through the admissible kernel. The following example shows that this assertion does not
hold in case of admissible labellings.
Example 5.46. The following two AFs possess the same admissible kernels, namely Fk(ad) =Gk(ad) = F.
Consequently, applying characterization theorems for extension-based semantics we obtain F ≡EadM G for
M ∈ {L,E,N} (cf. Figure 5.4).
aF : b aG : b
Observe that ({b}, /0,{a})∈Lad(G)\Lad(F) because the argument a cannot be undecided in F since
it attacks the in-labelled argument b. Thus F 6≡LadM G for M ∈ {L,E,N,S}.
Let us assume that the equivalence notions considered in the example above are characterizable
through a certain kernel k. Due to the fundamental relation (Theorem 5.41) and the characterization
results w.r.t. admissible extensions (Figure 5.4), we already know that the kernel k has to satisfy the fol-
lowing implication: Fk = Gk =⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for any two AFs F and G. This means, we are looking
for a weaker kernel than the admissible one in the sense that first, everything which is redundant w.r.t. k
has to be redundant w.r.t. the admissible kernel too; and second, an attack from a to b has to survive
even if a is self-defeating and b counterattacks a. One candidate for k is the complete kernel since re-
dundancy w.r.t. the complete kernel implies redundancy w.r.t. to the admissible one, and furthermore, it
deletes an attack between two arguments if and only if both are self-defeating. And indeed, it was shown
that expansion equivalence as well as its local, normal and strong variant w.r.t. admissible labellings are
characterizable through the complete kernel as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.47 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given finite AFs F and G. We have,
F ≡LadM G ⇐⇒ Fk(co) = Gk(co) with M ∈ {L,E,N,S}.
5.4.3.2 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Preferred, Ideal, Grounded and Complete Labellings
In this subsection we present characterization theorems for strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. labelling-
based preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics. Remember that in case of strong expansions a
former attack between old arguments will never become a counterattack to an added attack. Consequently,
in contrast to arbitrary expansions former attacks do not play a role with respect to being a potential
defender of an added argument. The context-sensitive σ -*-kernels took these considerations into account
and allow for more deletions than their classical counterparts.
Example 5.48. According to Definition 5.17 we have, Fk∗(σ)=Gk∗(σ) for any semantics σ ∈{ad,gr,co}.
More precisely, the attacks (a,b) in F as well as (c,b) in G are redundant w.r.t. all three σ -*-kernels.
This means, in consideration of Figure 5.4 both frameworks are strong expansion equivalent w.r.t. the
extension-based versions of preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics.
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aF : b c aG : b c
Consider the following dynamic scenario where a stronger argument than the former ones is added.
Formally, we conjoin the AF H = ({c,d},{(d,c)}) to both frameworks F and G.
aF ∪˙ H : b c
d
aG ∪˙ H : b c
d
Note that both frameworks has to possess the same σ -extension since G≡EσS H for σ ∈ {pr, il,gr,co}
is already ensured. Furthermore, we observe ({a,d},{b,c}, /0) ∈ Lσ (F ∪˙ H) \Lσ (G ∪˙ H) since b
cannot be out-labelled in G ∪˙ H because there is no in-labelled attacker. This means, F 6≡LσS G for
σ ∈ {pr, il,gr,co}.
Analogously to the previous section let us assume that strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. the con-
sidered labelling-based semantics are characterizable through a certain kernel k. We immediately obtain,
Fk=Gk =⇒ Fk∗(σ)=Gk∗(σ) for any two AFs F and G. Possible candidates are the classical counter-
parts of the σ -*-kernels and indeed it was shown that these kernels guarantee the desired outcome. This
means, in case of strong expansion equivalence w.r.t. preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics
we have that the labelling-based version is characterizable through a classical σ -kernel if and only if the
extension-based version is characterizable through the corresponding σ -*-kernel.
Theorem 5.49 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given finite AFs F and G. We have,
1. F ≡LσS G ⇐⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for σ ∈ {pr, il},
2. F ≡LgrS G ⇐⇒ Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) and
3. F ≡LcoS G ⇐⇒ Fk(co) = Gk(co).
5.4.3.3 Normal Deletion Equivalence
Characterizing normal deletion equivalence in case of extension-based semantics is exceptional in several
regards. Remember that normal deletions retract arguments and their corresponding attacks. Firstly, only
a few characterization results are achieved (cf. Figure 5.4). Furthermore, apart from stable semantics,
none of the characterization results is purely kernel-based, i.e. beside the equality of kernels on certain
parts of the frameworks further loop- as well as attack-conditions have to be satisfied. Finally, quite
surprisingly, normal deletion equivalent AFs do not even have to share the same arguments enabling
equivalence classes with an infinite number of elements. Being equivalent w.r.t. labellings and possessing
different arguments at the same time is impossible in case of labellings since any argument has to be
labelled. It turned out that any considered labelling-based semantics is characterizable through traditional
kernels and thus, do not share any of the features mentioned above. Consider the following main theorem.
Theorem 5.50 ( [Baumann, 2016]). Given finite AFs F and G. We have,
1. F ≡LstbND G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb),
2. F ≡LσND G ⇐⇒ Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) for σ ∈ {ss,eg,pr, il},
3. F ≡LσND G ⇐⇒ Fk(co) = Gk(co) for σ ∈ {ad,co} and
4. F ≡LgrND G ⇐⇒ Fk(gr) = Gk(gr).
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5.4.4 Summary of Results and Conclusion
The following Figure 5.7 presents a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in case of labelling-
based semantics. Analogously to Figure 5.4 the entry “k” in row M and column σ indicates that ≡LσM is
characterizable through k given the finiteness restriction. The abbreviation “id” stands for identity map
and the question mark represents an open problem.16 A grey-highlighted entry reflects the situation that
extension-based and labelling-based version do not coincide.
dstbp dssp degp dadp dprp dilp dgrp dcop
? k(ad) k(ad) k(co) k(ad) k(ad) ? ?
k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(co) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co)
k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(co) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co)
k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(co) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co)
k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(co) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co)
id id id id id id id id
id id id id id id id id
id id id id id id id id
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Figure 5.7: Labelling-based Characterizations for Finite AFs
In contrast to extension-based semantics we observe a much more homogeneous picture. Firstly,
there is no need for the more sophisticated σ -*-kernels. Secondly, normal deletion equivalence w.r.t.
labelling-based semantics is naturally incorporated in the overall picture in the sense that it coincides
with its corresponding expansion, normal expansion and strong expansion equivalence notions.
The following Figure 5.8 applies to each one of the eight labelling-based semantics considered in
this section. In comparison to Figure 5.3 where preliminary relations are depicted it illustrates (to a
certain extent) a collapse of the diversity of the introduced equivalence notions in case of labelling-based
semantics.
16In contrast to extension-based semantics the labelling versions of conflict-free-based semantics like stage, naive, cf2 as well as
stage2 semantics (cf. [Caminada, 2011; Gaggl and Dvorˇák, 2016]) as well as weak expansion equivalence at all were not considered
so far and thus, represent open problems too.
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Figure 5.8: Relations for σ ∈ {stb,ss,eg,ad,pr, il,gr,co} - Labelling-based Versions and Finite AFs
5.5 Final Remarks
In this chapter we motivated and discussed several notions of equivalence in the context of abstract ar-
gumentation and provided an exhaustive number of characterization theorems for extension-based as
well as labelling-based semantics. In general we may state that Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works are a very compact formalism since the majority of the considered equivalence notion possess only
little space for redundancy. Moreover, most of these notions collapse to identity if self-loop-free AFs
are considered. This means, in this case any subframework of the AF in question may play a decisive
role w.r.t. further evaluations and thus, cannot be locally replaced by another. This insight is sometimes
used as an argument against the usefulness of the study of equivalence notions in the context of abstract
argumentation. Obviously, we agree that if you are expecting much space for simplification, then the
results are somehow disappointing but let us not lose sight of the fact that this is only clear after it has
been proved. Furthermore, as already stated, the results underline that in case of abstract argumentation
(almost) everything is meaningful similar to other non-monotonic formalisms available in the literature
(cf. [Lifschitz et al., 2001] for logic programs, [Turner, 2004] for causal theories, [Turner, 2001a] for
default logic and [Truszczyn´ski, 2006] for nonmonotonic logics in general). However, one decisive dif-
ference to these formalisms is that equivalence notions in case of abstract argumentation can be decided
syntactically. Indeed, kernels are interesting from several perspectives: First, they allow to decide the cor-
responding notion of equivalence by a simple check for topological equality and second, all kernels we
have obtained so far can be efficiently constructed from a given argumentation framework. This means,
if a certain equivalence notion is characterizable through such a kernel, then we have tractability of the
associated decision problem.
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Verifiability of Argumentation
Semantics
Over the last 20 years a series of abstract argumentation semantics were introduced. The motivations of
these semantics range from the desired treatment of specific examples to fulfilling a number of abstract
principles. The comparison via abstract criteria of the different semantics available is a topic which
emerged quite recently in the community ( [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b] can be seen as the first paper in
this line). In this chapter we take a further step towards a comprehensive understanding of argumentation
semantics. In particular, we study the following question: Do we really need the entire AF F to compute a
certain argumentation semantics σ? In other words, is it possible to unambiguously determine acceptable
sets w.r.t. σ , given only partial information of the underlying framework F. In order to solve this problem
let us start with the following reflections:
1. As a matter of fact, one basic requirement of almost all existing semantics (exemptions are given in
[Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999; Arieli, 2012; Grossi and Modgil, 2015]) is that of conflict-freeness,
i.e. arguments within a reasonable position are not allowed to attack each other. Consequently,
knowledge about conflict-free sets is an essential part for computing semantics.
2. The second step is to ask the following: Which information on top on conflict-free sets has to be
added? Imagine the set of conflict-free sets given by { /0,{a},{b}}. Consequently, there has to be
at least one attack between a and b. Unfortunately, this information is not sufficient to compute
any standard semantics (except naive extensions, which are defined as ⊆-maximal conflict-free
sets) since we know nothing precise about the neighborhood of a and b. The following three AFs
possess exactly the mentioned conflict-free sets, but differ with respect to other semantics.
aF : b aG : b aH : b
3. The final step is to try to minimize the added information. In other words, which kind of knowledge
about the neighborhood is somehow dispensable in the light of computation? Clearly, this will
depend on the considered semantics. For instance, in case of stage semantics [Verheij, 1996],
which requests conflict-free sets of maximal range, we do not need any information about incoming
attacks. This information can not be omitted in case of admissible-based semantics since incoming
attacks require counterattacks.
The above considerations motivate the introduction of verification classes specifying a certain amount of
information. In a first step, we study the relation of these classes to each other. We therefore introduce the
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notion of being more informative, capturing the intuition that a certain class can reproduce the information
of another. We present a hierarchy w.r.t. this ordering, containing 15 different verification classes only.
This is because many syntactically different classes collapse to the same amount of information.
We then formally define the essential property of a semantics σ being verifiable w.r.t. a certain veri-
fication class. We present a general theorem stating that any rational semantics is exactly verifiable w.r.t.
one of the 15 different verification classes. Roughly speaking, a semantics is rational if attacks inbetween
two self-loops can be omitted without affecting the set of extensions. An important aside hereby is that
even the most informative class contains indeed less information than the entire framework by itself.
We consider a representative set of standard semantics. All of them satisfy rationality and thus, are
exactly verifiable w.r.t. a certain class. Since the theorem does not provide an answer to which verification
class perfectly matches a certain rational semantics we study this problem one by one for any considered
semantics. As a result, only six different classes are essential to classify the considered standard se-
mantics.
In the last section we study an application of the concept of verifiability. More precisely, we address
the question of strong equivalence for semantics lying inbetween known semantics, so-called intermedi-
ate semantics. Strong equivalence is the natural counterpart to ordinary equivalence in monotonic theories
(see [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Baumann, 2016] for abstract argumentation and [Maher, 1986; Lif-
schitz et al., 2001; Turner, 2004; Truszczyn´ski, 2006] for other nonmonotonic theories). We provide
characterization theorems relying on the notion of verifiability and thus, contributing to a more abstract
understanding of the different features argumentation semantics offer.
6.1 Preliminaries and Strongly Admissible Sets
In this chapter we will consider finite AFs and extension-based semantics only. In Section 3.1.2 we
introduced the so-called range E⊕F of a certain set E w.r.t. a given AF F = (A,R). It is given by E
⊕
F =
E∪E+F where E+F = {b | (a,b) ∈ R,a ∈ E}. Similarly, we will use E	F to denote the anti-range of E
defined as E∪E−F with E−F = {b | (b,a) ∈ R,a ∈ E}. If clear from context we drop the indices and simply
write E⊕, E+, E	 or E− respectively.
We now introduce the concepts of intermediate semantics and rationality which will play a decisive
role in this chapter. Remember that we use σ ⊆ τ to indicate that σ(F) ⊆ τ(F) for each AF F.
Definition 6.1. Given three semantics ρ ,σ ,τ . If we have ρ ⊆ σ and σ ⊆ τ , we say that σ is
ρ-τ-intermediate.
Several examples of intermediate semantics can be found in Proposition 3.6. For instance, we have
that ss is stb-pr-intermediate.
Definition 6.2. A semantics σ rational if for each AF F, σ(F) = σ(Fl). We have Fl = (A(F),R(F) \
{(a,b) ∈ R(F) | (a,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F),a 6= b}).
Indeed, all semantics introduced in Definition 3.4 are rational. A prominent semantics that is based
on conflict-free sets, but is not rational is the cf2-semantics [Baroni et al., 2005], since here chains of
self-loops can have an influence on the SCCs of an AF (see also [Gaggl and Woltran, 2013]).
In order to present an exhaustive analysis of intermediate semantics (cf. Section 6.3) we provide
a missing characterizing kernel for strongly admissible sets firstly introduced in [Baroni and Giacomin,
2007b]. We will see that, besides grounded [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] and resolution-based grounded
semantics [Baroni et al., 2011b; Dvorˇák et al., 2014], strongly admissible sets are characterizable through
the grounded kernel. Consider the following self-referential definition taken from [Caminada, 2014].
Definition 6.3. Given an AF F = (A,R). A set S⊆ A is strongly admissible, i.e. S ∈ sad(F) iff any a ∈ S
is defended by a strongly admissible set S′ ⊆ S\{a}.
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The following properties are needed to prove the characterization theorem. (1) and (2) are already
shown in [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b], (3) is an immediate consequence of the former.
Proposition 6.4. Given two AFs F and G, it holds that
1. gr(F) ⊆ sad(F) ⊆ ad(F),
2. if S ∈ gr(F) we have: S′ ⊆ S for all S′ ∈ sad(F), and
3. sad(F) = sad(G) implies gr(F) = gr(G).
We now provide an alternative criterion for being a strongly admissible set. In contrast to the former
it allows one to construct strongly admissible sets step by step which enables a construction method.
Definition 6.5. Given an AF F = (A,R). A set S⊆ A is strongly admissible, i.e. S ∈ sad(F) iff there are
finitely many and pairwise disjoint sets A1, ...,An, s.t. S =
⋃
1≤i≤n Ai and A1 ⊆ ΓF( /0)1 and furthermore,⋃
1≤i≤ j Ai defends A j+1 for 1≤ j ≤ n−1.
The following proof shows that both definitions are indeed equivalent.
Proposition 6.6. Definitions 6.3 and 6.5 are equivalent.
Proof. For the proof we use S ∈ sadk(F) as a shorthand for S ∈ sad(F) in the sense of Definition k.
( ⇐= ) Given S ∈ sad6.5(F). Hence, there is a finite partition, s.t. S = ⋃1≤i≤n Ai, A1 ⊆ ΓF( /0) and⋃
1≤i≤ j Ai defends A j+1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1. Observe that
⋃
1≤i≤ j Ai ∈ sad6.5(F) for any j ≤ n. Let a ∈ S.
Consequently, there is an index i∗, s.t. a ∈ Ai∗ . Furthermore, since ⋃1≤i≤i∗−1 Ai defends Ai∗ by definition,
we deduce that
⋃
1≤i≤i∗−1 Ai ⊆ S \ {a} defends a. We have to show now that (the smaller set w.r.t. ⊆)⋃
1≤i≤i∗−1 Ai ∈ sad6.3(F). Note that
⋃
1≤i≤i∗−1 Ai ∈ sad6.5(F). Since we are dealing with finite AFs we
may iterate our construction. Hence, no matter which elements are chosen we end up with a ⊆-chain,
s.t. /0 ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤ie Ai ⊆ Se \ ae and /0 defends ae for some index ie, set Se and element ae. This means, the
question whether S ∈ sad6.3(F) can be decided positively by proving /0 ∈ sad6.3(F). Since the empty set
does not contain any elements we find /0 ∈ sad6.3(F) concluding sad6.5 ⊆ sad6.3.
( =⇒ ) Given S ∈ sad6.3(F), consider the following sets Si: S1 = (Γ( /0) \ /0)∩ S, S2 = (Γ(S1) \S1)∩ S,
S3 =
(
Γ(
⋃2
i=1 Si) \
⋃2
i=1 Si
)∩ S, . . . , Sn = (Γ(⋃n−1i=1 Si) \⋃n−1i=1 Si)∩ S. Since we are dealing with finite
AFs there has to be a natural n ∈N, s.t. Sn = Sn+1 = Sn+2 = . . . . Consider now the union of these
sets, i.e.
⋃n
i=1 Si. We show now that
⋃n
i=1 Si ∈ sad6.5(F) and
⋃n
i=1 Si = S. By construction we have
S1⊆ Γ( /0). Moreover,⋃1≤i≤ j Si defends S j+1 for 1≤ j≤ n−1. This can be seen as follows. By definition
S j+1 =
(
Γ(
⋃ j
i=1 Si) \
⋃ j
i=1 Si
)
∩ S. This means, S j+1 ⊆ Γ
(⋃ j
i=1 Si
)
. Since Γ
(⋃ j
i=1 Si
)
contains all
elements defended by
⋃ j
i=1 Si we obtain
⋃n
i=1 Si ∈ sad6.5(F). Obviously,
⋃ j
i=1 Si ⊆ S. In order to derive
a contradiction we suppose S 6⊆⋃ni=1 Si. This means there is a nonempty set S∗, s.t. S = S∗∪⋃ni=1 Si. Let
S∗ = {s1, . . . ,sk}. Observe that no element si is defended by ⋃ni=1 Si (*). Since S ∈ sad6.3(F) we obtain a
set S∗1 ⊆ S \{s1}, s.t. S∗1 ∈ sad6.3(F) and S∗1 defends s1. We now iterate this procedure ending up with a
set S∗k ⊆ S∗k−1 \{sk} ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Si, s.t. S
∗
k ∈ sad6.3(F) and S∗k defends sk contradicting (*) and concluding the
proof.
Example 6.7. Consider the following AF F.
aF : b c d e f
1Hereby, Γ is the so-called characteristic function (cf. Section 3.1.2). Note that the term ΓF( /0) can be equivalently replaced by
{a ∈ A | a is unattacked}.
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We have ΓF( /0) = {a,d}. Hence, for all S ⊆ {a,d}, S ∈ sad(F). Furthermore, ΓF({a}) = {a,c},
ΓF({d}) = {d, f} and ΓF({a,d}) = {a,d,c, f}. This means, additionally {a,c},{d, f},{a,d,c},{a,d, f},
{a,d,c, f} ∈ sad(F). Finally, ΓF({a,c}) = {a,c, f} justifying the last missing set {a,c, f} ∈ sad(F).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Definition 6.5. It is essential to prove the
characterization theorem for strongly admissible sets.
Corollary 6.8. Given an AF F and two sets B,B′ ⊆ A(F). If B defends B′, then B∪ B′ is strongly
admissible if B is.
The grounded kernel is insensitive w.r.t. strongly admissible sets, which then allows us to state the
main result for strongly admissible sets.
Lemma 6.9. For any AF F, sad(F) = sad
(
Fk(gr)
)
.
Proof. The grounded kernel is node- and loop-preserving, i.e. A(F) =A
(
Fk(gr)
)
and L(F) = L
(
Fk(gr)
)
.
Furthermore, cf (F)= cf
(
Fk(gr)
)
and ΓF( /0) = ΓFk(gr)( /0) as shown in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011,
Lemma 6].
(⊆) Given S ∈ sad(F). The proof is by induction on n indicating the number of sets forming a suit-
able (according to Definition 6.5) partition of S. Let n = 1. In consideration of the grounded kernel we
observe ΓF( /0) = ΓFk(gr)( /0), i.e. the set of unattacked arguments does not change. Since S ⊆ ΓF( /0) is
assumed we are done. Assume now that the assertion is proven for any k-partition. Let S be a (k+ 1)-
partition, i.e. S =
⋃k+1
i=1 Ai. According to induction hypothesis as well as Corollary 6.8 it suffices to
prove
⋃k
i=1 Ai defends Ak+1 in F
k(gr). Assume not, i.e. there are arguments b ∈ A(F) \ S, c ∈ Ak+1 s.t.
(b,c) ∈ R
(
Fk(gr)
)
⊆ R(F) and for all a ∈ ⋃ki=1 Ai, (a,b) /∈ R(Fk(gr)) (*). Since ⋃ki=1 Ai defends Ak+1
in F we deduce the existence of an argument a ∈ ⋃ki=1 Ai s.t. (a,b) ∈ R(F). Thus, (a,b) is redundant
w.r.t. the grounded kernel. According to Definition 5.10 and due to the conflict-freeness of
⋃k
i=1 Ai we
have (a,a) /∈ R(F) and (b,a), (b,b) ∈ R(F). Consequently, (b,a) ∈ Fk(gr). Since ⋃ki=1 Ai is a strong
admissible k-partition in F we obtain by induction hypothesis that
⋃k
i=1 Ai is strongly admissible in F
k(gr)
and therefore, admissible in Fk(gr) (Proposition 6.4). Hence there has to be an argument a ∈ ⋃ki=1 Ai, s.t.
(a,b) ∈ R
(
Fk(gr)
)
, contradicting (*).
(⊇) Assume S ∈ sad
(
Fk(gr)
)
. We show S ∈ sad(F) by induction on n indicating that S is a n-partition
in Fk(gr). Due to ΓF( /0) = ΓFk(gr)( /0) the base case is immediately clear. For the induction step let S be
a (k+ 1)-partition, i.e. S =
⋃k+1
i=1 Ai. By induction hypothesis we may assume that
⋃k
i=1 Ai is strongly
admissible in F. Using Corollary 6.8 it suffices to prove
⋃k
i=1 Ai defends Ak+1 in F. Assume not, i.e.
there are arguments b ∈ A(F) \S, c ∈ Ak+1 s.t. (b,c) ∈ R(F) and for all a ∈ ⋃ki=1 Ai, (a,b) /∈ R(F). We
even have (a,b) /∈ R
(
Fk(gr)
)
since R
(
Fk(gr)
)
⊆ R(F). Consequently, (b,c) has to be deleted in Fk(gr).
Definition 5.10 requires (c,c) ∈ R
(
Fk(gr)
)
contradicting the conflict-freeness of S in Fk(gr).
Theorem 6.10. For any two AFs F and G, we have F ≡sadE G ⇐⇒ Fk(gr) = Gk(gr).
Proof. (=⇒ ) We show the contrapositive, i.e. Fk(gr) 6= Gk(gr) =⇒ F 6≡sadE G. Assuming Fk(gr) 6=Gk(gr)
implies F 6≡grE G (cf. Theorem 5.14). This means, there is an AF H, s.t. gr(F ∪˙ H) 6= gr(G ∪˙ H). Due to
statement 3 of Proposition 6.4, we deduce sad(F ∪˙ H) 6= sad(G ∪˙ H) proving F 6≡sadE G.
(⇐= ) Given Fk(gr) = Gk(gr). Since expansion equivalence is a congruence w.r.t. ∪˙ we obtain (F ∪˙
H)k(gr) = (G ∪˙ H)k(gr) for any AF H. Consequently, sad
(
(F ∪˙ H)k(gr)
)
= sad
(
(G ∪˙ H)k(gr)
)
. Due to
Lemma 6.9 we deduce sad(F ∪˙ H) = sad(G ∪˙ H), concluding the proof.
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6.2 Verifiability
In this section we study the question whether we really need the entire AF F to compute the extensions
of a given semantics. Consider naive semantics. Obviously, in order to determine naive extensions it
suffices to know all conflict-free sets. Conversely, knowing cf (F) only does not allow to reconstruct
F unambiguously. This means, knowledge about cf (F) is indeed less information than the entire AF
by itself. In fact, most of the existing semantics do not need information about the entire AF. We will
categorize the amount of information by taking the conflict-free sets as a basis and distinguish between
different amounts of knowledge about the neighborhood of these sets. One the one hand this is natural
since conflict-freeness is the most basic concept used by argumentation semantics and on the other hand
the neighborhood (i.e. arguments attacking and being attacked by an argument)
Definition 6.11. We call a function rx : 2U ×2U → (2U )n (n > 0), which is expressible via basic set op-
erations only, neighborhood function. A neighborhood function rx induces the verification class mapping
each AF F to F˜x = {(S,rx(S⊕F ,S	F )) | S ∈ cf (F)}.
We coined the term neighborhood function because the induced verification classes apply these func-
tions to the neighborhoods, i.e. range and anti-range of conflict-free sets. The notion of expressible via
basic set operations simply means that (in case of n = 1) the expression rx(A,B) is in the language gen-
erated by the BNF X ::= A | B | (X ∪X) | (X ∩X) | (X \X). Consequently, in case of n = 1, we may
distinguish eight set theoretically different neighborhood functions, namely
rε (S,S′) = /0 r+(S,S′) = S r−(S,S′) = S′ r∓(S,S′) = S′ \S
r±(S,S′) = S\S′ r∩(S,S′) = S∩S′ r∪(S,S′) = S∪S′ r∆(S,S′) = (S∪S′) \ (S∩S′)
The names of the neighborhood functions are inspired by their usage in the verification classes they
induce (cf. Definition 6.11). A verification class encapsulates a certain amount of information about an
AF, as the following example illustrates.
Example 6.12. Consider the following AF F = ({a,b,c},{(a,b), (b,a), (b,b), (c,b)}).
aF : b c
Now take, for instance, the verification class induced by r+, that is F˜+ = {(S,r+(S⊕F ,S	F )) | S∈ cf (F)}=
{(S,S⊕F ) | S ∈ cf (F)}, storing information about conflict-free sets together with their associated ranges
w.r.t. F. It contains the following tuples: ( /0, /0), ({a},{a,b}), ({c},{b,c}), and ({a,c},{a,b,c}). For he
verification class induced by r±, on the other hand, we have F˜±= {( /0, /0), ({a}, /0), ({c},{b}), ({a,c}, /0)}.
Intuitively, it should be clear that the set F˜+ suffices to compute stage extensions (i.e., range-maximal
conflict-free sets) of F. This intuitive understanding of verifiability will be formally specified in Defini-
tion 6.15. Note that a neighborhood function rx may return n-tuples. Consequently, in consideration of
the eight basic functions we obtain (modulo reordering, duplicates, empty set) 27+1 syntactically differ-
ent neighborhood functions and therefore the same number of verification classes. As usual, we denote
the n-ary combination of basic functions (rx1(S,S′), . . . ,rxn(S,S′)) as rx(S,S′) by x = x1 . . .xn.
With the following definition we can put neighborhood functions into relation w.r.t. their information.
This will help us to show that actually many of the induced classes collapse to the same amount of
information.
Definition 6.13. Given neighborhood functions rx and ry returning n-tuples and m-tuples, respectively,
we say that rx is more informative than ry, for short rx  ry, iff there is a function δ : (2U )n → (2U )m
such that for any two sets of arguments S,S′ ⊆U , we have δ (rx(S,S′)) = ry(S,S′). We denote the strict
part of  by , i.e. rx  ry iff rx  ry and ry 6 rx. Finally, rx ≈ ry (rx represents ry and vice versa) in case
rx  ry and ry  rx.
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+± +∓ ±∓ ∩∪ −± −∓
+ ± ∩ ∆ ∪ ∓ −
ε
Figure 6.1: Representatives of neighborhood functions and their relation w.r.t. information; a node x
stands for the neighborhood function rx; an arrow from x to y means rx ≺ ry.
It turns out that many neighborhood functions amount to the same amount of information. In partic-
ular, r+− represents all rx1,...,xn with n > 2.
Lemma 6.14. All neighborhood functions are represented by the ones depicted in Figure 6.1 and the
≺-relation represented by arcs in Figure 6.1 holds.
Proof. We begin by showing that all neighborhood functions are represented in Figure 6.1. Clearly, each
neighborhood function rx represents itself, i.e. rx ≈ rx. All neighborhood functions for n= 1 are depicted
in Figure 6.1. We turn to n = 2. Consider the neighborhood functions r+±, r+∩, and r±∩, defined as
r+±(S,S′) = (S,S \ S′), r+∩(S,S′) = (S,S∩S′), and r±∩(S,S′) = (S \ S′,S∩S′) for S,S′ ⊆U . Observe
that S = (S\S′)∪ (S∩S′). Hence, we can easily define functions in the spirit of Definition 6.13 mapping
the images of the function to one another.
• δ1(r+±(S,S′)) = δ1(S,S\S′) =de f (S,S\ (S\S′)) = (S,S∩S′) = r+∩(S,S′);
• δ2(r+∩(S,S′)) = δ2(S,S∩S′) =de f (S\ (S∩S′),S∩S′) = (S\S′,S∩S′) = r±∩(S,S′);
• δ3(r±∩(S,S′)) = δ3(S\S′,S∩S′) =de f ((S\S′)∪ (S∩S′),S\S′) = (S,S\S′) = r+±(S,S′).
Therefore, r+± ≈ r+∩ ≈ r±∩. In particular, they are all represented by r±. We can apply the same
reasoning to other combinations of neighborhood functions and get the following equivalences w.r.t.
information content:
• r+∓ ≈ r+∪ ≈ r∓∪;
• r±∓ ≈ r±∆ ≈ r∓∆;
• r∩∪ ≈ r∩∆ ≈ r∪∆;
• r−± ≈ r−∪ ≈ r±∪; and
• r−∓ ≈ r−∩ ≈ r∓∩,
with the functions stated first acting as representatives in Figure 6.1.
For the remaining functions returning 2-tuples we get r+− ≈ r+∆ ≈ r−∆ by the fact that r∆(S,S′) =
(S∪S′) \ (S∩S′).
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• δ4(r+−(S,S′)) = δ4(S,S′) =de f (S, (S∪S′) \ (S∩S′)) = r+∆(S,S′);
• δ5(r+∆(S,S′)) = δ5(S, (S∪S′)\(S∩S′)) =de f ((S\((S∪S′)\(S∩S′)))∪((S∪S′)\(S∩S′))\S, (S∪
S′) \ (S∩S′)) = (S′, (S∪S′) \ (S∩S′)) = r−∩(S,S′);
• δ6(r−∆(S,S′)) = δ6(S′, (S∪ S′) \ (S∩ S′)) =de f ((S′ \ ((S∪ S′) \ (S∩ S′)))∪ ((S∪ S′) \ (S∩ S′)) \
S′,S′) = (S,S′) = r+−(S,S′).
Finally, every neighborhood function rx1...xn with x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {+,−,±,∓,∪,∩,∆} and n ≥ 3 is rep-
resented by r+− since we can compute all possible sets from S and S′. Therefore r+− (together with all
of these equally informative function) is the most informative neighborhood function.
Now consider two functions rx and ry such that there is an arrow from x to y in Figure 6.1. It is
easy to see that ry  rx since, for sets of arguments S and S′, rx(S,S′) is either contained in ry(S,S′) or
obtainable from ry(S,S′) by basic set operations. The fact that rx 6 ry, entailing ry  rx, follows from the
impossibility of finding a function δ such that δ (rx(S,S′)) = ry(S,S′).
If the information provided by a neighborhood function is sufficient to compute the extensions under
a semantics, we say that the semantics is verifiable by the class induced by the neighborhood function.
Definition 6.15. A semantics σ is verifiable by the verification class induced by the neighborhood
function rx returning n-tuples (or simply, x-verifiable) iff there is a function (also called criterion) γσ :(
2U
)n× 2U → 22U s.t. for every AF F ∈ U we have: γσ (F˜x,A(F)) = σ(F). Moreover, σ is exactly
x-verifiable iff σ is x-verifiable and there is no verification class induced by ry with ry ≺ rx such that σ is
y-verifiable.
Observe that if a semantics σ is x-verifiable then for any two AFs F and G with F˜x = G˜x and
A(F) = A(G) it must hold that σ(F) = σ(G).
We proceed with a list of criteria showing that well-known semantics mentioned in Definition 3.4
are verifiable by a verification class induced by a certain neighborhood function. In the following, we
abbreviate the tuple
(
F˜x,A(F)
)
by F˜xA.
γna
(
F˜εA
)
=
{
S | S ∈ F˜,S is ⊆ -maximal in F˜
}
;
γstg
(
F˜+A
)
=
{
S | (S,S+) ∈ F˜+,S+ is ⊆ -maximal in {C+ | (C,C+) ∈ F˜+}
}
;
γstb
(
F˜+A
)
=
{
S | (S,S+) ∈ F˜+,S+ = A
}
;
γad
(
F˜∓A
)
=
{
S | (S,S∓) ∈ F˜∓,S∓ = /0
}
;
γpr
(
F˜∓A
)
=
{
S | S ∈ γad
(
F˜∓A
)
,S is ⊆ -maximal in γad
(
F˜∓A
)}
;
γss
(
F˜+∓A
)
=
{
S | S ∈ γad
(
F˜∓A
)
,S+ is ⊆ -maximal in
{
C+ | (C,C+,C∓) ∈ F˜+∓,C ∈ γad
(
F˜∓A
)}}
;
γil
(
F˜∓A
)
=
{
S | S is ⊆ -maximal in
{
C |C ∈ γad
(
F˜∓A
)
,C ⊆
⋂
γpr
(
F˜∓A
)}}
;
γeg
(
F˜+∓A
)
=
{
S | S is ⊆ -maximal in
{
C |C ∈ γad
(
F˜∓A
)
,C ⊆
⋂
γss
(
F˜+∓A
)}}
;
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γsad
(
F˜−±A
)
=
{
S | (S,S−,S±) ∈ F˜−±,∃(S0,S−0 ,S±0 ), . . . , (Sn,S−n ,S±n ) ∈ F˜−± :
( /0 = S0 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ Sn = S∧∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : S−i ⊆ S±i−1)
}
;
γgr
(
F˜−±A
)
=
{
S | S ∈ γsad
(
F˜−±A
)
,∀(S¯, S¯−, S¯±) ∈ F˜−± : S¯⊃ S⇒ (S¯− \S±) 6= /0)
}
;
γco
(
F˜+−A
)
=
{
S | (S,S+,S−) ∈ F˜+−, (S− \S+) = /0,∀(S¯, S¯+, S¯−) ∈ F˜+− : S¯⊃ S⇒ (S¯− \S+) 6= /0)
}
.
It is easy to see that the naive semantics is verifiable by the verification class induced by rε since the
naive extensions can be determined by the conflict-free sets. Stable and stage semantics, on the other
hand, utilize the range of each conflict-free set in addition. Hence they are verifiable by the verification
class induced by r+. Now consider admissible sets. Recall that a conflict-free S set is admissible if and
only if it attacks all attackers. This is captured exactly by the condition S∓ = /0, hence admissible sets
are verifiable by the verification class induced by r∓. The same holds for preferred semantics, since we
just have to determine the maximal conflict-free sets with S∓ = /0. Semi-stable semantics, however, needs
the range of each conflict-free set in addition, see γss, which makes it verifiable by the verification class
induced by r+∓. Finally consider the criterion γco. The first two conditions for a set of arguments S
stand for conflict-freeness and admissibility, respectively. Now assume the third condition does not hold,
i.e., there exists a tuple (S¯, S¯+, S¯−) ∈ F˜+− with S¯ ⊃ S and S¯− \S+ = /0. This means that every argument
attacking S¯ is attacked by S, i.e., S¯ is defended by S. Hence S is not a complete extension, showing that
γco(F˜+−A ) = co(F) for each F ∈U . One can verify that all criteria from the list are adequate in the sense
that they describe the extensions of the corresponding semantics.
The concepts of verifiability and being more informative behave correctly insofar as more informative
neighborhood functions do not lead to a loss of verification capacity.
Proposition 6.16. If a semantics σ is x-verifiable, then σ is verifiable by all verification classes induced
by some ry with ry  rx.
Proof. As σ is verifiable by the verification class induced by rx it holds that there is some γσ such
that for all F ∈ U , γσ (F˜x,A(F)) = σ(F). Now let ry  rx, meaning that there is some δ such that
δ (ry(S,S′)) = rx. We define γ ′σ (F˜y,A(F)) = γσ ({(S,δ (S)) | (S,S) ∈ F˜y},A(F)) and observe that
{(S,δ (S)) | (S,S) ∈ F˜y}= F˜x, hence γ ′σ (F˜y,A(F)) = σ(F) for each F ∈U .
In order to prove unverifiability of a semantics σ w.r.t. a class induced by a certain rx it suffices to
present two AFs F and G such that σ(F) 6= σ(G) but, F˜x = G˜x and A(F) = A(G). Then the verification
class induced by rx does not provide enough information to verify σ . In the following we will use this
strategy to show exact verifiability. Consider a semantics σ which is verifiable by a class induced by rx. If
σ is unverifiable by all verifiability classes induced by ry with ry ≺ rx we have that σ is exactly verifiable
by rx. The following examples study this issue for the semantics under consideration.
Example 6.17. The complete semantics is +−-verifiable as seen before. The following AFs show that it
is even exactly verifiable by that class.
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aF1 : b aF′1 : b
aF2 : b c aF′2 : b c
aF3 : b aF′3 : b
aF4 : b aF′4 : b
aF5 : b aF′5 : b
aF6 : b aF′6 : b
First consider the AFs F1 and F′1, and observe that F˜1
+±
= {( /0, /0, /0), ({a}, /0, /0)} = F˜′1
+±
. On the
other hand F1 and F′1 differ in their complete extensions since co(F1) = { /0} but co(F′1) = {{a}}. There-
fore complete semantics is unverifiable by the verification class induced by r+±. Likewise, this can be
shown for the classes induced by r−∓, r±∓, r−±, r+∓, and r∩∪, respectively:
• F˜2−∓ == F˜′2
−∓
, but co(F2) = {{a},{a,c}} 6= {{a,c}}= co(F′2).
• F˜3±∓ = F˜′3
±∓
, but co(F3) = { /0,{a}} 6= {{a}}= co(F′3).
• F˜4−± = F˜′4
−±
, but co(F4) = { /0,{a}} 6= { /0}= co(F′4).
• F˜5+∓ = F˜′5
+∓
, but co(F5) = { /0,{a}} 6= {{a}}= co(F′5).
• F˜6∩∪ = F˜′6
∩∪
, but co(F6) = {{a}} 6= { /0}= co(F′6).
Hence complete semantics is exactly verifiable by the verification class induced by r+−.
Example 6.18. Consider the semi-stable and eager semantics and recall that they are +∓-verifiable. To
show exact verifiability it suffices to show unverifiability by the classes induced by r+, r∪, and r∓ (cf.
Figure 6.1); F1 and F6 are taken from Example 6.17 above.
• F˜1+ = F˜′1
+
, but ss(F1) = eg(F1) = { /0} 6= {{a}}= ss(F′1) = eg(F′1).
• F˜6∪ = F˜′6
∪
, but ss(F6) = eg(F6) = {{a}} 6= { /0}= ss(F′6) = eg(F′6).
• F˜7∓ = F˜′7
∓
, but ss(F7) = {{b}} 6= {{a},{b}}= ss(F′7) and eg(F7) = {{b}} 6= { /0}= eg(F′7).
aF7 : b c aF′7 : b c
121
6.2. Verifiability
ε: na
+: stb, stg ∓: ad, pr, il
+∓: ss, eg −±: gr, sad
+−: co
Figure 6.2: Semantics and their Exact Verification Classes
Hence, both the semi-stable and eager semantics are exactly verifiable by the verification class induced
by r+∓.
Example 6.19. Now consider the grounded and strong admissible semantics and recall that they are−±-
verifiable. In order to show exact verifiability we have to show unverifiability by the classes induced by
r±, r−, and r∪ (cf. Figure 6.1); again, the AFs from Example 6.17 can be reused.
• F˜1± = F˜′1
±
, but gr(F1) = { /0} 6= {{a}}= gr(F′1) and sad(F1) = { /0} 6= { /0,{a}}= sad(F′1).
• F˜2−= F˜′2
−
, but gr(F2) = {{a}} 6= {{a,c}}= gr(F′2) and sad(F2) = { /0,{a}} 6= { /0,{a},{a,c}}=
sad(F′2).
• F˜6∪ = F˜′6
∪
, but gr(F6) = {{a}} 6= { /0}= gr(F′6) and sad(F6) = { /0,{a}} 6= { /0}= sad(F′6).
Hence, both the grounded and strong admissible semantics are exactly verifiable by the verification
class induced by r+∓.
Example 6.20. Finally consider stable, stage, admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. They are either
+-verifiable (stb and stg) or ∓-verifiable (ad, pr, and il). We have to show unverifiability w.r.t. the
verification class induced by rε . Consider, for instance, the AFs F4 and F′4 from Example 6.17. We
have F˜4
ε
= F˜′4
ε
, but ad(F4) = { /0,{a}} 6= { /0}= ad(F′4), stb(F4) = {{a}} 6= /0 = stb(F′4), and σ(F4) =
{{a}} 6= { /0}= σ(F′4) for σ ∈ {stg,pr, il}, showing exactness of the respective verification classes.
The insights obtained through Examples 6.17 , 6.18, 6.19 and 6.20 show that the verification classes
obtained from the criteria given above are indeed exact. Figure 6.2 shows the resulting relation between
the semantics under consideration with respect to their exact verification classes.
We turn now to the main theorem stating that any rational semantics is exactly verifiable by one of
the 15 different verification classes.
Theorem 6.21. Every semantics which is rational is exactly verifiable by a verification class induced by
one of the neighborhood functions presented in Figure 6.1.
Proof. First of all note that by Lemma 6.14, rε is the least informative neighborhood function and for
every other neighborhood function rx it holds that rε  rx. Therefore, if a semantics is verifiable by the
verification class induced by any rx then it is exactly verifiable by a verification class induced by some ry
with rε  ry  rx. Moreover, if a semantics is exactly verifiable by a class, then it is by definition also
verifiable by this class. Hence it remains to show that every semantics which is rational is verifiable by a
verification class presented in Figure 6.1.
We show the contrapositive, i.e., if a semantics is not verifiable by a verification class induced by
one of the neighborhood functions presented in Figure 6.1 then it is not rational. Assume a semantics
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σ is not verifiable by one of the verification classes. This means σ is not verifiable by the verification
class induced by r+−. Hence there exist two AFs F and G such that F˜+− = G˜+− and A(F) = A(G), but
σ(F) 6= σ(G). For every argument a which is not self-attacking, a tuple ({a},{a}+,{a}−) is contained
in F˜+− (and in G˜+−). Hence F and G have the same not-self-attacking arguments and, moreover these
arguments have the same ingoing and outgoing attacks in F and G. This, together with A(F) = A(G)
implies that Fl = Gl (see Definition 6.2) holds. But since σ(F) 6= σ(G) we get that σ is not rational,
which was to show.
Note that the criterion giving evidence for verifiability of a semantics by a certain class has access to
the set of arguments of a given AF. In fact, only the criterion for stable semantics makes use of that – it
can be omitted for the other semantics.
6.3 Intermediate Semantics
A type of semantics which has aroused quite some interest in the literature (see e.g. [Baroni and Giacomin,
2007a] and [Nieves et al., 2011]) are intermediate semantics, i.e. semantics which yield results lying
between two existing semantics. The introduction of σ -τ-intermediate semantics can be motivated by
deleting undesired (or add desired) τ-extensions2 while guaranteeing all reasonable positions w.r.t. σ . In
other words, σ -τ-intermediate semantics can be seen as sceptical or credulous acceptance shifts within
the range of σ and τ .
A natural question is whether we can make any statements about compatible kernels of intermediate
semantics. In particular, if semantics σ and τ are characterizable by some kernel k, is then every σ -τ-
intermediate semantics characterizable by k. The following example answers this question negatively.
Example 6.22. Recall from Theorem 5.14 that both stable and stage semantics are compatible with
k(stb), i.e. F ≡stbE G ⇐⇒ F ≡stgE G ⇐⇒ Fk(stb) = Gk(stb). Now we define the following stb-stg-
intermediate semantics, say stagle semantics: Given an AF F = (A,R), S ∈ sta(F) iff S ∈ cf (F), S⊕F ∪
S	F = A and for every T ∈ cf (F) we have S⊕F 6⊂ T⊕F . Obviously, it holds that stb⊆ sta⊆ stg and stb 6= sta
as well as sta 6= stg, as witnessed by the AF F:
aF : b c
It is easy to verify that stb(F) = /0⊂ sta(F) = {{b}}⊂ stg(F) = {{b},{c}}. We proceed by showing
that stagle semantics is not characterizable by k(stb). To this end consider Fk(stb) which is depicted below.
aFk(stb) : b c
Now, sta
(
Fk(stb)
)
= {{b},{c}} witnesses F 6≡sta Fk(stb) and therefore, F 6≡staE Fk(stb). Since Fk(stb) =(
Fk(stb)
)k(stb)
we are done, i.e. stagle semantics is indeed not characterizable by the stable kernel.
It is the main result of this section that characterizability of intermediate semantics w.r.t. a certain
kernel can be guaranteed if verifiability w.r.t. a certain class is presumed. The provided characterization
theorems generalize former results presented in Theorem 5.14. Moreover, due to the abstract character of
the theorems the results are applicable to semantics which may be defined in the future.
2Recently, the so-called extension removal problem was studied []. Here, instead of sticking to an intermediate semantics the
authors studied whether it is possible - and if so how - to modify a given AF in such a way that certain undesired extensions are no
longer generated.
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Before turning to the characterization theorems we state some implications of verifiability. In par-
ticular, under the assumption that σ is verifiable by a certain class, equality of certain kernels implies
expansion equivalence w.r.t. σ .
Proposition 6.23. For any +-verifiable semantics σ we have Fk(stb) = Gk(stb) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
Proof. It was shown that Fk(stb) = Gk(stb) =⇒ (F ∪˙ H)k(stb) = (G ∪˙ H)k(stb) (cf. In [Oikarinen and Woltran,
2011] or Item 5 of Fact 5.12)(i). Consider now a +-verifiable semantics σ . In order to show σ(F) =
σ
(
Fk(stb)
)
(ii) we prove F˜+ = F˜k(stb)
+
(*) first. It is easy to see that S ∈ cf (F) iff S ∈ cf
(
Fk(stb)
)
. Fur-
thermore, since k(stb) deletes an attack (a,b) only if a is self-defeating we deduce that ranges does not
change as long as conflict-free sets are considered. Thus, σ(F) = (Def.) γσ (F˜+) = (*) γσ
(
F˜k(stb)
+)
= (Def.)
σ
(
Fk(stb)
)
. Now assume that Fk(stb) = Gk(stb) and let S ∈ σ(F ∪˙ H) for some AF H. We have to show
that S ∈ σ(G ∪˙ H). Applying (ii) we obtain S ∈ σ
(
(F ∪˙ H)k(stb)
)
. Furthermore, using (i) we deduce
S ∈ σ
(
(G ∪˙ H)k(stb)
)
. Finally, S ∈ σ(G ∪˙ H) by applying (ii), which concludes the proof.
The following results can be shown in a similar manner.
Proposition 6.24. For a semantics σ it holds that
• if σ is +-verifiable then Fk(stb) = Gk(stb) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
• if σ is +∓-verifiable then Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
• if σ is +−-verifiable then Fk(co) = Gk(co) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
• if σ is −±-verifiable then Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
• if σ is ε-verifiable then Fk(na) = Gk(na) =⇒ F ≡σE G.
We proceed with general characterization theorems. The first one states that stb-stg-intermediate se-
mantics are characterizable via the stable kernel if+-verifiability is given. Consequently, stagle semantics
as defined in Example 6.22 can not be +-verifiable.
Theorem 6.25. Given a semantics σ which is +-verifiable and stb-stg-intermediate, then
Fk(stb) = Gk(stb) ⇐⇒ F ≡σE G.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Follows directly from Proposition 6.24.
(⇐= ) We show the contrapositive, i.e. Fk(stb) 6= Gk(stb) =⇒ F 6≡σE G. Assuming Fk(stb) 6= Gk(stb)
implies F 6≡stbE G, i.e. there exists an AF H such that stb(F ∪˙ H) 6= stb(G ∪˙ H) and therefore, stb(F ∪˙
H) 6= stb(G ∪˙H). Let B = A(F)∪A(G)∪A(H) and H′ = (B∪{a},{(a,b), (b,a) | b ∈ B}). It is easy to
see that stb(F ∪˙ H′) = stb(F ∪˙ H)∪{{a}} and stb(G ∪˙ H′) = stb(G ∪˙ H)∪{{a}}. Since now both
stb(F ∪˙ H′) 6= /0 and stb(G ∪˙ H′) 6= /0 it holds that stb(F ∪˙ H′) = stb(F ∪˙ H′) and stb(G ∪˙ H′) =
stb(G ∪˙ H′). Hence σ(F ∪˙ H′) 6= σ(F ∪˙ H′), showing that F 6≡stbE G.
The following theorems can be shown in a similar manner.
Theorem 6.26. Given a semantics σ which is −±-verifiable and gr-sad-intermediate, it holds that
Fk(gr) = Gk(gr) ⇐⇒ F ≡σE G.
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Theorem 6.27. Given a semantics σ which is+∓-verifiable and ρ-ad-intermediate for any ρ ∈{ss, il,eg},
it holds that Fk(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇐⇒ F ≡σE G.
Recall that complete semantics is a ss-ad-intermediate semantics. Furthermore, it is not characteriz-
able by the admissible kernel as already observed in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. Consequently, it is
not +∓-verifiable (as we have shown in Example 6.17 with considerable effort).
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have initiated a, to the best of our knowledge, novel approach contributed to the analysis
and comparison of abstract argumentation semantics. The main idea of our approach is to provide a novel
categorization in terms of the amount of information required for testing whether a set of arguments is
an extension of a certain semantics. The resulting notion of verification classes allows us to categorize
any new semantics (given it is “rational”) with respect to the information needed and compare it to other
semantics. Thus our work is in the tradition of the principle-based evaluation due to Baroni and Giacomin
[Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b] and paves the way for a more general view on argumentation semantics,
their common features, and their inherent differences.
Using our notion of verifiability, we were able to show characterizability for certain intermediate
semantics w.r.t. some classical kernels. Concerning concrete semantics, our results yield the following
observation: While preferred, semi-stable, ideal and eager semantics coincide w.r.t. strong equivalence,
verifiability of these semantics differs. In fact, preferred and ideal semantics manage to be verifiable with
strictly less information.
For future work we envisage an extension of the notion of verifiability classes in order to categorize
semantics not captured by the approach followed in this chapter, such as cf2 [Baroni et al., 2005].
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Summary and Final Remarks
The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) brings together people from theoretical sciences like mathem-
atics or philosophy and application oriented researchers. For a particular application the latter group
is engaged with several design decisions ranging from how to represent the relevant knowledge? and
how to update a given knowledge base? over how to simplify a given knowledge base? to how much
computing power is sufficient for the intelligent agent?. In consideration of the large variety of existing
logical formalisms it is of utmost importance to select the most adequate one for the specific purpose in
mind. The presented habilitation treatise tackles several fundamental intrinsic properties of knowledge
representation formalisms and thus contributes to an informed choice for the designer. The results can be
compactly summarized as follows (for detailed summaries and conclusions we refer to the Sections 2.4,
3.5, 4.7, 5.5 and 6.4). First, we tackled the open question whether strong equivalence of two theories
(which guarantees their mutual replaceability without loss of information) in a certain formalism can be
decided via ordinary equivalence in another classical logic-like formalism. We showed that the important
case of considering only finite knowledge bases guarantees the existence of a canonical characterizing
formalism. This means that the search for characterizing logics for a given representation formalism
– analogously to the logic of here-and-there in case of normal logic programs under stable model se-
mantics [Lifschitz et al., 2001] – is not doomed to failure. Secondly, we studied argumentation semantics
which play the flagship role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory in very detail [Dung, 1995]. In par-
ticular, we compared a representative number of semantics regarding the following properties: existence
and uniqueness, expressibility, replaceability and verifiability. It turned out that the considered properties
are highly sensitive to the chosen semantics as well as structural properties of the considered AFs. This
variety can be seen as a positive feature since it allows the designer to choose the most appropriate one
for the current task.
In the last few years AI has stepped more and more into the public. Omniscient question answering
systems like IBM’s Watson [Ferrucci et al., 2010] or a superhuman chess, shogi as well as Go playing
program like DeepMind’s AlphaZero [Silver et al., 2018] left a remarkable impression in the wider public.
Especially, the latter program is considered to be one of the greatest breakthroughs in AI. Even the most
optimistic researchers did not expect that a game like Go will be played by a machine at super human level
within the next 10 years since it is an extremely complex game, more so than chess. The Danish chess
grandmaster Peter Heine Nielsen [BBC, 2017] said about the chess skills of AlphaZero the following:
I always wondered how it would be if a superior species landed on earth and showed us
how they played chess. Now I know.
The public and scientific opinion about what AI is capable to achieve changed so many times since
the by now famous Dartmouth Summer Workshop in 1956 [McCarthy et al., 1955] which is considered
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by most researchers as the beginning of AI research. The history of artificial intelligence is marked by
the alternation of periods of enthusiasm equipped with broad funding opportunities and cycles of disap-
pointment and criticism, so-called AI winters. Right now we are definitely in a hype cycle. Several major
biennial conferences in AI decided to become an annual event like the prestigious International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (from 2015 onwards) [IJCAI, 2019] as well as the leading know-
ledge representation conference International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation
and Reasoning (from 2020 onwards) [KR, 2019]. Moreover, the German government decided to spend
more than 3 billion Euros for research and development of artificial intelligence over the next years up to
2025 [Scherer and Lotito, 2018]. In order to stop the AI brain drain the initiative will include a funding
of 100 new professorships. The goal is clear: Germany wants to become a worldwide leader in AI.
I’m sure that the next few years will be an exciting time regarding new AI developments. One of
the main challenges will be how to transfer research results into industry and finally into our daily life.
It is not too far-fetched to envisage that the expertise of programs like AlphaZero and Watson might be
used to optimize dangerous missions like fire fighting or to assist elderly people in their daily decisions.
What is not achieved by both programs so far is the ability to explain why certain decisions are derived.
This means, the actions performed by these AIs are neither transparent, nor easily understandable by
humans. In order to attain a broad approval for AI technologies explanation components has to be im-
plemented. This issue or this demand is known as explainable AI [Holzinger, 2018]. Argumentation
theory provides the formal ingredients for being able to have a discussion or justifying a certain proposal
via explicitly mentioning the pros and cons. In this regard, I believe that the presented formal study of
intrinsic properties of Dung’s abstract argumentation formalism may contribute to the development of a
new AI generation.
128
Bibliography
[Alchourrón et al., 1985] Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., and Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of
theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50:510–
530.
[Arieli, 2012] Arieli, O. (2012). Conflict-tolerant semantics for argumentation frameworks. In Proc.
JELIA, pages 28–40.
[Baroni et al., 2014] Baroni, P., Boella, G., Cerutti, F., Giacomin, M., van der Torre, L. W. N., and
Villata, S. (2014). On the input/output behavior of argumentation frameworks. Artificial Intelligence,
217:144–197.
[Baroni et al., 2011a] Baroni, P., Caminada, M., and Giacomin, M. (2011a). An introduction to argu-
mentation semantics. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 26:365–410.
[Baroni et al., 2018a] Baroni, P., Caminada, M., and Giacomin, M. (2018a). Abstract argumentation
frameworks and their semantics. In Baroni, P., Gabbay, D., Giacomin, M., and van der Torre, L.,
editors, Handbook of Formal Argumentation, chapter 4. College Publications.
[Baroni et al., 2013] Baroni, P., Cerutti, F., Dunne, P. E., and Giacomin, M. (2013). Automata for infinite
argumentation structures. Artificial Intelligence, 203:104–150.
[Baroni et al., 2011b] Baroni, P., Dunne, P. E., and Giacomin, M. (2011b). On the resolution-based
family of abstract argumentation semantics and its grounded instance. Artif. Intell., 175(3-4):791–813.
[Baroni and Giacomin, 2007a] Baroni, P. and Giacomin, M. (2007a). Comparing argumentation se-
mantics with respect to skepticism. In Proc. ECSQARU, pages 210–221.
[Baroni and Giacomin, 2007b] Baroni, P. and Giacomin, M. (2007b). On principle-based evaluation of
extension-based argumentation semantics. Artificial Intelligence, 171:675–700.
[Baroni et al., 2005] Baroni, P., Giacomin, M., and Guida, G. (2005). SCC-recursiveness: a general
schema for argumentation semantics. Artificial Intelligence, 168:162–210.
[Baroni et al., 2018b] Baroni, P., Giacomin, M., and Liao, B. (2018b). Locality and modularity in ab-
stract argumentation. In Baroni, P., Gabbay, D., Giacomin, M., and van der Torre, L., editors, Hand-
book of Formal Argumentation, chapter 19. College Publications.
[Baumann, 2011] Baumann, R. (2011). Splitting an argumentation framework. In Logic Programming
and Nonmonotonic Reasoning - 11th International Conference, LPNMR 2011, Vancouver, Canada,
May 16-19, 2011. Proceedings, pages 40–53.
[Baumann, 2012a] Baumann, R. (2012a). Normal and strong expansion equivalence for argumentation
frameworks. Artificial Intelligence, 193:18–44.
129
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Baumann, 2012b] Baumann, R. (2012b). What does it take to enforce an argument? minimal change
in abstract argumentation. In ECAI 2012 - 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence. In-
cluding Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS-2012) System Demonstrations Track,
Montpellier, France, August 27-31 , 2012, pages 127–132.
[Baumann, 2014a] Baumann, R. (2014a). Context-free and context-sensitive kernels: Update and dele-
tion equivalence in abstract argumentation. In ECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 18-22 August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic - Including Prestigious Applications of In-
telligent Systems (PAIS 2014), pages 63–68.
[Baumann, 2014b] Baumann, R. (2014b). Metalogical Contributions to the Nonmonotonic Theory of
Abstract Argumentation. College Publications - Studies in Logic.
[Baumann, 2016] Baumann, R. (2016). Characterizing equivalence notions for labelling-based se-
mantics. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fifteenth
International Conference, KR 2016, Cape Town, South Africa, April 25-29, 2016., pages 22–32.
[Baumann, 2018] Baumann, R. (2018). On the nature of argumentation semantics: Existence and unique-
ness, expressibility, and replaceability. In Baroni, P., Gabbay, D., Giacomin, M., and van der Torre,
L., editors, Handbook of Formal Argumentation, chapter 14. College Publications. also appears in
IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications 4(8):2779-2886.
[Baumann and Brewka, 2010] Baumann, R. and Brewka, G. (2010). Expanding argumentation frame-
works: Enforcing and monotonicity results. In Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of
COMMA 2010, Desenzano del Garda, Italy, September 8-10, 2010., pages 75–86.
[Baumann and Brewka, 2013a] Baumann, R. and Brewka, G. (2013a). Analyzing the equivalence zoo
in abstract argumentation. In Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems - 14th International Work-
shop, CLIMA XIV, Corunna, Spain, September 16-18, 2013. Proceedings, pages 18–33.
[Baumann and Brewka, 2013b] Baumann, R. and Brewka, G. (2013b). Spectra in abstract argumenta-
tion: An analysis of minimal change. In Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 12th In-
ternational Conference, LPNMR 2013, Corunna, Spain, September 15-19, 2013. Proceedings, pages
174–186.
[Baumann and Brewka, 2015a] Baumann, R. and Brewka, G. (2015a). AGM meets abstract argument-
ation: Expansion and revision for dung frameworks. In [Yang and Wooldridge, 2015], pages 2734–
2740.
[Baumann and Brewka, 2015b] Baumann, R. and Brewka, G. (2015b). The equivalence zoo for Dung-
style semantics. Journal of Logic and Computation.
[Baumann et al., 2012] Baumann, R., Brewka, G., Dvorák, W., and Woltran, S. (2012). Parameterized
splitting: A simple modification-based approach. In Correct Reasoning - Essays on Logic-Based AI in
Honour of Vladimir Lifschitz, pages 57–71.
[Baumann et al., 2011] Baumann, R., Brewka, G., and Wong, R. (2011). Splitting argumentation frame-
works: An empirical evaluation. In Theorie and Applications of Formal Argumentation - First Inter-
national Workshop, TAFA 2011. Barcelona, Spain, July 16-17, 2011, Revised Selected Papers, pages
17–31.
[Baumann et al., 2016a] Baumann, R., Dvorák, W., Linsbichler, T., Spanring, C., Strass, H., and Woltran,
S. (2016a). On rejected arguments and implicit conflicts: The hidden power of argumentation se-
mantics. Artificial Intelligence, 241:244–284.
130
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Baumann et al., 2014a] Baumann, R., Dvorák, W., Linsbichler, T., Strass, H., and Woltran, S. (2014a).
Compact argumentation frameworks. In ECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, 18-22 August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic - Including Prestigious Applications of Intelligent
Systems (PAIS 2014), pages 69–74.
[Baumann et al., 2014b] Baumann, R., Dvorák, W., Linsbichler, T., Strass, H., and Woltran, S. (2014b).
Compact argumentation frameworks. CoRR, abs/1404.7734.
[Baumann et al., 2017] Baumann, R., Dvorˇák, W., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2017). A general
notion of equivalence for abstract argumentation. In IJCAI, Proceedings of the 26th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Melbourne, China, Australia, August 19-25 ,2017, page to
appear.
[Baumann et al., 2016b] Baumann, R., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2016b). Verifiability of argu-
mentation semantics. CoRR, abs/1603.09502.
[Baumann et al., 2016c] Baumann, R., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2016c). Verifiability of argu-
mentation semantics. In Computational Models of Argument - Proceedings of COMMA 2016, Pots-
dam, Germany, 12-16 September, 2016, pages 83–94.
[Baumann and Spanring, 2015] Baumann, R. and Spanring, C. (2015). Infinite argumentation frame-
works - On the existence and uniqueness of extensions. In Advances in Knowledge Representation,
Logic Programming, and Abstract Argumentation - Essays Dedicated to Gerhard Brewka on the Oc-
casion of His 60th Birthday, pages 281–295.
[Baumann and Spanring, 2017] Baumann, R. and Spanring, C. (2017). A study of unrestricted abstract
argumentation frameworks. In IJCAI, Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Arti-
ficial Intelligence, Melbourne, China, Australia, August 19-25 ,2017, page to appear.
[Baumann and Strass, 2012] Baumann, R. and Strass, H. (2012). Default reasoning about actions via ab-
stract argumentation. In Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2012„ Septem-
ber 10-12, 2012, Vienna, Austria, pages 297–309.
[Baumann and Strass, 2013] Baumann, R. and Strass, H. (2013). On the maximal and average numbers
of stable extensions. In Theory and Applications of Formal Argumentation - Second International
Workshop, TAFA 2013, Beijing, China, August 3-5, 2013, Revised Selected papers, pages 111–126.
[Baumann and Strass, 2015] Baumann, R. and Strass, H. (2015). Open problems in abstract argumenta-
tion. In Advances in Knowledge Representation, Logic Programming, and Abstract Argumentation -
Essays Dedicated to Gerhard Brewka on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, pages 325–339.
[Baumann and Strass, 2016] Baumann, R. and Strass, H. (2016). An abstract logical approach to char-
acterizing strong equivalence in logic-based knowledge representation formalisms. In Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference,
KR 2016, Cape Town, South Africa, April 25-29, 2016., pages 525–528.
[Baumann and Strass, 2017] Baumann, R. and Strass, H. (2017). On the number of bipolar boolean
functions. J. Log. Comput., 27(8):2431–2449.
[Baumann and Ulbricht, 2018] Baumann, R. and Ulbricht, M. (2018). If nothing is accepted - repairing
argumentation frameworks. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings
of the Sixteenth International Conference, KR 2018, Tempe, Arizona, 30 October - 2 November 2018,
pages 108–117.
131
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Baumann and Woltran, 2016] Baumann, R. and Woltran, S. (2016). The role of self-attacking arguments
in characterizations of equivalence notions. Journal of Logic and Computation, 26(4):1293–1313.
[BBC, 2017] BBC (2017). Google’s ’superhuman’ deepmind ai claims chess crown. https://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-42251535.
[Belardinelli et al., 2015] Belardinelli, F., Grossi, D., and Maudet, N. (2015). Formal analysis of dia-
logues on infinite argumentation frameworks. In [Yang and Wooldridge, 2015], pages 861–867.
[Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007] Bench-Capon, T. J. M. and Dunne, P. E. (2007). Argumentation in
artificial intelligence. Artif. Intell., 171(10-15):619–641.
[Besnard and Hunter, 2001] Besnard, P. and Hunter, A. (2001). A logic-based theory of deductive argu-
ments. Artificial Intelligence, 128:203–235.
[Besnard and Hunter, 2009] Besnard, P. and Hunter, A. (2009). Argumentation based on classical logic.
In Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 133–152. Springer.
[Birkhoff, 1973] Birkhoff, G. (1973). Lattice Theory, volume 25 of American Mathematical Society
Colloquium Publications. American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, third edition.
[Brewka, 1992] Brewka, G. (1992). Nonmonotonic reasoning: Logical foundations of commonsense.
SIGART Bull., 3(2):28–29. Reviewer-Marek, V. W.
[Brewka et al., 2013a] Brewka, G., Ellmauthaler, S., Strass, H., Wallner, J. P., and Woltran, S. (2013a).
Abstract dialectical frameworks revisited. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 803–809. IJCAI/AAAI.
[Brewka et al., 2013b] Brewka, G., Strass, H., Ellmauthaler, S., Wallner, J. P., and Woltran, S. (2013b).
Abstract dialectical frameworks revisited. In IJCAI, Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, Beijing, China, August 3-9, 2013, pages 803–809.
[Brewka and Woltran, 2010a] Brewka, G. and Woltran, S. (2010a). Abstract dialectical frameworks. In
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation
and Reasoning (KR), pages 102–111.
[Brewka and Woltran, 2010b] Brewka, G. and Woltran, S. (2010b). Abstract dialectical frameworks.
In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Twelfth International
Conference, KR 2010, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, May 9-13, 2010.
[Cabalar and Diéguez, 2014] Cabalar, P. and Diéguez, M. (2014). Strong equivalence of non-monotonic
temporal theories. In Baral, C., Giacomo, G. D., and Eiter, T., editors, Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference, KR 2014,
Vienna, Austria, July 20-24, 2014. AAAI Press.
[Caminada, 2006] Caminada, M. (2006). Semi-stable semantics. In Computational Models of Argument:
Proceedings of COMMA 2006, September 11-12, 2006, Liverpool, UK, pages 121–130.
[Caminada, 2011] Caminada, M. (2011). A labelling approach for ideal and stage semantics. Argument
and Computation, 2:1–21.
[Caminada, 2014] Caminada, M. (2014). Strong admissibility revisited. In Proc. COMMA, pages 197–
208.
132
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Caminada and Amgoud, 2007] Caminada, M. and Amgoud, L. (2007). On the evaluation of argument-
ation formalisms. Artificial Intelligence, 171:286–310.
[Caminada et al., 2012] Caminada, M. W., Carnielli, W. A., and Dunne, P. E. (2012). Semi-stable se-
mantics. Journal of Logic and Computation, 22:1207–1254.
[Caminada and Verheij, 2010] Caminada, M. W. and Verheij, B. (2010). On the existence of semi-stable
extensions. In Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[Caminada and Oren, 2014] Caminada, M. W. A. and Oren, N. (2014). Grounded semantics and infinit-
ary argumentation frameworks. In Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[Clark, 1978] Clark, K. L. (1978). Negation as failure. In Gallaire, H. and Minker, J., editors, Logic and
Data Bases, pages 293–322. Plenum Press.
[Cohn, 1981] Cohn, P. M. (1981). Universal algebra. Mathematics and Its Applications. Springer,
Dordrecht.
[Dantsin et al., 1997] Dantsin, E., Eiter, T., Gottlob, G., and Voronkov, A. (1997). Complexity and
expressive power of logic programming. In Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual IEEE Conference on
Computational Complexity, Ulm, Germany, June 24-27, 1997, pages 82–101.
[Davey and Priestley, 2002] Davey, B. and Priestley, H. (2002). Introduction to Lattices and Order.
Cambridge University Press, second edition.
[Delgrande and Peppas, 2015] Delgrande, J. P. and Peppas, P. (2015). Belief revision in horn theories.
Artificial Intelligence, 218:1–22.
[Delgrande et al., 2013] Delgrande, J. P., Peppas, P., and Woltran, S. (2013). Agm-style belief revision
of logic programs under answer set semantics. In Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning,
12th International Conference, LPNMR 2013, Corunna, Spain, September 15-19, 2013. Proceedings,
pages 264–276.
[Delgrande et al., 2008] Delgrande, J. P., Schaub, T., Tompits, H., and Woltran, S. (2008). Belief revision
of logic programs under answer set semantics. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reas-
oning: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference, KR 2008, Sydney, Australia, September
16-19, 2008, pages 411–421.
[Denecker et al., 2000] Denecker, M., Marek, V., and Truszczyn´ski, M. (2000). Approximations, Stable
Operators, Well-Founded Fixpoints and Applications in Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In Logic-Based
Artificial Intelligence, pages 127–144. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Diestel, 2006] Diestel, R. (2006). Graph Theory. Electronic library of mathematics. Springer.
[Diller et al., 2015] Diller, M., Haret, A., Linsbichler, T., Rümmele, S., and Woltran, S. (2015). An
extension-based approach to belief revision in abstract argumentation. In [Yang and Wooldridge,
2015], pages 2926–2932.
[Dung, 1995] Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-
monotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77:321–357.
[Dunne et al., 2015] Dunne, P. E., Dvorák, W., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2015). Characteristics
of multiple viewpoints in abstract argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 228:153–178.
133
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Dunne et al., 2013] Dunne, P. E., Dvorˇák, W., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2013). Characteristics
of multiple viewpoints in abstract argumentation. In 4th Workshop on Dynamics of Knowledge and
Belief, pages 16–30.
[Dunne et al., 2016] Dunne, P. E., Spanring, C., Linsbichler, T., and Woltran, S. (2016). Investigating the
relationship between argumentation semantics via signatures. In IJCAI, Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, New York, NY, USA, 9-15 July
2016, pages 1051–1057.
[Dvorˇák and Dunne, 2018] Dvorˇák, W. and Dunne, P. E. (2018). Computational problems in formal
argumentation and their complexity. In Baroni, P., Gabbay, D., Giacomin, M., and van der Torre,
L., editors, Handbook of Formal Argumentation, chapter 14. College Publications. also appears in
IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications 4(8):2557–2622.
[Dvorák et al., 2011] Dvorák, W., Dunne, P. E., and Woltran, S. (2011). Parametric properties of ideal
semantics. In IJCAI, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16-22, 2011, pages 851–856.
[Dvorˇák and Spanring, 2016] Dvorˇák, W. and Spanring, C. (2016). Comparing the expressiveness of
argumentation semantics. Journal of Logic and Computation.
[Dvorˇák and Gaggl, 2012] Dvorˇák, W. and Gaggl, S. A. (2012). Incorporating stage semantics in the
scc-recursive schema for argumentation semantics. In Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop
on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2012).
[Dvorˇák et al., 2014] Dvorˇák, W., Linsbichler, T., Oikarinen, E., and Woltran, S. (2014). Resolution-
based grounded semantics revisited. In Proc. COMMA, pages 269–280.
[Dvorˇák and Woltran, 2011] Dvorˇák, W. and Woltran, S. (2011). On the intertranslatability of argument-
ation semantics. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 41:445–475.
[Dyrkolbotn, 2014] Dyrkolbotn, S. K. (2014). How to argue for anything: Enforcing arbitrary sets of
labellings using afs. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the
Fourteenth International Conference, KR 2014, Vienna, Austria, July 20-24, 2014.
[Eiter and Fink, 2003] Eiter, T. and Fink, M. (2003). Uniform equivalence of logic programs under the
stable model semantics. In Palamidessi, C., editor, Logic Programming, 19th International Confer-
ence, ICLP 2003, Mumbai, India, December 9-13, 2003, Proceedings, volume 2916 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 224–238. Springer.
[Eiter et al., 2013] Eiter, T., Fink, M., Pührer, J., Tompits, H., and Woltran, S. (2013). Model-based
recasting in answer-set programming. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 23(1-2):75–104.
[Ferrucci et al., 2010] Ferrucci, D. A., Brown, E. W., Chu-Carroll, J., Fan, J., Gondek, D., Kalyanpur, A.,
Lally, A., Murdock, J. W., Nyberg, E., Prager, J. M., Schlaefer, N., and Welty, C. A. (2010). Building
watson: An overview of the deepqa project. AI Magazine, 31(3):59–79.
[Gabbay, 1985] Gabbay, D. M. (1985). Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert
systems. In Apt, K. R., editor, Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems, pages 439–457, Berlin,
Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[Gabbay et al., 1994] Gabbay, D. M., Hogger, C. J., and Robinson, J. A., editors (1994). Handbook
of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming: Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Uncertain
Reasoning, volume 3. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA.
134
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Gaggl and Dvorˇák, 2016] Gaggl, S. A. and Dvorˇák, W. (2016). Stage semantics and the SCC-recursive
schema for argumentation semantics. Journal of Logic and Computation, 26(4):1149–1202.
[Gaggl and Woltran, 2013] Gaggl, S. A. and Woltran, S. (2013). The cf2 argumentation semantics revis-
ited. Journal of Logic and Computation, 23:925–949.
[Gebser et al., 2012] Gebser, M., Kaminski, R., Kaufmann, B., and Schaub, T. (2012). Answer set solv-
ing in practice. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 6(3):1–238.
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V. (1988). The stable model semantics for
logic programming. In ICLP, pages 1070–1080.
[Goguen and Burstall, 1984] Goguen, J. A. and Burstall, R. M. (1984). Introducing institutions. In
Logics of Programs, pages 221–256. Springer.
[Gottlob, 1992] Gottlob, G. (1992). Complexity results for nonmonotonic logics. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 2(3):397–425.
[Grossi and Modgil, 2015] Grossi, D. and Modgil, S. (2015). On the graded acceptability of arguments.
In Proc. IJCAI, pages 868–874.
[Holzinger, 2018] Holzinger, A. (2018). explainable ai (ex-ai).
https://gi.de/informatiklexikon/explainable-ai-ex-ai/.
[IJCAI, 2019] IJCAI (2019). International joint conferences on artificial intelligence organization. ht-
tps://www.ijcai.org/.
[Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999] Jakobovits, H. and Vermeir, D. (1999). Robust semantics for argument-
ation frameworks. JLC, 9(2):215–261.
[KR, 2019] KR (2019). Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning. http://www.kr.org.
[Kraus et al., 1990] Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., and Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, prefer-
ential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44(1):167 – 207.
[Lifschitz et al., 2001] Lifschitz, V., Pearce, D., and Valverde, A. (2001). Strongly equivalent logic pro-
grams. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2(4):526–541.
[Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] Lifschitz, V. and Turner, H. (1994). Splitting a logic program. In Hen-
tenryck, P. V., editor, International Conference on Logic Programming, pages 23–37. MIT Press.
[Linsbichler et al., 2016] Linsbichler, T., Pührer, J., and Strass, H. (2016). A uniform account of realizab-
ility in abstract argumentation. In ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
29 August-2 September 2016, The Hague, The Netherlands - Including Prestigious Applications of
Artificial Intelligence (PAIS 2016), pages 252–260.
[Linsbichler et al., 2015] Linsbichler, T., Spanring, C., and Woltran, S. (2015). The hidden power of
abstract argumentation semantics. In Theory and Applications of Formal Argumentation - Third Inter-
national Workshop, TAFA 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 25-26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers,
pages 146–162.
[Maher, 1986] Maher, M. J. (1986). Eqivalences of logic programs. In Proc. ICLP, pages 410–424.
[Makinson, 1994] Makinson, D. (1994). Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic program-
ming (vol. 3). chapter General Patterns in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 35–110. Oxford University
Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA.
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[McCarthy et al., 1955] McCarthy, J., Minsky, M. L., Rochester, N., and Shannon, C. E. (1955). A
PROPOSAL FOR THE DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON ARTIFICIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE. http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html.
[Nieves et al., 2011] Nieves, J. C., Osorio, M., and Zepeda, C. (2011). A schema for generating relevant
logic programming semantics and its applications in argumentation theory. Fundam. Inform., 106(2-
4):295–319.
[Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] Oikarinen, E. and Woltran, S. (2011). Characterizing strong equivalence
for argumentation frameworks. Artificial Intelligence, 175:1985–2009.
[Ore, 1944] Ore, O. (1944). Galois connexions. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
55(3):493–513.
[Osorio et al., 2005] Osorio, M., Zepeda, C., Nieves, J. C., and Cortés, U. (2005). Inferring acceptable
arguments with answer set programming. In Proceedings of the Sixth Mexican International Confer-
ence on Computer Science (ENC), pages 198–205.
[Prakken, 2010] Prakken, H. (2010). An abstract framework for argumentation with structured argu-
ments. Argument and Computation, 1:93–124.
[Qi and Yang, 2008] Qi, G. and Yang, F. (2008). A survey of revision approaches in description logics. In
Proceedings of the 21st International Workshop on Description Logics (DL2008), Dresden, Germany,
May 13-16, 2008.
[Rahwan and Simari, 2009] Rahwan, I. and Simari, G. R. (2009). Argumentation in Artificial Intelli-
gence. Springer.
[Reiter, 1980] Reiter, R. (1980). A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13:81–132.
[Rudin, 1976] Rudin, W. (1976). Principles of Mathematical Analysis. International series in pure and
applied mathematics. McGraw-Hill.
[Scherer and Lotito, 2018] Scherer, M. and Lotito, M. (2018). Germany announces 3 billion
"artificial intelligence (ai) made in germany" initiative. https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/germany-announces-eu3-billion-artificial-intelligence-ai-made-germany.
[Silver et al., 2018] Silver, D., Hubert, T., Schrittwieser, J., Antonoglou, I., Lai, M., Guez, A., Lanctot,
M., Sifre, L., Kumaran, D., Graepel, T., et al. (2018). A general reinforcement learning algorithm that
masters chess, shogi, and go through self-play. Science, 362(6419):1140–1144.
[Spanring, 2012] Spanring, C. (2012). Intertranslatability results for abstract argumentation semantics.
Master’s thesis, Uni Wien.
[Spanring, 2015] Spanring, C. (2015). Hunt for the collapse of semantics in infinite abstract argument-
ation frameworks. In 2015 Imperial College Computing Student Workshop, ICCSW 2015, September
24-25, 2015, London, United Kingdom, pages 70–77.
[Strass, 2013] Strass, H. (2013). Approximating operators and semantics for abstract dialectical frame-
works. Artificial Intelligence, 205:39–70.
[Strass, 2015] Strass, H. (2015). The relative expressiveness of abstract argumentation and logic pro-
gramming. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January
25-30, 2015, Austin, Texas, USA., pages 1625–1631.
136
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Tarski, 1955] Tarski, A. (1955). A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications. Pacific
Journal of Mathematics, 5(2):285–309.
[Truszczyn´ski, 2006] Truszczyn´ski, M. (2006). Strong and uniform equivalence of nonmonotonic theor-
ies – an algebraic approach. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 48(3–4):245–265.
[Truszczyn´ski, 2007] Truszczyn´ski, M. (2007). The modal logic S4F, the default logic, and the logic
here-and-there. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July
22–26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, pages 508–514. AAAI Press.
[Truszczyn´ski and Woltran, 2008] Truszczyn´ski, M. and Woltran, S. (2008). Hyperequivalence of logic
programs with respect to supported models. In Fox, D. and Gomes, C. P., editors, Proceedings of
the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2008, Chicago, Illinois, USA, July
13–17, 2008, pages 560–565. AAAI Press.
[Turner, 1996] Turner, H. (1996). Splitting a default theory. In Clancey, W. J. and Weld, D. S., editors,
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference,
pages 645–651. AAAI Press / The MIT Press.
[Turner, 2001a] Turner, H. (2001a). Strong equivalence for logic programs and default theories (made
easy). In Eiter, T., Faber, W., and Truszczyn´ski, M., editors, Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic
Reasoning, 6th International Conference, LPNMR 2001, Vienna, Austria, September 17-19, 2001,
Proceedings, volume 2173 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 81–92. Springer.
[Turner, 2001b] Turner, H. (2001b). Strong equivalence for logic programs and default theories (made
easy). In LPNMR, pages 81–92.
[Turner, 2004] Turner, H. (2004). Strong equivalence for causal theories. In Logic Programming and
Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 7th International Conference, LPNMR 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA,
January 6-8, 2004, Proceedings, pages 289–301.
[van Emden and Kowalski, 1976] van Emden, M. H. and Kowalski, R. A. (1976). The Semantics of
Predicate Logic as a Programming Language. Journal of the ACM, 23(4):733–742.
[Verheij, 1996] Verheij, B. (1996). Two approaches to dialectical argumentation: Admissible sets and
argumentation stages. In Proceedings of the biannual International Conference on Formal and Applied
Practical Reasoning (FAPR), pages 357–368. Universiteit.
[Verheij, 2003] Verheij, B. (2003). Deflog: On the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assump-
tions. Journal of Logic and Computation, 13(3):319–346.
[Weydert, 2011] Weydert, E. (2011). Semi-stable extensions for infinite frameworks. In Benelux Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 336–343.
[Williams and Antoniou, 1998] Williams, M. and Antoniou, G. (1998). A strategy for revising default
theory Extensions. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the
Sixth International Conference, KR 1998, Trento, Italy, June 2-5, 1998., pages 24–35.
[Woltran, 2008] Woltran, S. (2008). A common view on strong, uniform, and other notions of equival-
ence in answer-set programming. TPLP, 8(2):217–234.
[Wu et al., 2009] Wu, Y., Caminada, M., and Gabbay, D. M. (2009). Complete Extensions in Argument-
ation Coincide with 3-Valued Stable Models in Logic Programming. Studia Logica, 93(2–3):383–403.
137
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Yang and Wooldridge, 2015] Yang, Q. and Wooldridge, M., editors (2015). Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina,
July 25-31, 2015. AAAI Press.
[Zorn, 1935] Zorn, M. (1935). A remark on method in transfinite algebra. Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society, 41:667–670.
138
